Essays on bargaining and repeated games by Wolitzky, Alexander
Essays on Bargaining and Repeated Games
by
Alexander G. Wolitzky
A.B. Economics and Mathematics, Harvard University, 2007
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ECONOMICS
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
ARCHIVES
JUNE 2011
©2011 Alexander G. Wolitzky. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or
hereafter created.
Signature of Author:
Department of Economics
May 16, 2011
Certified by:
Gregory K. Palm Professor
Glenn Ellison
of Economics, Thesis Supervisor
Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics,
Daron Acemoglu
Thesis Supervisor
f
.. uhamet Yildiz
P> sor f conomics, Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by:
Esther Duflo
Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics
Chair, Department Committee on Graduate Studies
MASSACHUSETTS INSTlfTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUN 10 2011
LIBRARIES
Essays on Bargaining and Repeated Games
by
Alexander G. Wolitzky
Submitted to the Department of Economics on May 13, 2011 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
ABSTRACT
The thesis consists of four essays on bargaining and repeated games.
The first essay studies whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing
future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. Given any prior
over behavioral types, a modified prior is constructed with the same total weight on behavioral
types and a larger support under which almost all efficient, feasible, and individually rational
payoffs are attainable in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, whether reputation effects emerge
in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over behavioral
types other than its support.
The second essay studies reputational bargaining under the assumption of first-order
knowledge of rationality. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself is
determined, as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this
much. It is shown that this maxmin share of the surplus is large relative to the player's initial
reputation, and that the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus
compensation for any delay in reaching agreement.
The third essay studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in
sequential equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring. The foundational result is
that the maximum level of cooperation can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. Comparative
statics on the maximum level of cooperation are shown to be highly tractable. For the case of
fixed monitoring networks, a new notion of network centrality is introduced, which characterizes
which players have greater capacities for cooperation and which networks can support more
cooperation.
The fourth essay studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period
has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. Optimal equilibrium pricing
and profits are characterized. For durable goods, a lower bound on optimal profit for any
discount factor is provided. The bound converges to the optimal static monopoly profit as the
discount factor converges to one, in contrast to the Coase conjecture.
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1 Indeterminacy of Reputation Effects in Repeated Games
with Contracts
1.1 Introduction
Does game theory make strong predictions about the outcomes of long-run relationships? It
has been known since the seminal papers of Kreps et al (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982),
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) that reputation effects have important consequences for
equilibrium selection in many dynamic games. Fudenberg and Levine (1989) famously
showed that a patient long-run player facing a series of short-run opponents receives at least
her Stackelberg payoff in any Nash equilibrium, if her "Stackelberg type" has positive prior
probability, and similar results hold in two-player repeated games in the limit where one
player becomes infinitely more patient than the other.1 However, reputation effects are
elusive in two-player games with comparably patient players: 2 indeed, it is not obvious what
outcome one would expect reputation effects to select in such games. For this reason, the
reputation result of Abreu and Pearce (2007, henceforth AP) is striking: AP show that, in
two-player repeated games with common discounting in which players may offer each other
binding commitments to future divisions of the surplus, all perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) payoffs converge to the Nash bargaining with threats payoffs as the probability of
behavioral types converges to zero, so long as the "Nash bargaining with threats type"
has positive prior probability and different commitment types are distinguishable from each
other from the start of the game. Thus, AP's results suggest that allowing players to sign
binding contracts in repeated games-which seems very plausible in many applications, such
as employer-employee and union-firm relationships-leads to extremely strong equilibrium
'Schmidt (1993) and Cripps et al (1996) provide weaker payoff bounds than do Fudenberg and Levine
(1989). Stronger results hold with trembles (Aoyagi (1996)), imperfect monitoring (Celentani et al (1996)),
or complicated commitment types (Evans and Thomas (1997)).
2See Chan (2000) for a folk theorem and Chan (2000) and Cripps et al (2005) for uniqueness results
in special games. Aumann and Sorin (1989) derive a uniqueness result for common interest games under
additional assumptions. Recently, Atakan and Ekmekci (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) provide additional uniqueness
results for a broad class of extensive-form games with perfect information and for a broad class of one-sided
reputation-building games with imperfect monitoring of the non-reputation-builder. On reputation effects
(or lack thereof) in bargaining, see Myerson (1991), Abreu and Gul (2000), Kambe (1999), Compte and
Jehiel (2002), Lee and Liu (2010), and the second essay in this thesis.
selection results in the presence of an arbitrarily small amount of incomplete information.
The current paper investigates whether this intuition is correct, or whether the ability to
make such strong predictions about long-run relationships requires additional assumptions
about the nature of the incomplete information in the model.
Formally, I extend AP's model by allowing that different commitment types may not
be immediately distinguishable, and show that whether or not reputation effects emerge
depends on the relative probabilities of different behavioral types, rather than on only the
support of the prior distribution over behavioral types.' In particular, given any prior over
behavioral types, I construct a modified prior with a larger support under which almost all
efficient, feasible, and individual rational payoffs are perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs
(Theorem 1). Furthermore, the weight on any behavioral type under the original prior is
at most K times its weight under the modified prior, where K is a constant that does not
depend on the original prior and is non-decreasing in the discount rate; thus, there is a
uniform bound on the extent to which any original prior must be modified to yield a new
prior for which a folk theorem holds. Therefore, if the only assumption that a researcher
is willing to make about the prior distribution of behavioral types is that some types have
positive prior probability, she cannot rule out any efficient, feasible, individually rational
payoffs. This stands in stark contrast with the case of one long-run player facing a series
of short-run players (Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992)), where assumptions of this form
lead to strong conclusions about equilibrium payoffs.
The essential intuition for the result is that, when different behavioral types are initially
indistinguishable, imitating a "tough" behavioral type may not be profitable for a normal
player (i, say), because doing so may lead her opponent (j) to believe that she is a "soft"
behavioral type, at least for a long time. This is the key difference between my model and
AP's, in which if player i imitates a tough behavioral type, player j believes that player i
is either tough or normal, since in AP's model different behavioral types are immediately
distinguishable. In particular, in my model there may be soft types of player i that play like
tough types with some probability, but also concede to player j with high enough probability
"I do, however, assume that normal types have the ability to distinguish themselves from behavioral
types. The role of this assumption is discussed in Section 1.4.
that player j will keep playing against an apparently tough type in the hope that it will turn
out to be a soft type. As long as soft types continue to concede on the equilibrium path,
player j will eventually become convinced that she is facing a tough type and concede. But
if the prior probability of soft types is high enough relative to the prior probability of tough
types, this will take long enough that player i will not be tempted to imitate a tough type.
Note that these soft types reward one's opponent for failing to concede in much the
same way as Evans and Thomas' (1997, 2001) commitment types punish one's opponent for
failing to play a prescribed action. The reason why allowing complicated commitment types
leads to multiplicity in my model and uniqueness in Evans and Thomas' is the difference in
patience: with equal patience, the fact that player j thinks that player i may be a complicated
commitment type may limit player i's ability to manipulate player j's beliefs quickly enough
for her to benefit from doing so, while if player i is infinitely more patient than player j
she can only benefit from player j's attributing to her a wide range of possible commitment
types. This line of argument shows why a player cannot guarantee herself a high payoff
in my model even if she is the only reputation-builder (i.e., if her opponent is known to be
normal), despite her potentially useful ability to offer binding contracts. It also provides an
intuition for why existing reputation results with equal patience rely on strong restrictions
on the prior distribution over commitment types, even in the limited class of games for which
such results apply,4 while reputation results for games in which one player is infinitely more
patient than the other do not require such restrictions. 5
Finally, there is an interesting connection-suggested to me by an anonymous referee-
between my results and the failure of reputation effects in some repeated games with a patient
reputation-builder and a relatively impatient long-run opponent. Reputation effects may fail
to obtain in that setting because the normal reputation-builder may punish her opponent for
'Chan's (2000) uniqueness result depends on there being only one commitment type; Cripps et al (2005)
obtain uniqueness only in the limit as the weight on commitment types other than the Stackelberg type
converges to zero; Atakan and Ekinekci (2009a) assume that non-Stackelberg types distinguish themselves
from the Stackleberg type at a uniform rate; Atakan and Ekmekci (2009b) assume that there is only one
commitment type; Atakan and Ekmekci (2009c) assume that all commitments types are finite-automata,
which in their model is a similar restriction to that in Atakan and Ekmekci (2009a); and Aumann and Sorin
(1989) assume that every commitment type that follows a pure strategy with finite memory has positive
probability, but that no other commitment types have positive probability.
'For example, none of the papers cited in Footnote 1 relies on upper bounds on the prior probability of
any type.
best-responding to her Stackelberg action (see chapter 16 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006)
for an informative discussion of this point). However, the reputation-builder can circumvent
this problem when she is allowed to offer binding contracts, as in AP, which makes AP's
uniqueness result possible.6 Introducing additional behavioral types, as in my model, can
restore the opponent's incentive to fail to best-respond to the reputation builder's action,
leading to the failure of reputation effects.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the model, which
is very similar to AP's model, with the modification that distinct behavioral types are not
immediately distinguishable from each other. Section 1.3 presents the main idea of the
paper in the context of a simple example: the prisoner's dilemma with a single behavioral
type on each side. It serves to build intuition and to contrast, my results with AP's. Section
1.4 presents the main result, Theorem 1. Section 1.5 offers brief concluding remarks.
1.2 Model
I begin with the hybrid discrete-time/continuous-time model developed by AP. There are
two players. At each integer time n = 0, 1, 2,. . ., players choose actions in a finite stage
game G = (Si, Ui)> and also make demands ("contracts," "offers") ui E TIH, where LIi is the
convex hull of the set of player i's feasible payoffs in G, and ui is interpreted as the lowest
payoff that player i is willing to accept in the continuation game. Actions determine flow
payoffs until the next integer time, assuming neither player accepts the other's contract offer.
That is, if players use actions (s1, S2), player i's period payoff is Ui (si, 82) fI e rtdt, where r
is the common discount rate. Assume also, as in AP, that players can select mixed actions
(mi, m) at integer times, in which case mixing occurs continuously throughout the period,
so it is as if mixed actions are observable; let Mi be the set of player i's mixed actions.
At any time (not just integer times), either player j (= -i) can accept the other player's
standing offer ui ("concede"), in which case the players receive (i, p (ui)), where 4j (a) is
"Indeed, the ability to offer binding contracts makes reputation-building easier in many settings, which
provides another motivation for our indeterminacy result. Games with a patient reputation-builder facing a
relatively impatient opponent is one example. Another is common-interest games with two equally patient
players (Cripps and Thomas, 1997), where it is again easy to see that allowing binding contracts leads to
reputation effects.
the highest feasible payoff for j consistent with i getting ui, and the game ends (each player
only has one standing offer at a time-these may change on the integers). As in AP, there
is a first and last date at which player j can accept each offer of player 's (i.e., "just after
n" and "just before n + 1"), and the players move sequentially in an arbitrary, pre-specified
order at each integer time n; see AP for more details of this formulation of time. I assume
that the function #b is strictly decreasing, which rules out common-interest games, and use
31 and #i interchangeably. The game ends immediately if the standing offers ever satisfy
(Ia, u2 ) G H, in which case both players get their demands. Thus, the game can be thought
of as a "repeated game with contracts" or as "bargaining with payoffs as you go." At time
t, the (disagreement) history ht of mixed actions (mi , m2 ) and demands (ui, u) is publicly
observed.
At the beginning of the game, there is a chance that each player is one of a number of
behavioral types, which are simply repeated game strategies (i.e., arbitrary automata that
may condition their player on the entire history ht). Player i is of behavioral type ye (i.e.,
is committed to strategy y) with prior probability wi (-y), and 7i is assumed have countable
support; since I do not assume that 7ri (71) is positive for any -y, this formulation allows for
both one-sided and two-sided reputation-formation. 7  I assume that each 7y plays a pure
strategy over (Hi, Mi) but may mix over accepting or rejecting j's offer. This restriction is
made to simplify notation, and is without significant loss of generality, since a mixed strategy
over (Hi, Mi) can be approximated by a lottery over countably many pure strategies over
(H1, Ml); in addition, an element of Mi is already a lottery over Si, so the only restriction
here is that behavioral types do not mix over uncountably many elements of Hi.' Players'
types are drawn independently. Let zi be the probability that i is one of the behavioral
types, i.e., z, = EyG)supp ri . Let (G, -) describe the stage game together with the
'In AP, ri (^yi) is the probability of player 's being of type -y conditional on being a behavioral type.
We let 7i (-y,) be the unconditional probability of player i's being of type -y;.
'One difference between the model and AP is that AP do not allow behavioral types to play mixed
strategies or concede at non-integer times. The assumption that behavioral types can mix and concede
at non-integer times is not crucial, as each type I consider that mixes and concedes at non-integer times
can be replaced by a set of types, each one of which concedes with probability 1 at a different integer time
without substantially affecting the results. Furthermore, AP's results do not rely on their assumption that
behavioral types do not mix or concede at non-integer times. Thus, this difference in assumptions-which
substantially simplifies our exposition-does not drive the difference in results between the current paper
and AP.
common prior over behavioral types.
AP assume that, before play over (HI, M) begins, there is an initial "announcement" stage,
where each player simultaneously announces a behavioral type '}i. AP assume that behavioral
types (but not normal types) announce their types truthfully; this is why behavioral types are
instantly distinguishable from each other in their model. I dispense with the announcement
stage almost entirely: I assume only that there is an initial "revelation" stage, in which each
normal player has the option to "reveal rationality", i.e., to costlessly and certifiably reveal
to the other player that she is normal. Formally, I assume that before players choose their
initial (II, M), they publicly announce an element of the set {0, 1}, and that all behavioral
types announce 0; I refer to announcing 1 as "revealing rationality". I also assume that
behavioral types do not condition their play on whether their opponents reveal rationality."1 I(
Unlike the announcement stage of AP, the revelation stage is included in my model
essentially for convenience, and indeterminacy of reputation effects persists without the
revelation stage; see the discussion preceding the proof of Theorem 1 for a discussion of
the role of the revelation stage in the model. In addition, the analysis goes through if
behavioral types also have the ability to certifiably reveal their types, because a normal type
cannot mimic a behavioral type that certifiably reveals itself. Hence, the revelation stage
can also be given a positive justification if players can exhibit hard information that reveals
their types. For example, an incumbent firm may be able to publicly exhibit its production
costs by letting potential entrants tour its factories and look at its financial records, and an
employee may be able to publicly exhibit her outside option by producing job offers from
rival employers. Thus, even with the revelation stage, the analysis does not rely on normal
and behavioral players having different abilities to reveal their types (as it is as if every
player can either reveal her true type or reveal "nothing"), in contrast to the analysis of AP
(as in their model behavioral players are forced to reveal their true types but normal players
'The assumption that normal players may "reveal rationality" to each other is also present., roughly
speaking, in AP. Technically, AP require normal players to announce a behavioral type., rather than allowing
them to announce that they are normal, but they show in their Footnote 17 that this assumption is immaterial
in their model. More substantively, AP also assume that behavioral types do not condition their play on
announcements.
" One can check that Theorem 1 continues to hold if behavioral types can condition their play on whether
their opponents reveal rationality, provided that the prior probability that each player is behavioral is
sufficiently small (proof available upon request).
are not).
1.3 Example
In this section, I illustrate the main idea of the paper in the context of a simple example.
Let G be the prisoner's dilemma:
C D
C 1,1 -1,3
D 3, -1 0,0
I first consider this stage game with a single behavioral type (the Nash bargaining with
threats type, analyzed by AP) on each side, and note that a uniqueness result applies as in
AP. I then add an additional "soft" behavioral type on each side and show that, for suitably
chosen priors, almost all efficient, feasible, and individually rational payoffs can be attained
in PBE. The argument for this fact contains many of the ideas of the proof of the main
result (Theorem 1) in a much simpler context.
First, consider the case where each player is normal with probability 1 - z, and with
probability z is the behavioral type that in every period plays D and demands 1, and never
accepts an offer of less than 1. Call this behavioral type y; note that -y is the Nash bargaining
with threats type. AP show that, when z is small, a normal player's expected payoff in
any PBE is close to her Nash bargaining with threats payoff. In this simple example, an
even stronger result applies: for any z > 0, both normal players receive payoff 1 in any
PBE. This follows from an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 1 of AP, which I sketch
here. Suppose there exists a PBE in which normal player i's payoff is less than 1. Then
she must receive payoff less than 1 from imitating -y, i.e., from not revealing rationality and
then playing D and demanding 1 in every period. Player i receives 1 from this strategy
when player j is of type -y, so she must receive less than 1 from this strategy when player j
is normal. However, if player i imitates -y, there exists some finite time T such that normal
player j accepts her demand with probability 1 by T." Let To be the infimum over all T
" This follows by a fairly standard reputation-building argument. For the details, see the proof of Lemma
1 of AP.
such that this is the case, and suppose towards a contradiction that To > 0. Then there
exists E > 0 such that player j's offer at To - E, #i (uj), is less than 1 (as otherwise the
two demands would be compatible and the game would have ended), and e-" (1) > #i (U ).
Therefore, upon reaching time To - E player i will not concede until after time To (as this
yields payoff at least e-" (1), whereas conceding yields payoff di (uj)). This implies that
normal player j must concede at time To - E, contradicting the hypothesis that To > 0.
Hence, player i's offer of 1 must be accepted with probability 1 by normal player j at time
0, which implies that player i can guarantee herself a payoff of 1 in any PBE by imitating
7. And, of course, the same argument applies to player j.
Next, suppose that each player is still normal with probability 1 - z, but is now of type y
with probability z (k) for some K > 1, and with probability z (K-) is of type i, defined as
follows: plays D and demands 1 in every period, but also accepts any non-negative offer at
time t at hazard rate r/x (t), where X (t) is the probability that player i is of type ' at time
t conditional on her being behavioral (i.e., of type ) or f) and having played D, demanded
1, and not conceded until time t. That is,
rt 1
x (t) e
for all t such that this is nonnegative. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where x (t) is the ratio
(at time t) of the distance from the curve e- (which is the probability that player i does
not concede before time t conditional on her being behavioral) to the dotted line at I toK
the distance from the curve to the x-axis. ' always rejects negative offers, and also rejects
any offer at any time t such that e-t < . I claim that, for any u* E (L, 2 - f), there is
now a PBE in which player i receives payoff u* when both players are normal.
To see this, consider the following strategy profile: Normal player j reveals rationality.
If player i reveals rationality, player j plays D and demands 4j (u*) in every period, and
accepts player i's demand if and only if #b (ui) > # (u). If player i does not reveal
rationality, player j plays D and demands 2 in every period up to time 1 log K, and never
accepts an offer of less than 2 until time 1 log K. At time 1 log K, player j continues playing
D and demanding 2 in every period, but switches to accepting player i's demand if and only
probability
mass
typey
1/K
rt
type y
time T
Figure 1: Evolution of Beliefs Conditional on Facing a Behavioral Opponent
if 0, (u,) > 1. To complete the description of on-path play, I specify that normal player
i's strategy is identical to player j's, except that in the subgame after both players reveal
rationality player i demands u and accepts player j's demand if and only if #i (uj) ;> u.
Without going into the details, I specify that off-path behavior is as in the proof of Theorem
1, arid assert that this behavior is sequentially rational. Thus, to check that this strategy
profile is a PBE, one must only check that there are no profitable one-shot deviations at
on-path histories.
Clearly, both players' play is optimal after both players reveal rationality. It remains
only to check that their play is optimal (at on-path histories) after one's opponent fails to
reveal rationality, and that it is optimal to reveal rationality initially. I first verify that
player j's play is optimal after player i does not reveal rationality (the argument for player i
is symmetric). If player i does not reveal rationality, then she must be one of the behavioral
types, which implies that it is optimal for player j to play D in every period. Also, since
player j always has the option of accepting her opponent's offer of 1, and only type ~y ever
accepts a demand of more than 1, player j can do no worse than always demanding 2, the
highest demand that offers player i a non-negative payoff. Furthermore, note that if player
j's assessment that player i is of type ~7 is x (t) > 0, then player j expects player i to accept
her demand of 2 at rate 'X (t) = r. Therefore, for any - such that X (T) > 0, player j's
expected payoff from rejecting player i's offer until time T and then accepting is
T f e-(+r) (r (2) + 0) dt + e-(+r
0
which is the same as player j's payoff from accepting player i's offer immediately. Therefore,
player j's decision to reject player i's offer whenever X (t) > 0 is (weakly) optimal. Next,
observe that X (t) reaches 0 at time T satisfying
e-rT -
K'
or
1
T- -log K.
At this time, player j becomes certain that player i is of type '), and therefore must accept
player i's offer of 1. Thus, player j's continuation strategy is optimal after player i does not
reveal rationality.
Finally, one must verify that revealing rationality is optimal for both players. Consider
player i first. If player j is behavioral, then player i's payoff is not affected by whether or
not she reveals rationality, so it is optimal for her to reveal rationality if and only if it is
optimal for her to do so conditional on the event that player j is normal. If player j is
normal and player i reveals rationality, player i receives payoff u*. If player j is normal
and player i does not reveal rationality, player i can never receive a positive flow payoff and
cannot accept a positive offer <h (uj) or have a positive demand of her own accepted until
time T. Furthermore, the highest offer she ever receives is 1, and the highest demand of
hers that player j ever accepts is also 1. Therefore, in the event that player j is normal,
player i's payoff in the subgamne after she does not reveal rationality is no more than
eT (1) = I.K
Since u* > ,it follows that player i's decision to reveal rationality is optimal. Finally, the
same argument applies to player j, and the fact that u* < 2 - k implies that #, (u*) >
so player J's decision to reveal rationality is optimal as well. This completes the argument
that each player can receive any payoff in (1, 2 - 1) when her opponent is normal in some
PBE.
I make four brief remarks to conclude the analysis of this example: First, the fact that
each player can receive any payoff in ( 2 - when her opponent is normal in a PBE
implies that she can receive any ex ante expected payoff in this range when the probability
that her opponent is behavioral (z) is sufficiently small. Second, taking K large yields a
single prior distribution over behavioral types under which almost any efficient, feasible, and
individually rational payoff vector is attainable in PBE; that is, there is no need to tailor the
prior distribution to the target payoff vector. Third, the above argument does not require
type 's concession rate to be exactly r/X (t); all that is needed is that type - concedes at
least this quickly.' 2 Fourth, the smallest K required for a given payoff vector to be attainable
in PBE with the above prior is independent of the discount rate, r. All but the last of these
observations also apply to the general model, as will become clear in the following section.
Furthermore, the constant K used in the construction of the modified prior in the general
analysis is non-decreasing in r, so K remains bounded as the players become more patient.
1.4 Indeterminacy of Reputation Effects
This section contains the formal statement and proof of the main result. The analysis
is complicated by the possibility that players may imitate behavioral types with arbitrary
repeated game strategies, rather than only the stationary type considered in the above
example. However, the idea that a player will not imitate a given behavioral type if there is
a high prior probability on a particular "soft" type whose play initially resembles that type
carries over from the example.
Let u* be i's (mixed action) minmax payoff, let i # (uj), and let i and ti be i's lowest
and highest feasible payoffs, respectively. Let mi be a mixed action of i's that minmaxes j.
"2 However, if type i concedes faster than this, then K must be larger to support the same range of target
payoffs in PBE.
Say that u is a "PBE payoff of (G, 7r) when both players are normal" if there is a PBE of
(G, 7) that yields expected payoff a conditional on both players' being normal. Of course,
if zi and z2 are small, then u is a PBE payoff of (G, r) when both players are normal if and
only if u is close to an ex ante expected PBE payoff of the normal players in (G, 7r) (since G
is finite), but one need not assume that zi and z2 are small. Write u > (>) i' if ni > (>) i'
for i E {1,2}.
The main result is the following:
Theorem 1 For any finite game G, vector ii > u, and number F > 0, there exists a number
K > 1 such that, for every prior -r, there exists a modified prior q' with the following three
properties:
1. z = zi for i E {1, 2}.
2. 7r (y) > ±ru (-}i) for all 7i E supp 7ri and i E {1, 2}.
3. For any discount rate r E (0, f), the set of PBE payoffs of (G, 7r') when both players
are normal contains any efficient u* C T I such that u* > n.
Theorem 1 says that there exists a single modified prior for which the PBE set contains
almost any efficient, feasible, and individually rational payoff, for any discount rate below
an arbitrary fixed number (in particular, the constant - is chosen freely, and need not be
"small"). Also, the extent to which the original prior must be modified to yield such a
new prior, measured by K, does not depend on the original prior, r, but only on G, Fi, and
F. Finally, Theorem 1 does not show that the uniqueness result of AP is sensitive to the
addition of a "small" mass of behavioral types that initially pool with another behavioral
type. Rather, it shows that their result is sensitive to the addition of a "large" mass of such
types, where "largeness" is determined only by G and Ft.
A noteworthy consequence of Theorem 1 is the existence of a bound on the extent to
which the original prior must be modified (K) that is uniform over discount rates below F;
in particular, this bound does not explode as the discount rate goes to zero. This contrasts
with the results of Fudenberg and Levine (1989), which imply that the prior probability of
the Stackelberg type must converge to zero if payoff multiplicity is to persist as r goes to
zero." The key difference is the presence of equal discounting in my model. In particular,
the rate at which player i must be conceding to player j for player j to be willing to reject
her demand scales with r. This implies that the time T required for player i to convince
player j that she is a "tough" type scales with 1/r. Hence, the resulting cost of delay to
player i, e -rT, is independent of r. This argument is exactly as in the example of Section
1.3."1 Indeed, K only depends on the discount rate at all in Theorem 1 due to a technical
issue resulting from the hybrid discrete-time/continuous-time nature of the model.' 5
I now outline the proof of Theorem 1. The first step is constructing the modified prior
r' for given -r, G, ft, and F. The goal is constructing a "soft" (henceforth, "offsetting")
type ~i for every -yi - supp rri such that ji has the following properties: On-path, i follows
the same strategy over (Ili, Mi) as }y does for a long time; ~i concedes to player j quickly
enough that player j does not accept any offer less than #j (fii) when she is not confident
whether she is facing type 'yi or type i, but slowly enough that it takes a long time for
player j to learn whether she is facing type yi or type ~ys; and 1i induces player j to play
either (ni, m) or some other "tough" action for a long time. These "tough" actions of
player j that are induced by type i are called admissible in the proof of Theorem 1. The
point of this construction is that, if player j assigns sufficient weight to his facing type i,
then player j will play an admissible action and reject all offers of less than #j (6i) until
some distant time Ti.1' Therefore, if normal player i receives at least ai, in some strategy
profile and T is sufficiently large, then she does not want to pretend to be of type -Y, since
"It is easy to see that Fudenberg and Levine's results continue to apply if contracts are allowed, as a patient
long-run player could simply imitate the Stackelberg type who rejects all contract offers and demands her
highest feasible payoff every period. This relates to the observation in Footnote 6 that allowing contracts
often makes reputation results easier to obtain.
"In contrast, if in the current model player i were made much more patient than player j, she could
guarantee herself nearly i in any PBE by making a demand close to iii and playing mi every period, as
long as the behavioral type that follows this strategy is present with positive probability.
"'The issue is that, if player j acts second at an integer time t, it is impossible to punish player j
for deviating from his prescribed action until time t + 1. This friction is larger when r is larger, which
necessitates a larger K in the construction in the proof of Theorem 1. This friction would be entirely
absent if the continuous-time model were replaced by the limit of discrete-time models as actions become
frequent, which is why the fact that K depends on T may be viewed as an artifact of the hybrid discrete
time/continuous time nature of the model.
"An exception to this is that player j may play an inadmissible action in response to an offer by player i
of at least @. (u6). However, it can be shown that player i also receives a low payoff in this case, essentially
because either player j accepts her generous offer or she accepts a correspondingly aggressive demand of
player j's.
she is guaranteed to receive a low flow payoff until time T. Finally, the modified prior 7T' is
defined so that player j's beliefs after player i fails to reveal rationality are that, whichever
strategy 7y E supp 7i player i follows, player i is initially very likely to be an offsetting type.
The second step is verifying that it is indeed optimal for player j to play an admissible
action and reject any offer less than #5 (6j) until time T. This might at first appear to be
difficult, because it is very difficult to determine player j's entire optimal strategy under
prior 7'. However, to show that it is optimal for player j to play an admissible action and
reject any offers less than #j (iii) at some history h', it suffices to exhibit a single continuation
strategy of player j's that involves playing an admissible action and rejecting any offer less
than 5 (64) and yields a higher payoff than any continuation strategy that involves playing
any inadmissible action or accepting an offer less than #j (6j). And, if type §i concedes at
a high enough rate until time T, then it can be verified that playing the best admissible
action in the current period, then playing (Qij,rm) and rejecting player i's offer until time
T, and finally accepting player i's offer just after time T yields a higher payoff for player j
than does any continuation strategy involving playing any inadmissible action or accepting
an offer less than 5 (i) at history h'.
Finally, I construct a PBE in which normal players attain the target payoffs (u*, u*).
In this PBE, when both players reveal rationality, they then demand their target payoffs,
ending the game immediately with the target payoffs. If player i deviates by failing to reveal
rationality, then, as we have seen, she faces only admissible actions until time Ti and her
offer is rejected unless she demands less than ai (with the exception described in Footnote
16), so, regardless of her continuation strategy, she receives a payoff below her target payoff.
Hence, both players reveal rationality. The specification of off-path play supporting this
behavior is somewhat complicated, and builds on a construction in AP.
The role of the assumption that normal players can "reveal rationality" to each other
is as follows: Suppose that, at the beginning of the game, normal player i is supposed to
demand u* and normal player j is supposed to demand #j (uQ), ending the game. If some
behavioral player j offers player i more than u*, player i is tempted to demand more than
u in the hope that player j is of this type. If player j turns out to make the normal
demand 5 (uf), player i can simply accept this offer an instant after it is made and thus
go unpunished for her experimentation. Allowing normal players to reveal rationality to
each other before the beginning of play eliminates this problem, since, if player j reveals
rationality, normal player i has no reason to experiment with higher initial demands. Since
this is the only point in the proof where the ability of normal players to reveal rationality
matters, any modification of the game that prevents normal player i from experimenting
in this way allows us to eliminate the revelation stage." The revelation stage can also be
eliminated without such a modification if zi, z2, and r are sufficiently small. The idea is that
the strategy profile constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 can be modified by prescribing
that normal player 1 initially demands fil and normal player 2 initially demands #2 (UT),
player 1 immediately accepts player 2's demand if it equals #2 (u*), and the first player who
deviates receives her minmax payoff if agreement is not reached by time 1. Under this
strategy profile, neither player has an incentive to experiment in the above manner, because
player 1 is already demanding her highest feasible payoff, and, when z1 is small, player 2
receives less than her minmax payoff if she deviates and then accepts when player 1 demands
i1. The requirement that r is also small is needed to ensure that a player is willing to wait
and receive her highest feasible and individually rational at the next integer time when her
opponent deviates. The details of this construction are available upon request.
Proof of Theorem 1. Step 1: Construction of T'
I begin by constructing, for any type 7y, an offsetting type j that at every instant either
follows the strategy of type 'y? or concedes. The motivation for the details of the specification
of , will become clear in Step 2 of the proof.
First, observe that the theorem is trivial if there is no vector u* E II such that u* > i,
so assume that such a vector exists. Since fL > u and 4j is decreasing, this implies that
j > dy (6j) > it,. Let
0O - tiiE
2
"For example. rather than allowing normal players to reveal rationality one could impose an E penalty on
both players for failing to come to agreement immediately, and assume that z1 and z2 are sufficiently small
that this penalty outweighs any incentive to experiment, i.e., that E (1 - z3 ) > (i- u) z for all i (proof
available upon request).
#5 (U ) -i nf 6 - #g (U 0) f,-eg(4
p = max - i Oj (fi)
ng - ~ -' 0, ( - e-9 ) # (uo) + e-T#g (6t2)), ' n - Us '
and let
1- pi
Observe that pi < 1, so K is finite. This number K will suffice for the proof.
Fix a discount rate r C (0, F). Let
Ai 0- Ni) - 2
and let
eAit
Xi (t) 1 - K
To understand the definition of y (t), suppose that initially player i plays strategy -y with
probability , and with probability K plays a different strategy that up to time t plays
the same (Tr, mi) as does -y and also accepts player j's offer at a hazard rate that makes the
unconditional hazard rate that player i accepts player j's offer equal A,. Then xj (t) is a
lower bound on the probability that player i is not playing strategy yj at time t conditional
on the event that she has not accepted player j's offer by time t (indeed, y (t) is exactly
this probability if and only if strategy 'yj never accepts player j's offer before time t).
Next, let T be the time at which Xi (t) reaches pi; that is,
1
Ti -log (K (1 - pi)).
Finally, let
Ai (t)
xi (t)
if Xi (t) > 0, and let A, (t) = 0 otherwise. If A, (t) is player i's acceptance rate conditional
on not playing -y, and Xi (t) is the probability that player i is not playing 'y, then Ai (t) is
player 's unconditional acceptance rate.
I now define admissible actions, as previewed in the outline of the proof:
Definition 1 At an integer time t at which player j acts first, the action (Uj, m) is ad-
missible and all other actions are inadmissible. At an integer time t at which player j acts
second, the action ( 1, mn) is admissible, as is the action (max {Kij, U (mi (t) , m)} , mj) for
any ny that satisfies m E arg mnax' Uj (mi (t) , m.) and U (mi (t) , mj) > #j (up), where
mi (t) is player i's realized time-t action; and all other actions are inadmissible. A history
ht is admissible if player j has never played an inadmissible action, and is inadmissible
otherwise.
We are ready to define type j:
Definition 2 Given any type j, the 'y-offsetting type, , is the strategy defined as follows:
If history ht is admissible, ~j plays the same (ui, mi) as does 31, and ~1j accepts player j's
demand at hazard rate A, (t); if in addition t = Ti, then j accepts player j's demand with
probability 1. If ht is inadmissible, j plays (nj, m) and rejects player j's demand.
Finally, I define the modified prior T'. In this definition, ~' is the y '-offsetting type
defined above.
Definition 3 The modified prior 7r' is given by r'- j) = r (Ki)+Z supp ri:~ =-y
for all types ').
Observe that z = zi and 7r' (,) > r() for all 7y C supp 7r. Thus, to prove the
theorem it suffices to show that the set of PBE payoffs of (G,7r') when both players are
normal contains any efficient u* E H such that u* > ft. This is done in Steps 2 and 3 of the
proof.
Step 2: Behavior under 7'
I now establish the key property of the modified prior 7r'. Under a strategy profile in
the game (G, r') in which normal players reveal rationality, player j's optimal continuation
strategy at any history ht that is consistent with player i following some strategy Yj E sipp 7r'
is determined up to indifference by sequential rationality. Say that an action of player j's
is (weakly) optimal at such a history if it is part of an optimal continuation strategy.
Lemma 1 Fix a strategy profile in the game (G, r') in which normal players reveal ratio-
nality. Suppose that history ht is admissible, player i's past play at ht is consistent with her
following some strategy -y' G supp 7r', and t < T. Then the following two statements hold at
ht :
1. Suppose that player i's demand is at least fj. Then it is optimal for player j to reject
player i's demand. If in addition t is an integer, then it is optimal for player j to play
an admissible action.
2. If t is an integer at which player j acts second and it is optimal for player j to reject
player i's demand and play an inadmissible action, then under any optimal continuation
strategy agreement is reached by time t + 1 and player j receives continuation payoff at
least #j (uO).
Proof of Lemma 1. First, suppose that player i's time-t demand is at least Li. I show
that rejecting player i's demand at time t is optimal by exhibiting a strategy that involves
rejected player i's demand at time t and yields a weakly higher payoff than accepting this
demand. In particular, suppose that player j plays (mi, mj) from the next integer time
onward and rejects player i's demand until just after time T, and then accepts player i's
demand. When player j follows this strategy, player i concedes at unconditional rate at
least Ai at all times earlier than T (since at such times there is probability at least Vi (t)
that she is conceding at rate Ai (t), as player j is always playing an admissible action), and
concedes at time T with unconditional probability at least
Xi (T) = Pi ;> 3_
af 
- h at
Therefore, player J's continuation payoff from this strategy is at least
e- (rAiA)t (Ai- + rlij) dt + e (r+Ai)(Ti- t) (~(u?) - Ow ( +3 Uj u j ('tt)
-(1 _-(r+Ai)(T-t)) (A,\iu + r~jj) +j e (r+Ai)(T-O t) (a)
(I - e(r-\i)(Ti-t)) Oj (a?) + e-(r±)i)(T -t)Oi (u0)
On the other hand, player j's continuation payoff from accepting player i's demand at time
t is at most #j (iii). This is less than #j (u'), so it is optimal for player j to reject player i's
demand at time t.
Second, suppose that t is an integer at which player j acts first. Player j's continuation
payoff from rejecting player i's demand and playing any action other than (inj, m±y) (the
unique admissible action) is at most
Xi (t) u + (1 - xy (t)) nt,
because if player i is of type ~yi (which is the case with probability at least Xi (t)) she
immediately minmaxes player j. Since Xi (t) is decreasing and t < T, this is less than
Xi (T) 1ki + (1 - Xi (TM) ntg
ping + (1 - p) ng
nf - #g (6i) 0 (ii) - ut l
< (u + (ny).
As we have seen, #b (n ) is a lower bound on player i's continuation from rejecting player i's
demand and following (at least) one strategy that involves playing (Q,, im). Therefore, if
player i's tinie-t demand is at least <i, then it is optimal for player j to reject this demand
and play (n1 , mj).
Third, suppose that t is an integer at which player j acts second. Let U maxm; U (mi (t) , m.)
and let mr E arg maxm; Uj (mi (t) , m.). Then playing (max {i, Uj*} ,m*) at time t and
subsequently playing (R.-, mj) and rejecting player i's demand until just after time T (and
then accepting) yields continuation payoff at least
(1s -loe bcasmax { Uj,6 y )j es (o ) .m (1)
This follows because, if Uj ;> #j (,u ), then player j receives flow payoff Ui* and demands Ui*
from time t to time t + 1; and we have already seen that player j's continuation payoff from
playing (Eii, mj) and rejecting player i's demand until time T is at least #5 (us). On the
other hand, playing any inadmissible action at time t yields continuation payoff at most
(1 - xi (t)) n~ + xi (t) ((1 - e") max {Uj, #j (ui)} + e-r# (ut))
where ui is player i's time-t demand, because type 'i responds to an inadmissible action by
always rejecting player j's demand and minmaxing player j starting at time t +1.
then (2) is at most
(1 - xi (t)) nti +jx (t) ((1 - e-) max {Uj, /j (ii)} + e-r#j (a))
and therefore the difference between (1) and (2) is at least
If ui > ti9,
(1 - xi (t)) (1
This expression is non-negative if and only if
(t - - 0 (U
-e) #j (a?) + e- (ni))
Since r < r, a sufficient condition for this inequality is
Now xi (t) > Xi (T) = pi > S ,) so this sufficient condition holds.
Hence, it is optimal for player j to play an admissible action at time t whenever player i's
demand is at least fti.
Finally, if player j plays an inadmissible action at time t, then just before time t + 1 his
continuation payoff from rejecting player i's demand is at most
Xi (t) 1ki + (1 - Xi (0)) ny,
e-') #j (UI) + e-r (0j (UO) yi (t) 0i (Ini)) - (1 - Xi (t)),ng .
Xi (t) >fi 65 - #i (NO)
-7) #i (n l) + e-r#g (ii))
because the probability that player i is of type ',i at this time is at least Xi (t), and type ~7i
minmaxes player j starting at time t + 1. Since Xi (t) < xi (T) < , this is no more
than
uj - kJ ~ (5t- (i)
Hence, if ut < i, then agreement is reached by time t + 1 under any optimal continuation
strategy. Finally, as we have seen, it is optimal for player j to play an admissible action at
time t if ui > i, and this yields continuation payoff at least #i (u?). Therefore, at time t
it is optimal for player j to reject player i's demand and play an inadmissible action only if,
under any optimal continuation strategy, agreement is reached by time t + 1 and he receives
continuation payoff at least #j (uO). *
Step 3: Equilibrium Construction
I now construct strategy profiles for the normal types in (G, 7') that yield the desired
range of PBE payoffs. The construction builds on that in Lemma 24 of AP. The next
paragraph specifies on-path play, and the three paragraphs after it specify off-path play.
Fix u* E [ iU, #i (6tj)]. Normal players reveal rationality. If both players reveal rationality,
normal player i initially plays (U , _mi) and normal player j initially plays (#j (u*), _mj). Thus,
if both players are normal and follow their equilibrium strategies, the game ends immediately
with payoffs (u, oj (u7)). If player i does not reveal rationality and at history ht her play is
consistent with some type '-y E supp 7r', then normal player j is certain that her opponent is
behavioral, and her on-path continuation play is pinned down up to indifference by sequential
rationality. At any history at which player j is certain that player i is behavioral and is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting player i's offer, specify that she rejects; and at
any history at which player j is certain that player i is behavioral and is indifferent between
playing ( mn) and playing any other action, specify that she plays (Qj, mj). Player j's
play at other histories at which he is certain that player i is behavioral and is indifferent
between any two actions is irrelevant and can therefore be specified arbitrarily.
Off-path play in the subgame after both players reveal rationality is as in Lemma 24
of AP. In particular, if player i deviates to an incompatible demand, then player i plays
(i, mr) and player j plays (Qi, R) at the next integer time, and in the interim player i
accepts player j's demand and player j rejects player i's demand. The same continuation
play follows any single-player deviation. Next, suppose that both players deviate from their
prescribed play (to incompatible demands) at integer time t. If player l's flow payoff given
the realized time-t actions is weakly less than player 2's offer to her, then she accepts player
2's demand, and player 2 rejects her demand. If this condition fails for player 1 but holds
for player 2, then player 2 accepts and player 1 rejects. If both players' flow payoffs are
strictly greater than their opponents' offers to them, then neither player accepts until the
next integer time, at which point continuation play is as at the beginning of the subgame
after both players reveal rationality, with un replaced by player i's flow payoff.
Next, consider the subgame after player j reveals rationality and player i does not.
Suppose that at time t player i's play becomes inconsistent with all types 7yi E supp 7r (i.e.,
at time t player i either makes or rejects a demand that makes the history inconsistent with
all yi E supp 7r'). Then player i plays (ui, m,) and player j plays (11j, mj) at the next integer
time. In the interim, if player i's flow payoff given the realized time-t actions is weakly less
than player j's offer to her, then she accepts player j's demand, and player j rejects her
demand. If this condition fails for player i, then player j accepts player i's demand if and
only if this yields a higher payoff than receiving his flow payoff until the next integer time
and then receiving Qj. If both of these conditions fail, then neither player accepts until
just before the next integer time, at which point player i accepts player j's demand, if this
demand is no more than Eij. Continuation play following the next integer time is as at the
beginning of the subgame after both players reveal rationality, with u* replaced by ut. Now,
as long as player i's play is consistent with some type 7y E supp T', player j's play is pinned
down by sequential rationality and an arbitrary rule for breaking indifferences. Hence, the
above specification of play after player i deviates from any type 7i E supp 7r' determines
player i's entire optimal continuation strategy, again up to indifference.
Finally, consider the subgame after neither player reveals rationality. If at time I player
j's play becomes inconsistent with all types y' c supp 7F', then continuation strategies at the
resulting history ht are identical to continuation strategies at history h", defined to equal h'
with the modification that player j initially revealed rationality (which are specified in the
previous paragraph). That is, continuation play is "as if' player j had revealed rationality.
Similarly, if at time t both players' play simultaneously becomes inconsistent with all of
their types in supp 7r', then continuation play is specified to be the continuation play at the
corresponding history where both players have revealed rationality.
It is clear that each player's strategy is optimal at every history except the null history
before the players do or do not reveal rationality. Therefore, to check that the above
strategy profile is a PBE, it suffices to check that revealing rationality is optimal for both
players. This in turn requires only checking that revealing rationality is optimal for player
i conditional on player j's being normal, as revealing rationality has no effect on play if
player j is behavioral, by the assumption that behavioral types do not condition their play
oi whether their opponents reveal rationality.
Suppose that player j is normal and normal player i does not reveal rationality. At any
admissible history, if player i takes an action that is not consistent with any type 7y1 E supp 7r'i,
then her continuation payoff equals ui (by the above specification of off-path play). Thus,
suppose that player i's play remains consistent with some type 7Y; E supp 7' at all admissible
histories. By Lemma 1, continuation play prior to time T falls into one of two categories:
either player j always plays an admissible action and only accepts demands of no more than
ni; or, at some integer time t at which player j acts second, player j play an inadmissible
action and agreement is reached by the next integer time. I now show that in either case
player i's payoff is no more than u*, regardless of her strategy.
In the former case, the fact that u* > 6i2 > a1 implies that player i may receive a payoff
strictly above u* only if the game does not end before T. Since in this case player j plays
either _mj or some action n such that U (mi (t), mj) > @j (u') (and thus Uj (mi (t), mj) <
U ) at every time t < T, player i's payoff is at most
(1 - e-rTi ) UO + e-rTi.
Now
ur-u-
erT, (K (1- ) 
ti - U
Hence,
6 - L6 (f. - Uj)
In the latter case, recalling that agreement is reached before time t + 1 if player j plays
an inadmissible action at time t, leaving player j with payoff at least (o (uo), player i's
continuation payoff cannot be higher than the maximum of player i's time-t demand, denoted
ui, and the continuation payoff of type tj, denoted u7i (this is because player i's time-t action
mi is the same as the time-t action of types -yj and ij, because player j acts second at time
t). I claim that both of these values are weakly less than 6i (and thus weakly less than u*).
First, the fact that player j's continuation payoff is at least #j (uo) implies that
(1 - Xi (t)) nt + Xi (t) ((1 - e-r) 6§- + e rp (ui)) (Pi (us)
and therefore
er
#i (Ui) > j , (6~ u )) .Uxi (t)
Hence,
er
xi (T) (
< bc i.
Second, because player i cannot receive continuation payoff greater than <(u7') when
player i is of type §i,
(1-Xi (t)) ngj + Xi (t) #0iu ; #5 (i)
Hence,
U~xi (t)Oj(1i -fl 3 (UO)),
which implies that u' < i~ by the same argument as above.
We conclude that player i receives payoff weakly below 24 if she does not reveal rationality,
which implies that failing to reveal rationality is not a profitable deviation for player i.
The same argument applies to player j, because the fact that u* < #i (Qj) implies that
$j (u*) ;> 6ij. Therefore, the above strategy profile is a PBE. *
1.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play does
not lead to reputation effects in the absence of assumptions on the relative probabilities of
different behavioral types. This suggests that equilibrium selection due to reputation effects
is substantially weaker in games with two long-run players than in games with a single
long-run player, even in the presence of contracts, and that existing results do not provide
a completely convincing equilibrium selection argument for applications in which different
behavioral types may not be immediately distinguishable.
However, I reiterate that AP's uniqueness result is robust to introducing a small mass of
behavioral types that initially pool with other behavioral types; in particular, AP's result
continues to hold when behavioral types are not immediately distinguishable if the prior
probability of the Nash bargaining with threats is high enough relative to the prior probability
of "softer" types whose early play resembles that of the Nash bargaining with threats type.
This raises the intriguing question of where the boundary between AP's uniqueness result
and my multiplicity results lies. That is, for what prior distributions of behavioral types
do repeated games with contracts have unique equilibria, and for what priors does the folk
theorem apply? What happens in the transitional region between these regimes? Relatedly,
my arguments suggest that some behavioral types may be more profitably imitated for a wide
range of prior distributions than others; for example, a player must be very confident that
her opponent is really a soft type for her to keep playing when her opponent imitates a type
that gets "tougher" over time, as this behavior penalizes her for failing to concede. The
next essay in this thesis suggests that this approach may be tractable: there, I characterize
the behavioral type that is most profitably imitated in bargaining by a player who holds
"worst-case" beliefs about her opponent's prior belief about her own strategy, and show that
this type does indeed get "tougher" over time. I view these ideas as interesting directions
for future research.
2 Reputational Bargaining Under Knowledge of Ra-
tionality
2.1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in how individuals split gains from trade. The division
of surplus often determines not only equity, but also efficiency, as it affects individuals' ex
ante incentives to make investments; this effect of surplus division on efficiency is a major
theme of, for example, property rights theories of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986),
industrial organization models of cumulative innovation (Green and Scotchmer, 1995), and
search-and-matching models of the labor market (Hosios, 1990). Recently, "reputational"
models of bargaining have been developed that make sharp prediction about the division
of the surplus independently of many details of the bargaining procedure (Myerson, 1991;
Abreu and Gul, 2000; Kambe, 1999; Compte and Jehiel, 2002). In these models, players
may be committed to a range of possible bargaining strategies, or "postures," before the start
of bargaining, and bargaining consists of each player attempting to convince her opponent
that she is committed to a strong posture. These models assume that the probabilities
with which the players are committed to various bargaining postures (either ex ante or after
a stage where players strategically announce bargaining postures) are common knowledge,
and that play constitutes a (sequential) equilibrium. In this paper, I study reputational
bargaining while assuming only that the players know that each other is rational, and show
that each player can guarantee herself a relatively large share of the surplus-even if her
probability of being committed is small-by announcing the posture that simply demands
this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement. Furthermore, announcing
any other posture does not guarantee as much.
A key feature of my model is the existence of a positive number e such that, if a player
announces any bargaining posture (i.e., any infinite path of demands) at the beginning of
the game, she then becomes committed to that posture with probability at least E (or, equiv-
alently, she convinces her opponent that she is committed to that posture with probability
at least F). I derive the highest payoff that a. player can guarantee herself by announcing
any posture, regardless of her opponent's beliefs about her bargaining strategy, so long as
her opponent is rational and believes that she is committed to her announced posture with
probability at least E. More precisely, player l's "highest guaranteed," or "maxmin," payoff
is the highest payoff ui with the property that there exists a corresponding posture (the
"maxmin posture") and bargaining strategy such that player 1 receives at least u1 whenever
she announces this posture and follows this strategy and player 2 plays any best-response to
any belief about player l's strategy that assigns probability at least 6 to player 1 following
her announced posture. In particular, player 2 need not play a best-response to player
l's actual strategy, or vice versa; thus, player l's maxmin payoff is below her lowest Nash
equilibrium payoff.
The main result of this paper characterizes the maxmin payoff arid posture when only one
player may become committed to her announced posture; as discussed below, a very similar
characterization applies when both players may become committed. While the maxmin
payoff may be very small when s is small in general two-person games, it is relatively large
in my model: in particular, it equals 1/ (1 - log E). This equals 1 when E 1 (i.e., when
the player makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer) and, more interestingly, goes to 0 very slowly
as E goes to 0 (more precisely, it goes to 0 at a logarithmic rate, which is slower than any
polynomial rate). For example, a bargainer can guarantee herself approximately 30% of
the surplus if her commitment probability is 1 in ten; 13% if it is 1 in 1 thousand; and 7%
if it is 1 in I million. The second part of the main result is that the unique bargaining
posture that guarantees this share of the surplus simply demands this share in addition to
compensation for any delay; that is, it demands a share of the surplus that increases at rate
equal to the discount rate, r. This compensation amounts to the entire surplus after a long
enough delay, so the unique maxmin posture demands
min {ert/ (1 - log E) 1}
at every time t. This posture is depicted in Figure 2, for commitment probability 6 = 1/1000
and discount rate r = 1.
The intuition for the result that the unique maxmin posture demands compensation for
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Figure 2: The Unique Maxmin Bargaining Posture for e = 1/1000 and r =1
delay involves two key ideas. First, when player 2's beliefs are those that lead him to reject
player l's demand for as long as possible, player l's demand is accepted sooner when it is
lower. This is analogous to the argument in the existing reputational bargaining literature
that player 1 builds reputation more quickly in equilibrium when her current demand is
lower, though my analysis is not based on equilibrium. Second, the maxmin posture can
never make demands that would give player 1 less than her maxmin payoff if they were
accepted, because player 2 could simply accept some such demand and give player 1 a payoff
below her maxmin payoff, which was supposed to be guaranteed to player 1 (though it must
be verified that such behavior by player 2 is rational). Combining these ideas implies that
player 1 must always demand at least her maxmin level of utility (hence, compensation for
delay), but no more.
Three distinctive features of my approach are the timing of commitment (players freely
choose which bargaining postures to announce, but may become bound by their announce-
ments), the r.ange of bargaining postures players may announce (all possible paths of demands
for the duration of bargaining), and the solution concept (first-order knowledge of rational-
ity). The timing of commitment is appropriate if players are rational but may credibly
announce bargaining postures. This assumption has many precedents in the literature,
0 0.5
starting with Schelling (1956),"8 who discusses observable factors that make announced pos-
tures more credible, corresponding to a higher value of E in my model." The assumption
that a player may announce any path of demands and that all such announcements are
equally credible seems unappealing a priori, because announcing a "simple" posture may be
more credible than announcing a "complicated" posture. Fortunately, the unique maxmin
posture is simply announcing, "I want a certain share of the surplus, and if you make me
wait to get it then you must compensate me for the delay.",2 ) Thus, allowing players to
credibly announce complicated postures ensures that my characterization of the rmaxmin
posture does not depend on ad hoc restrictions on the range of credible postures, but my
characterization would still apply if only "simple" postures were credible. In addition, the
techniques I develop would allow one to characterize the maxmin payoff and posture in a
more general model where credibility varies across announcements.
A player's maxmin payoff is her lowest payoff consistent with (first-order) knowledge of
rationality (at the start of the game). In bargaining, a player cannot guarantee herself any
positive payoff without knowledge of her opponent's rationality, as, for example, she receives
payoff 0 if her opponent always rejects her offer and demands the entire surplus. Thus,
knowledge of rationality is the weakest solution concept consistent with positive guaranteed
payoffs. Furthermore, I show that any feasible payoff greater than the maxmin payoff is
consistent with knowledge of rationality, which implies that the maxrnin payoff and posture
are the key objects of interest under knowledge of rationality.
Imposing only knowledge of rationality rather than a stronger solution concept, such as
rationalizability or equilibrium, leads to more robust predictions. In particular, predictions
18 For game-theoretic models, see Crawford (1982), Fershtman and Seidmann (1993), Muthoo (1996),
Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008), and (especially) Kambe (1999). Staw (1981, 1997) discusses psychological
and sociological factors that lock individuals and organizations into costly courses of actions.
"For example, an announcement is more credible if the stakes in the current negotiation are small relative
to the stakes in potential future negotiations; if the announcement is observable to a large number of third
parties; if the bargainer can side-contract with third parties to bind herself to her announcements; if the
bargainer may be acting as an agent for a third party and does not have independent authority to change
her posture; or if the bargainer displays emotions that suggest an unwillingness to modify her posture.
2 To my knowledge, this is the first bargaining model that predicts that such a posture will be adopted,
though it seems like a reasonable bargaining position to stake out. For example, in most U.S. states defen-
dants must pay "prejudgment interest" on damages in torts cases, which amounts to plaintiffs demanding
the initial damages in addition to compensation for any delay (e.g., Knoll, 1996); similarly, unions sonmetimnes
include payment for strike days among their demands.
under knowledge of rationality (such as the prediction that each player receives at least her
maxmin payoff) do not depend on each player's beliefs about her opponent's strategies, so
long as each player believes that her opponent is playing a best-response to some belief
about her own play; and also do not depend on unmodelled strategic considerations that
do not affect a player's payoffs or her beliefs about her opponent's payoffs, but may affect
higher-order beliefs about payoffs. Such considerations arise naturally in bargaining: for
example, a local union that strategically announces that it will strike until offered a wage of
at least $25 an hour may be concerned that the firm's management may believe that it is
actually required by the national union to strike until offered a wage of at least $20 an hour.
The naxmin payoff and posture may also be viewed as the predicted payoff and posture of
a positive theory of bargaining in which each player is either maximally pessimistic (in a
Bayesian sense) about her opponent's strategy or expects her opponent to play her "worst-
case" strategy (in a maxmin sense), given her knowledge of her opponent's rationality. These
two approaches are equivalent in my model, though they differ in general games.
I consider two main extensions of the model. First, I characterize the maxmin payoffs
and postures when both players may become committed to their announced postures. I
find that each player's maxmin posture is exactly the same as in the one-sided commitment
model, and that each player's maxmin payoff is close to her maxmin payoff in the one-sided
commitment model as long as her opponent's commitment probability is small. Thus, the
one-sided commitment analysis applies to each player separately.
Second, I consider the role of the (continuous-time or discrete-time) bargaining procedure.
Here, I provide a result showing that the maxmin payoff and posture are robust to details of
the bargaining procedure such as the order and relative frequency of offers, so long as both
players have the opportunity to make offers frequently.2 '
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 relates this paper to the literature. Section
2.3 presents the model and defines maxmin payoffs and postures. Section 2.4 analyzes the
baseline case with one-sided commitment and presents the main characterization of maxmin
payoffs and postures. Section 2.5 presents four brief extensions. Section 2.6 considers
21 Abreu and Gul (2000) prove an analogous "independence of procedures" result in an equilibrium repu-
tational bargaining model. No such result holds in complete-information bargaining models in the tradition
of Rubinstein (1982).
two-sided commitment. Section 2.7 considers discrete-time bargaining games with frequent
offers. Section 2.8 concludes. Omitted proofs for Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are in the appendix,
and omitted proofs for Sections 2.5 and 2.7 are in the supplementary appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
The seminal paper on reputational bargaining is Abreu and Gul (2000), which generalizes
Myerson (1991).22 In their model, there is a vector of probabilities for each player corre-
sponding to the probability that she is committed to each of a variety of behavioral types
(which are analogous to bargaining postures in my model), and these vectors are common
knowledge. In the (effectively unique) sequential equilibrium, players randomiize over mim-
icking different behavioral types, with mixing probabilities determined by the prior, and
play proceeds according to a war of attrition, where each player hopes that her opponent
will concede. A player's equilibrium payoff is higher when she is more likely to be committed
to strong behavioral types and when she is more patient. Thus, Abreu and Gul present a
complete and elegant bargaining theory in which the bargaining procedure is unimportant
and sharp predictions are driven by the vector of prior commitment probabilities.
The main difference between my analysis and Abreu and Gul's is that I characterize
maxmin payoffs and postures rather than sequential equilibria. My approach entails weaker
assumptions on knowledge of commitment probabilities (i.e., second-order knowledge that
each player is committed to her announced posture with probability at least E, rather than
common knowledge of a vector of commitment probabilities) and on behavior (i.e., first-
order knowledge of rationality, rather than sequential equilibrium), and does not yield unique
predictions about the division of surplus or about the details of how bargaining will proceed.
One motivation for this complementary approach is that behavioral types are sometimes
viewed as "perturbations" reflecting the fact that a player (or an outside observer) cannot be
sure that the model captures all of the other player's strategic considerations. Thus, it seems
reasonable to assume that players realize that their opponents' type may be perturbed in
2 2Other important antecedents of Abreu and Gul (2000) include Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), who pioneered the incomplete information approach to reputation-formation, and Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1987, 1988), who study somewhat simpler reputational bargaining models.
some manner (e.g., that a rich set of types have positive prior weight), but assuming that the
distribution over perturbations is common knowledge goes against the spirit of introducing
perturbations. 23
The paper most closely related to mine is Kambe (1999). In Kambe's model, each player
first strategically announces a posture and then becomes committed to her announced pos-
ture with probability E, as in my model. Thus, Kambe endogenizes the behavioral types
of Abreu and Gul. The structure of equilibrium and the determinants of the division of
the surplus are similar to those in Abreu and Gul's model. There are two differences be-
tween Kambe's model and mine. First, Kambe requires that players announce postures
that demand a constant share of the surplus (as do Abreu and Gul), while I allow players to
announce non-constant postures (and players do benefit from announcing non-constant pos-
tures in my model). Second, and more fundamentally, Kambe studies sequential equilibria,
while I study maxmin payoffs and postures. These differences lead my analysis and results
to be quite different from Kambe's, with the exception that Kambe's calculation of bounds
on the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs resembles my calculation of the maxmin payoff
in the special case where players can only announce constant postures (Section 2.5.1).
There are also a number of earlier bargaining models in which players try to commit
themselves to advantageous postures. Crawford (1982) studies a two-stage model in which
players first announce demands and then learn their private costs of changing these demands,
and shows that such a model can lead to impasse. Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) show
that agreement is delayed until an exogenous deadline if each player is unable to accept an
offer that she has previously rejected. Muthoo (1996) studies a two-stage model related to
Crawford (1982), with the feature that making a larger change to one's initial demand is
more costly, and shows that a player's equilibrium payoff is increasing in her marginal cost
of changing her demand. Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) point out that if commitment is
costly in Crawford's model then impasse not only can result, but must. These papers study
2In games with a long-run player facing a series of short-run players, Watson (1993) and Battigalli and
Watso, (1997) show that common knowledge of the mere fact that the long-run player is committed to a
certain strategy with probability bounded away from 0 determines the division of the surplus. However, the
first essay in this thesis shows that common knowledge of the relative probabilities with which each player
is committed to each strategy is needed for equilibrium selection in games with two long-run players, even
when binding contracts are available (as is the case in bargaining).
equilibrium and do not involve reputation formation.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on bargaining with incomplete infor-
mation either without common priors (Yildiz 2003, 2004; Feinberg and Skrzypacz, 2005) or
with rationalizability rather than equilibrium (Cho, 1994; Watson, 1998), in that players may
disagree about the distribution over outcomes of bargaining. I briefly discuss a connection
with the literature on reputation in repeated games in the conclusion.
2.3 Model and Key Definitions
This section describes the model and defines maxmin payoffs and postures, which are the
main objects of analysis.
2.3.1 Model
Two players ("she," "he") bargain over one unit of surplus in two phases: a "commitment
phase" followed by a "bargaining phase." I describe the bargaining phase first. It is intended
to capture a continuous bargaining process where players can change their demands and
accept their opponents' demands at any time, but in order to avoid well-known technical
issues that emerge when players can condition their play on "instantaneous" actions of
their opponents (Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989; Bergin and MacLeod, 1993) I assume that
players can revise their paths of demands only at integer tinmes (while letting them accept
their opponents' demands at any time).
Time runs continuously from t = 0 to oo. At every integer time t E N (where N
is the natural numbers), each player i C {1, 2} chooses a path of demands for the next
length-1 period of time, ui : [t, t + 1) -> [0, 1], which is required to be the restriction to
[t, t + 1) of a continuous function on [t, t + 1]. Let /A be the set of all such functions. The
interpretation is that ui (T) is the demand that player i makes at time r (this is simply
denoted by Ui (T) when t is understood; note that ni (T) can be discontinuous at integer
times but is right-continuous everywhere"). Even though player i's path of demands for
[t, t + 1) is decided at t, player j only observes demands as they are made. Intuitively, each
2"A function f : R -+ R is right-continuous if, for every x E R and every q > 0, there exists 6 > 0 such
that If (x) -f (x')| < i for all x' E (x,x + 6).
player i may accept her opponent's demand uj (t) at any time t, which ends the game with
payoffs (e-rt (1 - u3 (t)) , e-rtUn (t)), where r C R+ is the common discount rate (throughout,
j -i). Formally, every instant of time t is divided into three dates, (t, -1), (t, 0), and (t, 1),
with the following timing:1 First, at date (t, -1), each player i announces accept or reject.
If both players reject, the game continues; if only player i accepts, the game ends with payoffs
(e-rt (1 - limT, uj (T)) , e-rt ljimTTt uj (-)); and if both players accept, the games ends with
payoffs determined by the average of the two demands, limrt ui (T) and limTt U2 (T). Next,
at date (t, 0), both players simultaneously announce their time-t demands (ui (t) , u2 (t))
(which were determined at the most recent integer time); if t is an integer, this is also the
date where each player chooses a path of demands for the next length-1 period. Finally, at
date (t, 1), each player i again announces accept or reject. If both players reject, the game
continues; if only player i accepts, the game ends with payoffs (e-rt (1 - uj (t)) , e- rU (t));
and if both players accept, the game ends and the demands ni (t) and u2 (t) are averaged.
This timing ensures that there is a first and last date at which each player can accept each
of her opponent's demands. In particular, at integer time t, player i may accept either her
opponent's "left" demand, limTtt Uj (r), or her time-t demand, aj (t).
The public history up to time t excluding the time-t demands is denoted by ht-
(T 1 (T) , u 2 (T))Tmt, and the public history up to time t including the time-t demands is de-
noted by ht+ = (U] (r) ,u2 (T))Tt (with the convention that this corresponds to all offers
having been rejected, as otherwise the game would have ended). A generic time-t history
is denoted by I'. Since lirnT uj (T) = uj (t) if t is not an integer, I generally distinguish
between h and h' only for integer t. Formally, a bargaining phase (behavior) strategy
for player i is a pair oT = (Fi, Gi) such that Fi maps histories into [0, 1] with the property
that Fi (h') < F (ht') whenever ht' is a successor of ht, and Gi maps histories of the form
h'- with t E N into A (Ut). Let E be the set of player i's bargaining phase strategies.
The interpretation is that Fi (ht-) is the probability that player i accepts player j's de-
inand at or before date (t, -1), Fi (ht+) is the probability that player i accepts player j's
demand at or before date (t, 1), and Gi (ht-) is the probability distribution over paths of
demands i : [t, t + 1) -> [0, 1] chosen by player i at date (t, 0). This formalism implies
2 5This is similar to the notion of date introduced by Abreu and Pearce (2007).
that player i's hazard rate of acceptance at history ht, fi (ht) / (1 - F, (h')), is well-defined
at any time t at which the realized distribution function Fi admits a density f, (in which
case Fi (ht-) = Fi (ht+)); and in addition player i's probability of acceptance at history ht+
(resp., ht-), Fi (ht+) - F (ht-) (resp., Fi (ht-) - limTt Fi (h'-)), is well-defined for all times
t. However, so long as one bears in mind these formal definitions, it suffices for the remain-
der of the paper to omit the notation (F, G) and instead simply view a (bargaining phase)
strategy Tig as a function that maps every history ht to a hazard rate of acceptance, a discrete
probability of acceptance, and (if ht = ht for some t E N) a probability distribution over
paths of demands ut. I say that agreement is reached at time t if the game ends at time t
(i.e., at date (t, -1) or (t, 1)). Both players receive payoff 0 if agreement is never reached.
At the beginning of the bargaining phase, player i has an initial belief 7i about the
behavior of her opponent. That is, 7i E A (E), so wi is a probability distribution over
behavior strategies oj; note that Ti can alternatively be viewed as an element of E by
reducing compound lotteries over pure strategies. Let supp (Ti) C Ej be the support of
'Ti, let ui (Ti, oj) be player i's expected utility given strategy profile (ai, oj), let ai (oT, 7 ) be
player i's expected utility given strategy ac and belief w1, and let E* (7i) - argmnax, ui (oi, Ti)
be the set of player i's best-responses to belief ri.
At the beginning of the game (prior to time 0), player 1 (but not player 2) publicly
announces a bargaining posture T : [0, oo) -> [0, 1], which must be continuous at non-
integer times t, be right-continuous everywhere, and have well-defined left limits everywhere.
Slightly abusing notation, a posture -y is identified with the strategy of player l's that de-
mands -y (t) for all t E R+ and always rejects player 2's demand; with this notation, E E1 .
In other words, a posture is a pure bargaining phase strategy that does not condition on
player 2's play or accept player 2's demand. After announcing posture y, player 1 becomes
committed to y with some probability E > 0, meaning that she must follow strategy , in the
bargaining phase. With probability 1 - E, she is free to play any strategy in the bargaining
phase. Whether or not player 1 becomes committed to , is observed only by player 1.
2.3.2 Defining the Maxmin Payoff and Posture
This subsection defines player l's maxmin payoff and posture. Intuitively, player l's maxmin
payoff is the highest payoff she can guarantee herself when all she knows about player 2 is that
he is rational (i.e., maximizes his expected payoff given his belief about player l's behavior,
and updates his belief according to Bayes' rule when possible) and that he believes that
player 1 follows her announced posture y with probability at least E.
Formally, that player 2 is rational and assigns probability at least E to player 1 following
her announced posture -y means that his strategy satisfies the following condition:
Definition 4 A strategy O-2 of player 2's is rational given posture y if there exists a belief
r2 of player 2's such that r2 (7) > E and o2 E Z (7r2 ).
A belief 7T1 of player l's is consistent with knowledge of rationality given posture y
if every strategy 0~2 E supp (7r1) is rational given posture '7. In other words, the set
of beliefs 7r1 that are consistent with knowledge of rationality given posture -y is I 7
A {o 2 : U 2 is rational given posture }.
Given that her belief is consistent with knowledge of rationality, the highest payoff that
player 1 can guarantee herself after announcing posture -y is the following:
Definition 5 Player l's maxmin payoff given posture y is
U* (y) = sup inf ni (o 1 , ri)11 iriE
A strategy 7* (y) of player l's is a maxmin strategy given posture y if
o * ()Eargmax inf Ui (0-1,7i) .
Equivalently, u* (-y) is the highest payoff player 1 can receive when she chooses a strategy
o-1 and then player 2 chooses a rational strategy o 2 that minimizes u1 (- 1 , U 2 ); that is,
u* (y) sup inf t1 (o-,- 2 )
1 072:C2 is rational given posture -y
In particular, to guarantee herself a high payoff, player 1 must play a strategy that does well
against any rational strategy of player 2's.26
Finally, I define player l's maxmin payoff, the highest payoff that player 1 can guarantee
herself before announcing a posture, as well as the corresponding maxmin posture.
Definition 6 Player l's maxmin payoff is
U* sup u* (-f)
A posture -y* is a maxmin posture if there exists a sequence of postures { } such that
7Y (t) -> * (t) for all t E R+ ard u* (7.n) -> U1*
I sometimes emphasize the dependence of u* and y* on F by writing u* (F) and ,*.2
Both the set of maxmin strategies given any posture y and the set of maxmin postures are
non-empty, though at this point this is not obvious.
The reason why -y* is defined as a limit of postures {'}Y I such that u* ('r) -> u*, rather
than as an element of arginax, u (i), is that the latter set may be empty because of an
openness problem that is standard in bargaining models. To see the problem, consider the
ultimatum bargaining game, where player 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand in [0, 1] to
player 2. By knowledge of rationality, player 1 knows that any demand strictly below 1
will be accepted, but demanding 1 does not guarantee her a positive payoff because it is a
best-response for player 2 to reject. Definition 6 is analogous to specifying that in this game
player l's maxmin payoff is 1 and her maxmin strategy is demanding 1.
Note that Definitions 5 and 6 are "non-Bayesian" in the sense that they characterize the
largest payoff that player 1 can guarantee herself, rather than the maximum payoff that she
can obtain given some belief. The following is the "Bayesian" version of these definitions:
26A potential criticism of the concept of the maxmin payoff given posture -y is that it appears to neglect
the fact that, in the event that player 1 does become committed to posture -y, she is guaranteed only
inf r H, ET [ui (y,U2)] in the bargaining phase, rather than sup,, inf,,np E"1 [ui (O1,7 2 )]. However, I
show in Section 2.4.3 that these two numbers are actually identical.
27The notation Y* (-) is already taken by the time-t demand of posture y*. I apologize for abusing notation
in writing u* (-y) and u* (E) for different objects and hope that this will not cause confusion.
Definition 7 Player l's pessimistic payoff given posture ' is
pess (,) inf sup u1 (c-1, wTi)
7r1 EH ai
Player 1's pessimistic payoff is up' - sup-Y 1 (7). A posture yPe... is a pessimistic
posture if there exists a sequence of postures {y,} such that y, (t) -+ -yP... (t) for all t E R+
adpe85(, pess
Player l's pessimistic payoff is the worst payoff she can receive by best-responding to
a fixed rational strategy of player 2's. Player l's maxmin payoff is weakly lower than her
pessimistic payoff, because in the definition of the pessimistic payoff player 1 "knows" the
distribution over player 2's strategies when she chooses her strategy, while in the definition
of the maxmin payoff her strategy is evaluated with respect to the worst-case response of
player 2's. However, I show in Section 2.4.3 that these payoffs are in fact identical in my
model. For expositional consistency, I focus on maxmin payoffs and strategies.
Another reason for studying player l's maxmin payoff is that it determines the entire
range of payoffs that are consistent with knowledge of rationality, as shown by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 For any posture y and any payoff ui E [u* (-y) , 1), there exists a belief 7r E
H' such that inax,, Ui (0-1, 7r) = Ui.
2.4 Characterization of the Maxmin Payoff and Posture
This section states and proves Theorem 2, the main result of the paper, which solves for
player l's maxmin payoff and posture. Section 2.4.1 states and discusses Theorem 2, and
Sections 2.4.2 through 2.4.4 provide the proof. The approach is as follows: In Section 2.4.2,
I fix a posture y and find a belief of player 2's, 7r? (satisfying 'r2 (y) ; e), and corresponding
best-response, o7 E E* (7ri), that minimize U1 ('y, a2), player l's payoff from mimicking -Y in
the bargaining phase; -r and or are called the 'y-offsetting belief and 7-offsetting strategy,
respectively, and play a key role in the analysis. Section 2.4.3 shows that 7 itself is a maxmin
strategy given posture 7,for any 7, which implies that u* (y) = u1 (-, or) for any posture -y.
That is, player l's maxmin payoff given posture -y is the payoff she receives from mimicking
-y when her opponent follows his 'y-offsetting strategy. Section 2.4.4 maximizes ui , U2)
over y to prove Theorem 2.
2.4.1 Main Result
The main result is the following:
Theorem 2 Player l's maxmin payoff is
U* (E) = /(1 - log E),
and the unique maxmin posture -y* is given by
-y* (t) = min {er/ (1 - log e) , 1} for all t C R+.
A priori, one might have expected player l's maxmin payoff to be very small when E is
small (because player 2's beliefs and strategy may be chosen quite freely in the definition of
the maxmin payoff), and might have expected player l's maxmin posture to be complicated
(as player 1 is not restricted to announcing monotone, continuous, or otherwise well-behaved
postures). Theorem 2 shows that, on the contrary, player l's maxmin payoff is relatively
high for even very small commitment probabilities E, as shown by Table 1, and that player
l's unique maxmin posture is simply demanding the maxmin payoff plus compensation for
any delay in reaching agreement.2 8
2
"The importance of non-constant postures is a difference between this paper and existing reputational
bargaining models, where it is usually assumed that players may only be committed to strategies that demand
a constant share of the surplus (as in Abreu and Gul (2000), Compte and Jehiel (2002), and Kambe (1999)).
A notable exception is Abreu and Pearce (2007), where players may be committed to non-constant postures
that can also condition their play on their opponents' behavior. However, Abreu and Pearce's main result
is that a particular posture that demands a constant share of the surplus is approximately optimal in their
model, when commitment probabilities are small.
E u*()
.25 .42
.1 .30
10-3 .13
10-6 .07
10-9 .05
Table 1: The Maxmin Payoff u* (E) for Different Commitment Probabilities E
The intuition for why the unique maxmin posture is given by Y* (t) = min {eru* (E) , 1}
was outlined in the introduction. The most basic intuition for why u* (E) is large relative to
E is that, when player 1 announces a posture that offers player 2 a large share of the surplus
and then mimics this posture, player 2 must accept player l's offer unless he believes that he
will be rewarded with high probability for rejecting. In the latter case, if player 1 does not
reward player 2 for rejecting, then player 2 quickly updates his belief toward player l's being
committed to her announced posture (i.e., player 1 builds reputation quickly), and player
2 accepts player l's offer when he becomes convinced that she is committed. Thus, player
1 builds reputation quickly when her demand is small, so a small commitment probability
need not lead to much delay before her demand is accepted.
2.4.2 Offsetting Beliefs and Strategies
In this subsection, I fix ani arbitrary posture for player 1, y, and find a rational strategy
of player 2's, o- (the "--offsetting strategy"), that minimizes player l's payoff when she
announces posture -y and then mimics -y in the bargaining phase. That is, I solve the
problem
inf U1 (Y, ( 2 ). (3)
The resulting strategy aj always demands the entire surplus and rejects player l's demand
until some time t*, and accepts player l's smaller time-t* demand, min {limTTt- Y (T) , (t*)}
(henceforth denoted by ' (t*)), if player 1 follows -y until time t*. If player 1 ever deviates
from y, then u' rejects player l's demand forever. The corresponding belief 7r' (the "y-
offsetting belief") is that player 1 plays -y with probability e, and with probability 1 - e plays
a particular strategy ~y that mixes between mimicking -y and accepting player 2's demand up
until time t*, and subsequently mimics y.
The key step in solving (3) is computing the smallest time T by which agreement must
be reached under strategy profile (-}, os). I then show that the value of (3) is simply
mnint<r e- (t), and that the time t* at which the strategy o' accepts ' (t) is a time before
T that minimizes erty (t).
Toward computing T, let v (t, -1) be the continuation value of player 2 from best-
responding to -y starting from date (t, -1), and let v (t) be the corresponding continuation
value starting from date (t, 1):
v (t, -1) max e'(T-t) (1 -y (T))
v(t) max{1 - y (t) Tt s T -7(r)), (4)
where - (r) = min {limi, y (s) , -y (-)}. Thus, the difference between v (t, 1) and v (t) is
that only v (t, -1) gives player 2 the opportunity to accept the demand 1-limTTt ' (T); in par-
ticular, v (t, -1) = v (t) if y (t) (or v (t)) is continuous at t. Note that maxT>t e-ra(-t) (1 - '} (T))
is well-defined because -y (T) is lower semi-continuous and limT. er-'(T-t) (1 -Y (T)) = 0,
and that v (t) is continuous at all non-integer times t; let {si, s2, ... S C N be the set of
discontinuity points of v (t). Finally, note that v (t) can increase at rate no faster than r.
That is, v (t) > e-'-t v (t') for all t' > t, because if v (t') = e-r-C) (1 - } (r)) for some
T > t', then v (t) e-r(Tt) (1 - (r)) = e-r(t-t)v (t'). This implies that v (t) is continuous
but for downward jumps,2 9 and that v (t) is differentiable almost everywhere."' These are
but two of the useful properties of the function v (t) (which are not shared by y (t)) that
reward working with v (t) rather than - (t) in the subsequent analysis.
Next, I introduce two functions A (t) and p (t) with the property that if player 1 mixes
29 A function f : R -+R is continuous but for downward jumps if lim inf fxy (x) > f (x*) >
limsup Ixf (x) for all x C R.
3 0Proof: Let f (t) = ert (t). Then f (t) is non-increasing, which implies that f (t) is differentiable
almost everywhere (e.g., Royden, 1988, p. 100). Hence, v (t) is differentiable almost everywhere.
between mimicking -y and conceding the entire surplus to player 2, then A (t) (resp., p (t))
is the smallest non-negative hazard rate (resp., discrete probability) at which player 1 must
concede in order for player 2 to be willing to reject player l's time-t demand, 'Y (t). Let
rv (t) - v' (t)1-(t)= (5)
1 - o (t)
if v (t) is differentiable at t and v (t) < 1, and let A (t) = 0 otherwise; note that A (t) > 0 for
all t, because v (t) cannot increase at rate faster than r. Also, let
v (t, -1) - v (t)p1(t) =)'(6) 1 - o (t)
if v (t) < 1, and let p (t) = 0 otherwise. To see intuitively why the aforementioned
property holds, note that accepting player l's time-t demand gives player 2 flow payoff
rv (t), while rejecting gives player 2 flow payoff A (t) (1 - v (t)) + v' (t), and equalizing these
flow payoffs yields (5);11,32 similarly, accepting player l's demand at date (t, -1) gives
player 2 payoff v (t, -1), while delaying acceptance until date (t, 1) gives player 2 payoff
p (t) (1) + (1 - p (t)) i (t), and equalizing these payoffs yields (6).
When player 2 expects player 1 to accept his demand at rate (resp., probability) A (t)
(resp., p (t)), he becomes convinced that player 1 is committed to posture -y at the time T
defined in the following lemma, which leads him to accept player l's demand no later than
the time T defined in the lemma. In the lemma, and throughout the paper, maximization
or minimization over times t should be read as taking place over t E R+ U {oo} (i.e., as
allowing t = o0, with the convention that e rO (oo) = 0 for all postures y).
-"This intuition is correct when v (t) =1 - y (t). When v (t) > 1 - -y (t), player 2 prefers to reject player
l's time-t demand even when player 1 concedes at rate 0. At these times, rv (t) = v' (t), which implies that
A (t) = 0. Hence, A (t) is always the smallest non-negative hazard rate at which player 1 must concede in
order for player 2 to be willing to reject 'y (t).
"If v' (t) = 0, then A (t) becomes the concession rate that makes player 2 indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the constant offer v (t), which is familiar from the literatures on wars of attrition and reputational
bargaining. However, in these literatures A (t) is the rate at which player 1 concedes in equilibrium, while
here is the rate at which player 1 concedes according to player 2's offsetting beliefs, as will become clear.
Lemma 2 Let
T sup t : exp - A (s) ds) 11 (1 - p (s)) > E
sESn[O,t)
and let
e-r (1 - y(t)) if t =T
T - max argmax
t>t er t (1 - - (t)) if t > T
Then, for any 7i2 such that 7r2 (') > E and any u 2  r E* (7 2), agreement is reached no later
than time T under strategy profile (-Y, 9 2 ). In particular,
inf 1 (h", o 2 ) > min e- 7 (t) (7)
(-2-2)-2 -Y) ! 72 Y, (72 t<T
Lemma 2 amounts to the statement that T is the latest time at which it is possible that
agreement has not yet been reached and player 2 is not certain that player 1 is playing -Y,
when player 2's initial belief is some 7r2 such that 7r2 (-y) > E, under strategy profile (-y, o 2 )
for some a 2 E E* (7r2 ). The first step of the proof (of Lemma 2) shows that, in computing
this time, one can restrict attention to beliefs 7r2 that assign probability 1 to player l's
accepting player 2's demand whenever player 1 deviates from strategy 7, and to strategies
o-2 that always demand the entire surplus. This is because giving more surplus to player 2
in the event that player 1 deviates from -y makes player 2 more willing to reject player l's
demand, without changing player 2's beliefs about the probability that player I is playing
-y at any history. The second step shows that, with beliefs of this form, if v (t) is always
equal to player 2's continuation payoff from delaying acceptance until he becomes convinced
that player 1 is playing -y, then player l's concession rate and probability must be given by
A (t) and p (t), and player 2 becomes convinced that player 1 is playing y at time T; this
formalizes the motivation for A (t) and p (t) given above. The proof is completed by showing
that if v (t) is ever strictly less than player 2's continuation payoff from delaying acceptance
until he becomes convinced that player 1 is playing -y, then player 2 becomes convinced that
player 1 is playing y no later than T.
The remainder of this subsection is devoted to showing that (7) holds with equality,
which proves that (3) equals mint<T e-- 'y (t). The idea is that player 2 may hold a belief
that induces him to demand the entire surplus until time t* -- min argmint<r e 7rt (t) and
then accept player l's offer; this is the -y-offsetting belief.33  I first define the -y-offsetting
belief, and then show that (7) holds with equality.
I begin by introducing a strategy, ~5, which is used in defining the 'y-offsetting belief.34
Let
exp (- f A (s) ds) s[,t) p (s)) -X (t) = mnax ,0 ;(8)
exp - f A (s) ds) Hscsn t(1 - p (s))
let
A (t) A (t) (9)
x (t)
if k (t) > 0, and let A (t) 0 otherwise; and let
(t) = min P , 1 (10)
if y (t) > 0, and let p (t) 0 otherwise. Intuitively, y (t) is the posterior probability that
player 2 assigns to player l's playing a strategy other than ', at time t when player l's
irconditional concession rate and probability are A (t) and p (t), and A (t) and P (t) are the
conditional (on not playing -y) concession rate and probability needed for the unconditional
concession rate and probability to equal A (t) and p (t).
Definition 8 ~y is the strategy that demands u1 (t) =y (t) for all t G R+, accepts with hazard
rate A (t) for all t < t*, accepts with probability P (t) at date (t, 1) for all t < t*, and rejects
for all t > t*, for all histories hi.
I now define the 'y-offsetting belief.
Definition 9 The 'y-offsetting belief, denoted 7ri, is given by 7r' (-) = E and 7r^ (') 1-6.
The -y-offsetting strategy, denoted og, is the strategy that demands U2 (t) = 1 for all t and
accepts or rejects player l's demand as follows:
:'Note that min argmin<e rty (t) is well-defined, because -y (t) is lower semi-continuous (though it may
equal -o, if T = co). This particular choice of t* is for concreteness; any element of argmint<7 e-ty (t)
would suffice for the analysis.
:" This approach is related to a construction in the first essay in this thesis.
1. If ht is consistent with -, then reject if t < t*; accept at date (t*, -1) if and only if
limr-t. - (T) < y(t*); accept at date (t*, 1) if and only if limTt '. (r) > }(t*); and
reject if t > t*.
2. If ht is not consistent with y, then reject.
Finally, I show that (7) holds with equality, and also that the y-offsetting (belief, strategy)
pair (7s, o') is a solution to (3). If t* = 00, then the following statement that agreement is
reached at time t* means that agreement is never reached.
Lemma 3 Agreement is reached at time t* under strategy profile (T, o,), and o E (ZT).
In particular, the pair (7r, o ) is a solution to (3), and u1 (', o-') min<r e-"3 (t ).
Proof. It is immediate from Definition 9 that agreement is reached at t* under strategy
profile (y, o'), which implies that ni (, o) equals mint<r e-rt (t), the right-hand side of
(7). Since 7r' (y) ;> 6, it remains only to show that or E E* (7i).
If t < min {, t* } and h' is consistent with , then, by construction of 5, player 1
accepts player 2's demand of 1 with unconditional hazard rate A (t) and unconditional discrete
probability p (t) under 7r^. The proof of Lemma 2 implies that it is optimal for player 2 to
demand U2 (t) =1 and reject at any time t < min i, t* } when player 1 accepts player 2's
demand of 1 at rate A (t) and probability p (t) until time T; and that in addition if t* < T
then player 2 is indifferent between between accepting and rejecting at time t* when player
1 accepts with this rate and probability until time T. Therefore, it is optimal for player 2 to
demand U2 (t) =1 and reject at time t when player 1 accepts with this rate and probability
only until time min t, t* .
If t E P, t*) and ht is consistent with 7, then under Tr player 2 is certain that player
1 is playing 7 at h'. Since t* < T, this implies that it is optimal for player 2 to reject.
If a history ht is not reached under strategy profile (7r, oT) (as is the case if t > t*), then
any continuation strategy of player 2's is optimal. Finally, to see that accepting } (t*)
(i.e., accepting at the more favorable of dates (t*, -1) and (t*, 1)) is optimal, note that
3 
'History ht is consistent with strategy u1 if there exists a strategy U 2 such that ht is reached under
(7 1, (2). In particular, history h'- (resp., ht+) is consistent with y if and only if ui (T) = y (r) for all T < t
(resp., T < t).
the fact that t* E argnint<T e-rty (t) implies that -y (t) > 7 (t*) for all t E [t*, T]. Hence,
t*tEarge (1 - (t)). Because ~y coincides with -y after time t*, it follows that,
conditional on having reached time t*, player 2 receives at most sulptC(t*,T] e rt (1 - y (t)) if
he rejects, and receives e * (1 - y (t*)) if he accepts, which is weakly more. Therefore,
o1 E E* (7). .
2.4.3 Maxmin Strategies
This subsection shows that 'y itself is a maxmin strategy given posture -, and that in partic-
ular u* (7) - ui (, U) = mint<T(-y) e -y (t), where I have made the dependence of T on -y
explicit. The intuition is that player 1 is not guaranteed a positive payoff in any continuation
game following a deviation from her announced posture, because at such histories player 2's
beliefs and strategy are unrestricted.
The key result of this subsection is the following:
Lemma 4 For any posture ', U* (3) = int<T(,) e-r (t).
Proof. By Lenna 3, (7r, or) is a solution to (3), so
or E argmin ui (y, 7r). (11)
7rI n
Under strategy o-', player 2 always demands U2 (t) = 1 and only accepts player l's demand
if player 1 conforms to y/ through time t*. Hence, sup., nl (o-1 , o1) ert*-* (t*) =1 (aY, oq),
and therefore
E  argmax a 1 (r 1 , ) . (12)
a1
(11) and (12) imply the following chain of inequalities:
sup inf U1 (-1,r) ;> inf a1 (-y, ri)
o1 7r IE 7ireni
= i(,or') (by (11))
max uI (o-1, or) (by (12))
> max minni u( 1 , 7ri).a1 7riEn
This is possible only if both inequalities hold with equality (and the supremum and infimum
in the first line are attained at -y and o, respectively). Therefore, u* (-y) = ui (, o)
mint<(e C-' e (t.
As an aside, a similar argument establishes the equivalence between the maxmin approach
of Definitions 5 and 6 and the Bayesian approach of Definition 7.
Corollary 1 up... (-y) = (-) for all ;u" = u*; and -y is a maxmin posture if and only
if it is a pessimistic posture.
Proof. (11) and (12) imply that inf7 1erp supU1 Ui (1, ri) =2 (,oq), by the same chain
of inequalities that proves that sup, inf 1 ern- ui (o, wr1) = u1 (-y, o). Hence, u p" -
u1 (7, (T) = u* (T) for all y, and the remainder of the result follows from Definition 7. U
2.4.4 Proof of Theorem 2
I now sketch the remainder of the proof of Theorem 2. The details of the proof are deferred
to the appendix.
The first part of the proof is constructing a sequence of postures {y,} such that limn,, u* ('-)
1/ (1 - log E) and { y, (t)} converges pointwise to y* (t) = min {ert / (1 - log F) , 1}. Define
7,y by
in() in , r 1 for all t E R+-
n + 1 1 - log 
Let T1 be the time where j,,, (t) reaches 1. It can be shown that T > T ( ,) for all n E N,
where T is defined as in Lemma 1 and I have emphasized the dependence of T on 7. This
implies that -, (t) = (n ' for all t < T (-y,,), and that 7y (t (' )) < 1. Since
', (t) is non-decreasing and -, (; (yn)) < 1, it follows from the definition of T (-y,) that
T (' ) T (-,). Thus, by Lemma 4,
U* (y,) minl e-l (t)
t<T(-Y) -
= min ( )t! (,y) n + 1 1 - log E
( n 
1
n + 1 1 - log E*
Therefore, limn",. * (I/) 1/(1 - log E).
The second part is showing that no posture y guarantees more than 1/ (1 - log E). Here,
the crucial observation is that any posture y such that y (t) > e / (1 - log E) for all t <
T (-y) satisfies T (') > T 1, where T 1 is the time at which y* (t) reaches 1. Since any
posture that guarantees at least 1/ (1 - log E) must satisfy y (t) > e t/ (1 - log E) for all
t < T ( ) (by Lemma 4), and T (y) > T(') for any posture -, this implies that u* (-y)
in,< - (t) e = 1/ (1 - log E) for any posture -. The appendix shows that in
addition no sequence of postures {'} converging pointwise to any posture other than y*
can correspond to a sequence of maxmin payoffs {u (y')} converging to 1/ (1 - log E).
2.5 Extensions
This section presents four extensions of Theorem 2. Section 2.5.1 characterizes the maxmin
payoff when player 1 can only announce constant postures; Section 2.5.2 extends Theorem
2 to general convex bargaining sets; Section 2.5.3 considers heterogeneous discounting; and
Section 2.5.4 extends Theorem 2 to higher-order knowledge of rationality.
2.5.1 Constant Postures
Theorem 2 shows that the unique maxmin posture is non-constant. In this subsection, I
determine how much lower a player's maxmin payoff is when she is required to announce
a constant posture. The purpose of this study is, first, to establish that announcing non-
constant postures allows a player to guarantee herself a significantly higher payoff; second,
to determine the share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself in settings where
announcing a non-constant posture might not be credible; and, third, to facilitate comparison
with the existing reputational bargaining literature, in which typically players can only
announce constant postures.
A posture a is constant if y (t) = -y (0) for all t. If y is constant, I slightly abuse
notation by writing T for the constant demand -y (t) in addition to the posture itself. The
constant posture y that maximizes u* (-y) is the maxmin constant posture, denoted ,*,3 and
"Such a posture exists for all E < 1, So there is no need for a limit definition like Definition 6. When
= 1, such a definition would imply that the maxmin constant posture equals 1.
0.5 0.75
Figure 3: The Ratio u* (e) /U* (6) for E E [0, 1].
the corresponding payoff is the maxmin constant payoff, denoted 71*. These can be derived
using Lemmas 2 through 4, leading to the following:
Proposition 2 For all E < 1, the unique maxmin constant posture is 2-log* og E)2 4 log2
and the maxmin constant payoff is i* (6) = exp (- (1 -*)) *.
Proposition 2 solves for * and U-* (E), but it does not yield a clear relationship between
the maxmin constant payoff, i* (E), and the (overall) maxmin payoff, u* (E). Therefore, I
graph the ratio of u* (E) to U-* (E) in Figure 3. In addition, the following analytical result
regarding the ratio of u* (E) to Ei* (E) is straightforward:
Corollary 2 u* (E) /U-* (E) is decreasing in E, lim,, u* (E) /uI* (E)
lim,_o u* (6) /f* (E) = e.
= 1. and
The most interesting part of Corollary 2 is that a player's maxmin payoff is ap-
proximately e times greater when she can announce non-constant postures than when she
can only announce constant postures, when her commitment probability is small. Thus,
there is a large advantage to announcing non-constant postures. However, a player can still
guarantee herself a substantial share of the surplus when she can only announce constant
postures, and her maxmin payoff goes to 0 with E at the same rate in either case.
0 0.25
2.5.2 General Convex Bargaining Sets
This subsection shows that the maxmin payoff derived in Theorem 2 is a lower bound on the
rnaxmin payoff with general convex bargaining sets, normalized so that each player's lowest
and highest feasible payoffs are 0 and 1. More generally, taking a concave transformation
of the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set weakly increases the maxmin payoff.
Formally, a decreasing function # : [0, 1] -> [0, 1] is the Pareto frontier (of the bargaining
set) if the game ends with payoffs (e-rui (t) ,e-r# (a1 (t))) when player 2 accepts player
l's demand ai (t), and ends with payoffs (e-rt#- (U2 (t)) , e-ru 2 (t)) when player 1 accepts
player 2's demand a2 (t). Note that the definition of player l's maxmin payoff is valid for
any bargaining set. The result is the following:
Proposition 3 Suppose that # : [0, 1] -- [0,11 is a decreasing and concave function satisfying
4 (0) = 1 and 0' (1) = 0, and that V : [0, 1] -> [0, 1] is an increasing and concave function
satisfying V) (0) = 0 and V1 (1) = 1. Let uO be player I's maxmin payoff when the Pareto
frontier is p, and let u be player I's maxmin payoff when the Pareto frontier is $o 0.
Then uo > t.
Proposition 3 shows that taking any concave transformation V) of a Pareto frontier #
weakly increases player l's maxmin payoff. The intuition is that any fixed demand of player
l's leaves more for player 2 when the Pareto frontier is V1 o # than when it is #, which
implies that player 2 must believe that player 1 is conceding more rapidly in order for him
to reject player l's demand when the Pareto frontier is 41 o #. This in turn lets player 1
build reputation more quickly and thus guarantee herself a higher payoff.
2.5.3 Heterogeneous Discounting
I have assumed that the players have the same discount rate. This simplified notation and
led to simple formulas for u* (E) and -y* in Theorem 2. However, it is straightforward to
generalize the model to the case where player i has discount rate ri and ri # rj; one must
only keep track of whose discount rate "r" stands for in the above analysis. Introducing
heterogeneous discounting yields interesting comparative statics with respect to the players'
relative patience, r1/r-2 (as will become clear, u* depends on r1 and r 2 only through r 1/r 2).
First, the standard result in the reputational bargaining literature (Abreu and Gul, 2000;
Compte and Jehiel, 2002; Kambe, 1999) that player 1's sequential equilibrium payoff con-
verges to 1 as r1/r 2 converges to 0, and converges to 0 as ri/r2 converges to 00, also applies
to player l's maxmin payoff. Thus, this important comparative static result continues to
hold under knowledge of rationality, and in particular does not rely on equilibrium. This is
analogous to the results on reputation in repeated games under knowledge of rationality of
Watson (1993) and Battigalli and Watson (1997). However, I also derive player l's maxmin
payoff for fixed r1 /r 2 (rather than only in the limit). This leads to a second comparative
static result, which indicates that a change in relative patience has a larger effect on the
maxmin payoff than a much larger change in commitment probability. An analogous result
holds in equilibrium in existing reputational bargaining models.
I first present the analog of Theorem 2 for heterogeneous discount rates, and then state
the two comparative statics results as corollaries.
Proposition 4 If player i's discount rate is ri, then player I's maxmin payoff, u* (E), is the
unique number u* that solves
1
u* (13)
1- log E - LL- 1I log U*
Corollary 3 shows that the standard limit comparative statics on rij/r 2 in reputational
bargaining models require only first-order knowledge of rationality.
Corollary 3 limri/r 2 -o U* (E) = 1. If E < 1, then in addition limrr/r 2 y u* (E) = 0.
Corollary 4 shows that the commitment probability E must decrease exponentially to
(approximately) offset a geometric increase in relative patience (ri/r 2 ) . The result is
stated for the case r1/r 2 < 1, where even an exponential decrease in E does not fully offset a
geometric increase in (r1/r2) -. If r1/r 2 > 1, then an exponential decrease in E more than
offsets a geometric increase in (r1 /r 2) 1
Corollary 4 Suppose that r1/r 2 < 1 and that r1/r 2 and E both decrease while (r1/r 2 ) log 6
remains constant. Then u* (E) increases.
2.5.4 Rationalizability
Theorem 2 derives the highest payoff that player 1 can guarantee herself under first-order
knowledge of rationality, the weakest epistemic assumption consistent with the possibility of
reputation-building. I now show that player 1 cannot guarantee herself more than this under
the much stronger assumption of rationalizability (or under any finite-order knowledge of
rationality), which reenforces Theorem 2 substantially. The intuition is that the 'y-offsetting
belief-and thus the 'y-offsetting strategy-is not only rational but also rationalizable, and
player 1 receives payoff u* when she best-responds to the y-offsetting strategy.
I consider the following definition of rationalizability:3 7
Definition 10 A set of bargaining phase strategy profiles Q = Q1 x Q2 C E 1 x E2 has the
best-response property given posture -y if for all oi C Q1 there exists some belief 71 A ( 2)
such that or E E* (7rI); and for all O-2 C Q2 there exists some belief 72 G A (Q1 U (-})
such that T2 (7') > E, with strict inequality only if -y E Q1, and (-2 E E* ( 2 ). The set of
rationalizable strategies given posture -y is
RAT (y) J {Q Q has the best-response property given posture y}.
Player 1's rationalizable maxmin payoff given posture -y is
RATAu () ---sup inf u1 (2io 2 )
Player 1 's rationalizable maxmin payoff is
uRAT RAT (Y)
A posture - RAT is a rationalizable maxmin posture if there exists a sequence of postures
{',} such that , (t) RA (t) for all t R and u AT
3 7 While consistent with this paper's focus on normal-form rationality, this normal-form definition of ra-
tionalizability is weak in that it does not eliminate strategies that are dominated "off-path." However, I
conjecture that Proposition 5 also holds under extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984; Battigalli and
Siniscalchi, 2003).
The result is the following:
Proposition 5 Player l's rationalizable maxmin payoff equals her maxmin payoff, and the
unique rationalizable maxmin posture is the unique maxmin posture. That is, u ^A - u*
and the unique rationalizable maxmin posture is RA T *
Any rationalizable strategy given posture -y is also rational given posture '}. Therefore,
Lemma 2 applies under rationalizability. The only additional fact used in the proof of The-
orem 2 is that u* (-Y) = mint T(- ) e-rt- (t) for any posture -y (Lemma 4). Supposing that the
analogous equation holds under rationalizability (i.e., that u AT (y) mint<T(,) e- rt (t)),
the proof of Theorem 2 goes through as written. Hence, to prove Proposition 5 it suffices to
prove the following lemma, the proof of which shows that the -offsetting belief and strategy
are rationalizable:
Lemma 5 For any posture -y, uA' (y) - minT() e (t).
2.6 Two-Sided Commitment
This section introduces the possibility that both players may announce-and become com-
mitted to-postures prior to the start of bargaining. I show that each player i's rnaxmin
payoff is close to that derived in Section 2.4 when her opponent's commitment probability,
Ej, is small in absolute terms (even if Ej is large relative to Er). In addition, each player's
maxmin posture is exactly as in Section 2.4. This shows that the analysis of Section 2.4 pro-
vides a two-sided theory of reputational bargaining. The results of this section contrast with
the existing reputational bargaining literature, which emphasizes that relative commitment
probabilities are crucial for determining equilibrium behavior and payoffs.
Formally, modify the model of Section 2.3 by assuming that in the announcement stage
players simultaneously announce postures (Y1, Y2), to which they become committed with
probabilities E1 and E2, respectively.38  The bargaining phase is unaltered. Thus, at the
beginning of the bargaining phase, player i believes that player j is committed to posture j
with probability Ej and is rational with probability 1 - Ej (though this fact is not common
3
'The events that player 1 and player 2 become committed need not be independent.
knowledge). The following definitions are analogs of Definitions 4 through 6 that allow for
the fact that both players may become committed to the postures they announce:
Definition 11 A belief -ri of player i's is consistent with knowledge of rationality given
postures (j, '}j) if 7i (7y.) > Ej; 7ri (wy) > Ej only if there exists 7rj such that 7 ( ') > Ei and
SEE (7); and, for all oj / -)j, o0- C supp (7i) only if there exists 7rj such that 7r (hi) > Ei
and oT E E (Trj). Let Hiyj be the set of player i's beliefs that are consistent with knowledge
of rationality given postures ('yj,7'y). Player i's maxmin payoff given postures (7/y, '3) is
u (-y7, 7yj) = sup inf ui (-i, 1ri)O'i 7riGH~
Player i's maxmin payoff is
u. sup iif U() .
^y2  '-Yj i T )
A posture '* is a maxmin posture (of player i's) if there exists a sequence of postures {-Yn}
such that ', (t) - < (t) for all t C R+ and inf, u* ('Yn,,) u*.
Note that if Ej 0 then all of these definitions (for player i) reduce to the corresponding
definitions in the one-sided commitment model. Thus, writing uj (Ej, Ej) for player i's
maxmin payoff in the two-sided commitment model when the commitment probabilities
are Eg and EJ, it follows that 7i (Ei,0) = u* (6j), player i's maxmin payoff in the one-sided
commitment model.
I now show that u (E, E) is approximately equal to u (Ei) whenever Ej is small, and
that the maxmin posture is exactly as in the one-sided commitment model. This is simply
because player i cannot guarantee herself anything in the event that player j is committed
(e.g., if player j's announced posture always demands the entire surplus), which implies that
player i guarantees herself as much as possible by conditioning on the event that player j is
not comnitted. In this event, which occurs with probability 1 - ej, player i can guarantee
herself u.* (s), and the only way she can guarantee herself this much is by announcing *.
Theorem 3 Player i's maxmin payoff is un (ej, ) (1 - e) u* (E), and player i's unique
max'min posture is *
Proof. Let yj be the posture of player j's given by -y (t) = 1 for all t. Note that nii (Ti, yj) =
0 for all ai. Therefore, infj ti (ai, 'yj) = 0 for all cr.
Next, let Ii'j (E6, E9) be the set of beliefs ri that are consistent with knowledge of
rationality for commitment probabilities (ej, e9), and let H (E&) be the analogous set in
the one-sided commitment model. I claim that if 7ri E H>'3 (Ei, Ej), then there exists
' E H1 i (ei) such that 7ri = (1 - Ej) 7r' ey, where (1 - a) x T ay is the compound lottery
that puts weight 1 - a on x and a on y. To see this, note that wTr (y>) > sJ, so there exists
a probability distribution 7r' such that 7ri = (1 - Ej) 7' (D E6 yj. Furthermore, by definition
of ri'' (E, Ej), o% E supp (7r') only if there exists 7rj such that 7T (-y) > Es and ag E E (7)
(whether or not oj equals yj)." By definition of I" (Esi), this implies that 7r' E f l (Ei).
Combining the above observations,
inf u ('Ye, -y) = inf sup inf a, (Ci, 7i)
= inf sup inf (1 - E6) u, (ai, T') + Euj (aT, .
= sup inf (1 -E) uI (7i, r') + Ej (0)
=(1 - Eg) Ui (7i).
Therefore, the definitions of u* (Ei, Ej) and u* (E6) imply that u* (Ei, Ej) = Sup (1 Ej) u* (4j)
(1 - Ej) u* (Ei). Similarly, the definition of a maxmin posture in the one-sided commitment
model implies that y is a maxmin posture in the two-sided commitment model if and
only if it is a maxmin posture in the one-sided commitment model with E = Ei. U
Theorem 3 implies that the qualitative insights of Theorem 2 also apply with two-sided
commitment. For example, fixing any 62 bounded away from 0, U* (E1, 62) goes to 0 at a
logarithmic rate in Ei. Thus, Theorem 3 says much more than that u* (61, E2) is continuous
in E2 at E2 = 0. Table 2 displays the maxmin payoff for both the one-sided commitment
:"Here, the weaker statement that r' (-yj) > 0 only if there exists 7rj such that 7rj (-y) > Ei and oT E Z (7r,)
is immediate, and this can be strengthened to the statement that 7e E supp (7r') only if there exists such a
7T because the best-response correspondence is upper hemi-continuous in beliefs.
model and the two-sided commitment model in the case where E1 = E2 = E:
6 n(6) (1 - ) U ()
.25 .42 .31
.1 .30 .27
10 .13 .13
10-6 .07 .07
10-9 .05 .05
Table 2: The Maxmin Payoff for Different Commitment
Probabilities E with One- and Two-Sided Commitment
Finally, Definition 11 specifies that player i's belief is consistent with knowledge of ratio-
nality only if it assigns probability exactly Ej to the event that player j is committed to Ej.
If this were relaxed by specifying that a belief is consistent with knowledge of rationality if
it assigns any probability E < Ej to the event that player j is committed to Ej (and assigns
probability 1 - E to player i's being rational), Theorem 3 and its proof would go through
with trivial modifications. Thus, Theorem 3 requires only that player i believes that player
j's commitment probability is not more than E6, not that player i believes that player j's
commitment probability is exactly Fj.
2.7 Discrete-Time Bargaining with Frequent Offers
This section considers discrete-time bargaining procedures in which both players can make
offers frequently. This includes procedures with any order and relative frequency of offers. I
show that, with one-sided commitment, for any sequence of discrete-time bargaining games
that converges to continuous time (in the sense that each player may make an offer close to
any given time), the corresponding sequence of maxmin payoffs and postures converges to the
continuous-time maxmin payoff and posture given by Theorem 2 (the analogous result with
two-sided commitment is immediate and is omitted to simplify the exposition). Abreu and
Gul (2000) provide a similar independence-of-procedures result for sequential equilibrium
outcomes of reputational bargaining. Because my result concerns maxmin payoffs and
postures rather than equilibria, my proof is very different from Abreu and Gul's.
Formally, replace the (continuous time) bargaining phase of Section 2.3 with the following
procedure: There is a (commonly known) function g : R+- {0, 1, 2} that specifies who
makes an offer at each time. If g (t) = 0, no player takes an action at time t. If g (t) i E
{1, 2}, then player i makes a demand ui (t) E [0, 1] at time t, and player j immediately accepts
or rejects. If player j accepts, the game ends with payoffs (e-rtu (t) , e--r (1 - u, (t))); if
player j rejects, the game continues. Let 17 {t : g (t) = i}, and assume that I7 n [0, t] is
finite for all t and that I7 is infinite. The announcement phase is correspondingly modified
so that player 1 announces a posture y : I -- [0, 1], and if player 1 becomes committed to
posture -y (which continues to occur with probability E), she demands '} (t) at time t and
rejects all of player 2's demands. I refer to the function g as a discrete-time bargaining
game.
I now define convergence to continuous time. This definition is very similar to that of
Abreu and Gul (2000), as is the above model of discrete-time bargaining and the correspond-
ing notation.
Definition 12 A sequence of discrete-time bargaining games {gn} converges to continuous
time if for all A > 0, there exists N such that for all n > N, t E R+, and i E {1, 2},
lIg" n [t, t + A] # 0.
The maxmin payoff and posture in a discrete-time bargaining game are defined exactly
as in Section 2.3. Let u*'" be player l's maxmin payoff in discrete-time bargaining game
g, and let u*' (-y) be player l's maxmin payoff given posture , in g. The independence-of-
procedures results states that, for any sequence of discrete-time bargaining games converging
to continuous time, the corresponding sequence of maxmin payoffs {u*'9"} converges to u*,
and any corresponding sequence of postures {y9n } such that u* '" (,-}g) - u* "converges" to
y*, where u* and y* are the maxmin payoff and posture identified in Theorem 2. The nature
of the convergence of the sequence {y-n } to -y* is slightly delicate. For example, there may
be (infinitely many) times t E R+ such that lim, }On (t) exists and is greater than y* (t),
because these demands may be "non-serious" (in that they are followed immediately by lower
demands)."' Thus, rather than stating the convergence in terms of {y9n} and y*, I state
it in terms of the corresponding continuation values of player 2, which are the economically
more important variables. Formally, given a posture 7y9 in discrete-time bargaining game
g", let
v9" (t) Ttmax e-r-t (1 - Y'" (T)).
T >t:T(-Ig*
Let v* (t) = max {1 - ert/ (1 - log e) , 0}, the continuation value corresponding to -y* in the
continuous-time model of Section 2.3. The independence-of-procedures result is as follows:
Theorem 4 Let {g4} be a sequence of discrete-time bargaining games converging to contin-
uous time. Then u'"n -> u*, and if {79n } is a sequence of postures with 79"g a posture in gn
and u* g" (j9-) -* u*, then van (t) -- v* (t) for all t E R+.
The key fact behind the proof of Theorem 4 is that for any sequence of discrete-time pos-
tures {y" } converging to some continuous-time posture -y, lim u (7}9) = limnn, u* (}qj)
(where u* (39-) is the maxmin payoff given a natural embedding of 79g in continuous time,
defined formally in the supplementary appendix). This fact is proved by constructing a be-
lief that is similar to the 79g-offsetting belief in each discrete-time game gn and then showing
that these beliefs converge to the -y-offsetting belief in the limiting continuous-time game.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a model of reputational bargaining in which players initially announce
postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over a unit of surplus. It
characterizes the highest payoff that a player can guarantee herself under first-order knowl-
edge of rationality, along with the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to
guarantee herself this much. A key step in the characterization is showing that this maxmin
payoff is the payoff a player receives when her opponent holds the "offsetting belief' that
she mixes between following her announced posture and accepting her opponent's demand
at a specific rate. Technically, this intermediate result lets one evaluate a posture in terms
of its performance against an opponent who holds the corresponding offsetting belief, rather
...The reason this complication does not arise in Theorem 2 is that the assumption that y (t) is continuous
at, non-integer times rules out "non-serious" demands.
than having to check it's performance against every rational opposing strategy. Conceptu-
ally, it shows that the maxmin payoff is also the lowest payoff that can be obtained by a
player who knows her opponent's strategy, establishing an equivalence between "maxmin"
and "Bayesian" definitions of the highest guaranteed payoff.
I find that a player can guarantee herself a relatively high share of the surplus even if her
probability of becoming committed is very small, and that the unique bargaining posture
that guarantees this much is simply demanding this share of the surplus in addition to
compensation for any delay in reaching agreement. These insights apply for one- or two-
sided commitment, for any bargaining procedure with frequent offers, for general bargaining
sets, for heterogeneous discount factors, and for any level of knowledge of rationality. In
addition, if a player could only announce postures that always demand the same share of the
surplus (as in most of the existing literature), her maxmin payoff would be approximately c
times lower.
These results are intended to complement the existing equilibrium analysis of reputational
bargaining models. Consider the fundamental question, "What posture should a bargainer
stake out?" In equilibrium analysis, the answer to this question depends on her opponent's
beliefs about her continuation play following every possible announcement. Yet it may be
impossible for either the bargainer or an outside observer to learn these beliefs, especially
when bargaining is one-shot. Hence, an appealing alternative approach is to look for a
posture that guarantees a high payoff against any belief of one's opponent, and for the
highest payoff that each player can guarantee herself. This paper shows that this approach
yields sharp and economically plausible results, while addressing important concerns about
robustness.
The results of this paper are particularly applicable in models where the division of the
surplus is of primary importance (rather than the details of how bargaining proceeds, which
depend on additional behavioral assumptions). A leading example is the class of models
where two parties make costly ex ante investments and then bargain over the resulting sur-
plus. It is a direct consequence of Theorem 3 that, if the players' commitment probabilities
are small, both players benefit from comparable increases in their commitment probabili-
ties.'" Note that this is distinct from the idea that both players benefit from reducing delay;
rather, both players benefit because higher commitment probabilities reduce the scope for
pessimism about how bargaining will proceed (which would not be possible in an equilibrium
analysis). This implies that, for example, comparably increasing both players' commitment
powers increases investments whenever investments are complementary. It seems likely that
additional insights could be derived by further studying non-equilibrium models of bargaining
both in this class of models and in other applied theory models involving bargaining.
Finally, I discuss two additional interesting issues for future research. First, an earlier
version of this paper extends the model to multilateral bargaining, where n > 3 players
must unanimously agree on the division of the surplus. In such a model, player j may
reject any proposal if he expects player k to do so as well, and vice versa. Hence, a
player with commitment power cannot guarantee herself a positive payoff under knowledge
of rationality. It therefore remains to be seen whether reputational models can make sharp
and robust predictions in multilateral bargaining.
Second, it would be interesting to analyze commitment and reputation-building under
knowledge of rationality in dynamic games other than bargaining, noting that the definition
of a player's maxmin payoff and posture extends to general games. One intriguing observa-
tion is that the rate at which the reputation-builder's maxmin payoff converges to her lowest
feasible payoff as her commitment probability converges to 0 is slower in my model than in
existing repeated game models. In particular, the reputation-builder's (player l's) maxmin
payoff converges to her minimum payoff of 0 at a logarithmic rate in E in my model, while
in repeated game models this convergence is at a polynomial rate in E.42  To understand
this difference, recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that if player 1 announces a constant
posture y, then her maxmin payoff given posture y equals 67/( 1 ~7y, which is polynomial in
" To see this somewhat more formally, recall that Theorem 3 states that player i's maxmin pay-
off is U(e,ej) = . Therefore, au e e -= , while an e,&,) 1 Since1 1og~, a~ E(1-1og~i) 'e 1-1og~,
lim,-o Ei (1 - log E) = 0, it follows that lime, 0 aui Eiej)Iaa = 0o. In this sense, an increase in E6
increases player i's maxmin payoff by much more than an increase in Ej decreases it.
"Fudenberg and Levine (1989) show that if player 1 is committed to her Stackelberg action with probability
7 and player 2 is nvopic, then player 1's payoff in any Nash equilibrium is at least E- I 1 + (1 - E ra) LI, for
some constant a > 0, where 7iL is her Stackelberg payoff and ul is her lowest feasible payoff. This bound
is the basis for most of the subsequent literature; for example, convergence to ui is also polynomial in E in
Schmidt (1993), Cripps, Schmidt, and Thomas (1996), and Evans and Thomas (1997).
E. However, the maxmin constant posture is increasing in E (and goes to 0 as E -4 0), and
Corollary 2 shows that player 1 can guarantee herself a payoff that goes to 0 at a logarithmic
rate in E by appropriately recalibrating her announced posture as E -- 0. Thus, roughly
speaking, the reason why reputation bounds in the repeated games literature converge to 0
more quickly than in my model is that there is generally no way to continuously moderate
one's posture as one's commitment probability decreases in repeated games.
2.9 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs for Sections 2.3 and 2.4
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof uses results from Section 2.4, and therefore should
not be read before reading Section 2.4.
Fix a posture -y and payoff u1 E [m* (-y) , 1). If ui # , (0), then let ui be identical to the
'y-offsetting strategy defined in Definition 9, with the modification that player l's demand
is accepted at any history h' at which player 1 has demanded it1 at all previous dates. If
i = -y (0), then let &' be identical to the y-offsetting strategy defined in Definition 9, with
the modification that player l's demand is accepted at date (- log (u1 ) /r, -1) if player 1
has demanded 1 at all previous dates. In either case, let 7r' be as in Definition 9, and note
that wr' (-y) > E. If ui # -y (0), no strategy under which u1 (0) = u1 is in the support of
72; similarly, if u1 = y (0), no strategy under which u1 (0) = 1 is in the support of gr- (since
i1 < 1). Therefore, the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3 shows that K E E* (7r ).
Hence, the belief fri given by fri ( = 1 is an element of I'. Furthermore, under strategy
2i, player 2 always demands 1 and only accepts player l's demand if player 1 has either
conformed to -y through time t* (defined in Section 2.4.2) or has always demanded ui (in
the ui # -y (0) case) or 1 (in the ui -y (0) case). Note that exp (-r (- log (ui) /r)) = u1.
Hence, in either case, ni (o1, fri) E {0, u* (}) , ui} for every strategy a1 . Let 6-i be the
strategy of player l's that always demands ui (if u1 # - (0)) or 1 (if i = -y (0)) and never
accepts player 2's demand. Then ni (&i, fri) = 1 = maxo1 ni (o 1, i), completing the proof.
U
Proof of Lemma 2. I prove the result for pure strategies 0 2 , which immediately implies
the result for mixed strategies.
Fix 7 2 such that 7r2 (y) > E and pure strategy 02 E E* (7 2 ). The plan of the proof is
to show that if r2 (7 ) > E and agreement is not reached by T under strategy profile (Y, o 2),
then player 2 must be certain that player 1 is playing y at any time t > T. This suffices to
prove the lemma, because 9 2 E E2* (7 2 ) implies that player 2 accepts y (t) no later than time
t = T if at any time t > T agreement has not been reached and he is certain that player 1
is playing 7y.
Let X(72,i2) (t) be the probability that player 2 assigns to player 1 not playing 7 at
date (t, -1) when his initial belief is r2 and play up until date (t, -1) is given by player
l's following strategy 7 and player 2's following (pure) strategy U2 ; this is determined by
Bayes' rule, because 7 2 (7) > F > 0. By convention, if agreement is reached at time T, let
x(7r2,(2) (t) - X(72,U2) (r) for all t > T. Let t (h,U 2 ) be the time at which agreement is reached
under strategy profile (7, 9 2) (with the convention that t (Y, o 2 ) o if agreement is never
reached under (-, 9 2)); and let
i (', 0 2 ) slip {t (7r2,02) (t) > 0}
the latest time at which player 2 is not certain that player 1 is playing 7 under strategy
profile (Y, o 2 ) with belief 7r2 . Let
sup (7, 0-2 ) (14)
(7'2 C2 ) :7r2 (-Y) 'E,i 2 CZ r2 (7r2 ) ,t(^Y,u 2 ) tc(Y,U 2)
That is, T is the latest possible time t at which player 2 is not certain that player 1 is
following -} and agreement is not reached by t. I will show that T T, which completes the
proof.
I first claim that in the definition of T it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to
(r 2 , ( 2) such that ( 2 always demands u2 (t) = 1, 7r2 puts probability 1 on player 1 conceding
at any history ht+ at which u1 (t) f 7 (t), and r2 puts probability 0 on player 1 conceding
at any history ht-; that is, that the right-hand side of (14) continues to equal T when this
additional constraint is imposed. To see this, suppose that (7r'2, a 2) satisfies r' (y) > E,
-' E E* (7r'), and t (,'a) > t (-y, a') (the constraints of (14)). Let 1r2 be the belief under
which player 1 demands ui (t) = - (t) for all t E R+; accepts player 2's demand at every
history of the form (7 (T) , 1),, at the same rate and probability at which player 1 deviates
from - at time t (i.e., at date (t, -1), (t, 0), or (t, 1)) under strategy profile (7i, o') (viewing
72 as a mixed strategy of player l's); and rejects player 2's demand at every other history.
Clearly, there exists a strategy 0 2 E E* (7r 2 ) that always demands U 2 (t) = 1. Note that
player l's rate and probability of deviating from y at history (y (T) , 1)T<t under belief 7 2
is the same as at time t under strategy profile (7rg, o'), and that player 2's continuation
payoff after such a deviation is weakly higher in the former case. Recall that strategy y
never accepts player 2's demand, so agreement is reached only if player 2 accepts player l's
demand or if player 1 has deviated from -y. Therefore, since rejecting player l's demand
-y (t) under strategy profile (7r', a') is optimal for all t < t ('h, o'2), it follows that rejecting
player l's demand -y (t) at history (-y (T) , 1),t is optimal under belief 7r2 , for all t < t (,T, U).
This implies that t (7y, 0 2 ) > t ('y, U'2). Furthermore, X (2U2) (t) = x(§'2) (t) for all t E +
so t (Y, a 2 ) = (7, o'2 ). Hence, t (-Y, 0 2) > (7, U2 ). Finally, T2 (Y) > E. Therefore, (7T2 , a 2 )
satisfies the constraints of (14); 9 2 always demands U2 (t) = 1; 7 2 puts probability 1 oni
player 1 conceding at any history ht+ at which ui (t) f y (t); 7r2 puts probability 0 oi
player 1 conceding at any history h'-; and ( , a 2 ) > (7, a'); so the right-hand side of (14)
continues to equal T when the additional constraint is imposed.
Thus, fix a belief 7r2 that puts probability 1 on player 1 conceding at any history ht+ at
which u1 (t) / -y (t), and puts probability 0 on player 1 conceding at any history ht-. Let
A)2 (t) and pT2 (t) be the concession rate and probability of player I at history (T (T) , 1),,
when her strategy is given by 72; let S72 be the (countable) set of times s such that p12 (s) >
0; and let i (7r2 ) - (y, ag), where o, is the strategy that always demands u2 (t) =1 and
always rejects player l's demand. Fixing a strategy a2 E E* (7r2) that always demands
U2 (t) = 1, note that (Y, a 2 ) and (-y, a) induce the same path of play until time t (7, U 2 ),
and therefore t (y, a 2) £ (-Y, a2 ) if and only if t (Y, a 2 ) > F (-r2). Hence, t (, 2 ) > i (Y, a 2 )
if and only if it is optimal for player 2 to reject player l's offer until time t (7r2 ), when his
initial belief is r2 and player 1 plays -y. I claim that this holds if and only if
1 -y(t)
/l(r 2 )
< ex (T - t) - f A 2 (s) ds) ( i (1 - p7 2 (s)) A 1 2 (T) dT
t sES2n (t , )
exp (-r (s - t) - A72 (q) dq) r (1 -7p2 (q)) p12 (S)
(qES'2n(t,s)
+ E
sES"2n (t,i(7F2)
(H)2)
+ exp 
-_r (i (72) - t) - i A 
2 (s) ds) (1 _ 7r2 (s)) V (F (7r2))
n(t,i((2))
(15)for all t < F (7r2) .
The left-hand side of (15) is player 2's payoff from accepting player l's demand at date
(t, 1) when p12 (t) = 0. The right-hand side of (15) is player 2's continuation payoff from
rejecting player l's demand until time (7r2) when p112 (t) = 0. Thus, (15) must hold if
t (-Y, o-2 ) ;> F (7 2 ). It remains to show that (15) implies that it is optimal for player 2 to
reject at times where p12 (t) > 0. Suppose that pT2 (t) > 0. At date (t, -1), the fact
that S12 is countable and (15) holds at all times before t that are not in S12 implies that
lim 1 , (1 - 7 (r)) is weakly less than player 2's continuation payoff from rejecting playing 1's
demand until time t (7r2). Furthermore, the fact that player 1 concedes with probability 0
at date (t, -1) implies that limTt (1 - y (T)) is indeed player 2's payoff from accepting at
date (t, -1). Thus, rejecting is optimal at date (t, -1). At date (t, 1), player 2's payoff
from accepting is (1 - p112 (t) /2) (1 - -y (t)) + (p T2 (t) /2) (1), while his continuation payoff
from rejecting until time t (7 2 ) is 1 - p' 2 (t) times the right-hand side of (15) plus p7 2 (t) (1).
Hence, (15) implies that rejecting is optimal at date (t, 1) as well.
p -r?
exp -- r (T - t) - A"2 (s) ds) (1 - p72 (s)) A12 (T) dT
(ses'2n(t,T)
exp (-r (s - t- [ )12 (q) dq) (q (1 - p72 (q)) p12 (s)
2n(ti(72 )) qs2n(t,s)
+ exp -r( (7 2) - t) -- yi( 2
)
for all t < (7r2) .
A 1 2 (s) ds)
) sES'2n(t,i(7r2))
(1- p12 (s))o (i (72))
(16)
To see this, note that (16) immediately implies (15) because v (t) > 1 - (t) for all t. For
the converse, suppose that (15) holds. If v (t) > 1 - y (t) then v (t) = e r(T-t) (1 - -T (T)) for
some T > t such that v (r, -1) = 1 - -y (T), which implies that v (T, -1) is weakly less than
the limit as s T r of the right-hand side of (16) evaluated at time s (with the convention
that the right-hand side of (16) equals v (s) if s ;> (7 2 )). Now the right-hand side of (16)
at time t is at least e--r(-t) times as large as is this limit, which implies that the right-hand
side of (16) at time t is at least e--r(-- )v (T, -1) = v (t). Hence, (16) holds.
By the previous two paragraphs, (14) may be rewritten as
T = sup sup t : X12 (t)
72:72(Y)>E,
(16) holds
exp ( f 2 (S) dS) Hses- 2n[o,t) (1 - r2 (s))
exp (- fJ \2 (s) ds) HsE 2n [0t) (1 - p7 2 (s)) > 0 .
(17)
I first show that there exists some belief 7 2 that both attains the (outer) supremum in (17)
(with the convention that the supremum is attained at 7r2 if i (-r2) =T = oo) and also
maximizes limtp XyT2 (t) over all beliefs 7r2 that attain the supremum (note that this limit
exists for all T2 , because x"T2 (t) is non-increasing). I also show that (16) must hold with
equality (at all t < T) under any such belief T2 , which implies that (17) may be solved under
the additional constraint that (16) holds with equality.
First, fix a sequence {X2} such that i (7r2) T T, 7r' (}) > F for all n, and (16) holds for all
In addition, (15) holds if and only if
v (t)
-E(72)
<; 
i
±
sCS~
n. Note that ,"' (t) is non-increasing in t, for all n. Since the space of monotone functions
from R+ to [0, 1] is sequentially compact (by Helly's selection theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley
(1995) Theorem 25.9)), there exists a subsequence {x2 } that converges pointwise to some
(non-increasing) function 2." Furthermore, x'T (0) = 1 - e, because X"" (0) = 1 - E for
all m. Combined with the fact that x1 2 is non-increasing, this implies that there exists a
pair of functions (A\2 : R+ - R+, p12 : R+ - [0, 1]) such that p 1 2 (t) = 0 for all t outside of
a countable set S12 and
(texp ( A2 (s) ds Hsesi2niO,t) (1 ~ pT2 (s)) -
X72 (t) = x 
HG-not
exp - f A7 2 (s) ds Hses 2 n[ot) (1 - p12 (s))
for all t. Therefore, there exists a belief 7r2 E A (E1 ) corresponding to concession rate
(resp., probability) A"2 (t) (resp., pT2 (t)) such that 7r2 (Y) > E. Finally, the fact that
X71 (t) -X 7 2 (t) for all t implies that
exp A" (s) ds 1 (1 - p " (s)) - exp (- A7 2 2 (s) ds) (1 - p W)
ses5-2n[o,t) sESwr2n[O't)
for all t. Since for all t < T, there exists M > 0 such that (16) holds at time t under 7'2" for
all m > M, this implies that (16) holds at all times t < T under 7r2.
I now show that if there exists a time t < T at which (16) holds with strict inequality
under belief 7T2 , then there exists an alternative belief r' that attains the supremum in (17).
Suppose such a time t exists. I claim that it follows that there exists a time ti < F (7r2)
at which (16) holds with strict inequality and in addition either f \+A A7 2 (s) ds > 0 for all
A > 0 or EsGs72n[t Jt1+A) p7 2 (s) > 0 for all A > 0. To see this, note that there must exist a
time t' E (t, F (7 2 )) such that either ft, A72 (s) ds > 0 for all A > 0 or p7 2 (t') > 0 (because
otherwise (16) could not hold with strict inequality at t). Let t1 be the infimum of such
'3Showing that the space of monotone functions from R+ -4 [0, 1] is sequentially compact requires a slightly
different version of Helly's selection theorem than that in Billingsley (1995), so here is a direct proof: If {f,}
is a sequence of monotone functions R+ -> [0, 1], then there exists a subsequence {fm} C {f,} that converges
on Q+ to a monotone function f : Q+> [0, 1]. Let f : R+ -+ [0,1] be given by f (x) lim 1 ,o f (xj),
where {x} x and xz E Q+ for all /. Then f is monotone, which implies that there is a countable set S
such that J is continuous on R+\S. Since S is countable, there exists a sub-subsequence {fk} _ {fm} such
that {fk} converges on S. Finally, let f (x) = f (x) if x E R+\S and f (x) = lim_-oo fk (x) if x E S. Then
{f} - f.
times t', and note that either A"2 (s) ds > 0 for all A > 0 or EsCS 2n [ti,t+A) p12  > U
for all A > 0. Then the fact that (16) holds with strict inequality at time t implies that
(16) holds with strict inequality at time ti, because otherwise the fact that ft , A 2 (s) ds = 0
and p T2 (t") = 0 for all t" E [t, ti) would imply that (16) could not hold with strict inequality
at time t.
Thus, let to < T be such that (16) holds with strict inequality at time to and in addition
ft t' A A 12 (s) ds > 0 for all A > 0 (the case where EsE2n[to,to+A) p7T2 (s) > 0 is similar, and
thus omitted). Since v (t) is continuous but for downward jumps, there exist '1 > 0 and
A > 0 such that (16) holds with strict inequality at t for all t E [to, to + A) when AX 2 (t)
is replaced by (1 - 7)) A 1 2 (t) for all t E [to, to+ A). Define A 12' (t) by A"2' (t) =-A" 2 (t)
for all t ( [to, to + A) and A7 2' (t) - (1 - ) A7 2 (t) for all t E [to, to + A). Next, I
claim that at time to player 2's continuation payoff from rejecting - until i (7 2 ) is strictly
lower when player l's concessions are given by (A"12 (t) , p12 (t)) than when they are given
by (A"2' (t) ,p 7 12" (t)), where p112" (t) is defined by p12" (t) p 7T 2 (t) for all t # to, and
p7 r2" (to) =1 - exp (-ii f(t±A A"2 (s) ds) (1 - p7 2 (to)) > 0. This follows because the to-
tal probability with which player 1 concedes in the interval [to, to + A) is the same under
(AX 2 (t) , p7 2 (t)) and under (A 12' (t) ,p 7 12" (t)), and some probability mass of concession is
moved earlier to to under (A7 2' (t) ,p112" (t)). Therefore, there exists ( > 0 such that at
time to player 2's continuation payoff from rejecting 'y until i(7 2) is the same when player
l's concessions are given by (A 12 (t) ,p11 2 (t)) and when they are given by (A7 2' (t) ,p 7 2' (t)),
where p"2' (t) is defined by p7 2' (t) p7 2 (t) for all t f to, and p"2' (to) (1 - (p"2" (to) <
px2" (to). The fact that (16) holds at all t < T when player l's concessions are given by
(A 7 2 (t) , p"2 (t)) now implies that (16) holds at all t < T when player l's concessions are
given by (A 12' (t) , p 7 2' (t)). Furthermore, exp (- f/' A 7 2' (t) dt) sSS'2n lo,) (1 - p72' ( >)) 
exp (_ fj A"2 (t) dt) (1 - p7 2 (s)) > E. Therefore, sup {t : x" (t) > 0} ;> i, so
by the definition of t it must be that sup {t : xj' (t) > 0} =.
Next, suppose that (16) holds with equality under belief w2 (defined above), and that in
addition v (t) is differentiable at some time t < i (F 2 ). Then the derivative of the right-hand
side of (16) at t must exist and equal v'(t). This implies that p"2 (t) = 0, and, by Leibniz's
rule, the derivative of the right-hand side of (16) equals -A72 (t) + (r + AJ2 (t)) v (t). Hence,
A\T2 t)=rv (t) - v' (t)
1 - V (t)
Since v (t) is differentiable almost everywhere, this implies that
fT  2 (s) ds = A (s) ds (18)
for all T < t (7 2 ), where A (s) is defined by (5). Similarly, if (16) holds with equality then
the difference between the limit as s T t of the right-hand side of (16) evaluated at s and the
limit as s { t of the right-hand side of (16) evaluated at s must equal v (t, -1) - v (t), for all
t < F (7 2). By inspection, this difference equals p72 (t) - p12 (t) v (t). Hence,
p 7 2 ( =v (t, -1) - v (t)
px2V (t))1 - v (t)
for all t < t (7r2 ). Therefore,
J7 (I - p )2 N (i-p(s)) (19)
sES'2n[O,T) sESn[O,T)
for all T < F (7 2 ), where S is the set of discontinuity points of v (t), and p (s) is defined by
(6). Combining (18) and (19), I conclude that if (16) holds with equality under belief 7r2 ,
then
(7 2 ) = sup t exp jt A (s) ds) s[ (1 - p (s)) > E
sESn[0,t)
which equals T. In addition, 7r2 (t) < 0 for all t E (, T), so T T and the supremum in
(17) is attained at 7r2 -
Combining the previous three paragraphs, it follows that the supremum in (17) is always
attained at some belief 7r2. I now show that there exists a belief that both attains the
suprenun in (17) and maximizes limj x12 (t) over all beliefs 7r2 that attain the supremum
in (17). Let X E [0, 1] be the supremum of lintp X12 (t) over all beliefs 7r2 that attain the
suprenum in (17). If X = 0, then any belief 7r2 that attains the supremum in (17) also
satisfies limtTt X7 2 (t) = X. Thus, suppose that X > 0. Let {7} be a sequence of beliefs
that all attain the supremum in (17) such that limtp x2 (t) I x. The above sequential
compactness argument implies that there exists a subsequence {72'"} C {wr} and a belief
72 satisfying the constraints of (17) such that X" (t) - xx2 (t) for all t. Furthermore,
x12 (t) is non-increasing, so lim tj. x72 (t) exists. Because 72 satisfies the constraints of (17),
lim 1te X1T2 (t) < x. Now suppose, toward a contradiction, that limTT X72 (t) < A. Then there
exists ii > 0 and t' < T such that x12 (t') < - ;. Since limnm. limP x"T (t) = x, there
exists M > 0 such that, for all m > M, lin X~m (t) > x -t. And xT' (t) is non-increasing
for all m, so this implies that X" (t') > X - il for all n > M. Now X"' (t') - y 2 (t')
implies that x12 (t') ;> X - iq, a contradiction. Therefore, limtnt X2 (t) = x. Furthermore,
limtTt X7 2 (t) > 0 implies that 7r2 attains the supremuni in (17).
Finally, if (16) holds with strict inequality at some time t < T under a belief 7r2 such
that t (7r2) T, the same procedure for modifying 7r2 described above yields a belief 7T such
that t (7') = and limTg 2" (t) > lin. x' (t). This implies that the only beliefs 7r2 that
both attain the supremum in (17) and maximize limtt VX2 (t) (over all beliefs that attain
the supremum in (17)) satisfy the additional constraint that (16) holds with equality. Since
I have proved that such a belief exists, the value of (17) equals the value of (17) under this
additional constraint, which I have shown to equal T. *
Proof of Theorem 1. Let y, and -* be defined as in Section 2.4.4. Note that {}
converges pointwise to y*. To show that limn,, u* (y) = 1/ (1 - log E), it remains only to
show that T > T (7y) for all n C N. To see this, note that T = log ( (1 - log E)).
Since 7, (t) (4) i for all t < T1 and 7 (t) is non-decreasing, it follows that v (t)
1 - ( n+) 1 _' for all t < Tn. Therefore,
exp T Irv t)- v' (t) 1 -V (s, -1)
-exp ( dt n1)(-oe~ tt0 1V (t) sE ,[ T ] 8
= exp - r ) ( log E) erdt
0 
= exp n + 1 I-los rT,
(n+n1
= exp - (1 -logE) 1-(n n + 11 - logse
= exp -- (1 - log E) E(n
Hence, by the definition of T ( }), T T (v,). Furthermore, the fact that exp ( f "-v(tdt)
is strictly decreasing in T for all T E [0, T] implies that Tn > T (-y).
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, I must show that if {0} is any sequence of pos-
tures converging pointwise to some posture -y satisfying u* ('Yn) -+ + 1  1/ (1 - log e), then
' = '*." There are two steps. First, letting {vn} be the continuation value functions
corresponding to the {-Y}, and letting v* be the continuation value function corresponding
to -*, I show that suPtc, e rt I* (t) - vn (t)| - 0. Second, I show that this implies that
Step 1:
Supposethat u* (y) > 1/ (1 - loge)-( for some posture y andsome( E (0, 1/ (1 - logE)).
Let T 1 z (1/r) log (1 - log e) (which equals limn,, T). Then it must be that T(y) <
T' - (1/r-) log (1 - ( (1 - log E)), for otherwise it would follow from T () >T() that
u* () = nin e-ryt) rTe-y) T()
t<T(-y) - t
< exp (-ri' + log (1 - ( (1 - log e))) (1) = -og
Furthermore, if u* (y) > 1/ (1 - log e) -(, it must also be that -y (t) > ert (1/ (1 - log e) -
''Technically, I must also show that u* (y*) < 1/ (1 - log E). In fact, u (-y*) 0, by Lemma 4 and the
observation that T (y-*) = oc (which follows because -y* (t) = 1 for all t > T (7*)).
for all t < T (-y), for otherwise mint T(,) e--r> (t) would be strictly less than 1/ (1 - log E) -.
I will show that, for all S > 0, there exists( > 0 such that, if both ' (t) > ert (1/ (1 - log E) -()
for all t < T ('}) and T (y) < T' - (1/r) log (1 - ( (1 - log E)), then sup,,I(,) u* (t) - v (t)| <
.
If T (-y) TP - (1/r) log (1 - ( (1 - log 6)) then T ('y) is finite, and therefore
exp (- y) rv (t) - v' ( dt [T
0 1 V (t ) sE n ,T 7 1 -uv(s))
It is straightforward to check that -y (t) > er (1/ (1 - log6) - () for all t < T ('a) only if
v (t) < 1 - er (1/ (1 - log E) - () for all t < T ("). Recall that e-rtV (t) is non-increasing.
Thus, if y (t) > er' (1/ (1 - log E) - () for all t < T (,) and T ('i) is finite, then
inf exp (- f
v(t): 0
e--rtv(t) nton-increasing,
V(t)< 1-ert (,_ -1
rv (t) - v' (t) 1 v (s, -1)) (20)1V - o()1-V (S)
ssSO0,T(Y)1
I first show that any attainable value of the program on the left-hand side of (20) can
be arbitrarily closely approximated by the value attained by a continuous function v (t)
satisfying the constraints of (20); hence, in calculating the infinium over such values, attention
may be restricted to continuous functions. To see this, fix q E (0, 1) and let
S' U
sESO [,t(Y)1
[s- , s1.
Define the function v4r (t) by v"r (t) = v (t) for all t V Sr', and
v, (t) V (s - i) - t - (s - (V (s - 77) - o (s))
'1)
for all t c S".
Observe that 0 (t) is continuous. Furthermore, for all s C S,
vxp' (t)/ \ - vT) (s -g - - (s - r/)
exp i 1 - o(tdt = 1 - v) (s) 1- v (s)
Also, since on (t) < 1
goes to 0 as 1) -> 0,
(1/ (1 - log 6) - () < 1 for all t E [0, t (Y) , and the measure of Sr
lim exp -
n-0o Js I
rV (t)> 
-dt 1.
1 - V" (t)J
Therefore,
1 - 7 1 (t) exp -- I V (t)sri 1 - on (t) dt)
sesnloT(7)]
v(s - )
1 - V (s))
rv (t) v' (t) dt
1 - o (t) FL
sCSr1O tOTY)1
1 - v (s, -1)
1- v (s) ) *
I now derive a lower bound on the left-hand side (20) under the additional constraint
that v (t) is continuous. Using the fact that v (s, -1) = v (s) for all s when v is continuous
and integrating the v'(t) / (1 - v (t)) term, this constrained program may be rewritten as
inf
e v(t) no-111ncreIsing.
v~t)<-e"(_( 
-(
exp - I T/ y) rv (t) dt1 - v (t) 1- V (0)1 -( ()
Since v (t) > 0 for all t, the value of this program is bounded from below by the value of the
program:
inf exp
v(t) continiouls:
e-r1tv(t) n1on-increasing,
v(t)<1 -Ce t -10EA
IO TY)0 7V (t)dt (1 - V (0))1 - V (t) (21)
Note that (21) decreases whenever the value of v (t) is increased on a subset of [0, () of
positive measure, so the unique solution to (21) is v (t) = 1 - ert (1/ (1 - log e) - () for all
t < t (,). With this function v (t), it can be checked that the value ofT (Y) such that (21)
equals e is
T' - 1 log (1 - C (1 - log E) log E) . (22)
This value is a lower bound on T (7) for any posture -y such that -y (t) ' er't (1/ (1 - log E) -
I (Y)lim exp -
= lim exp -
rn-0
v?7 (t) 
- v', (t)dt
1- v (t)
J{o0t(y)1 \Sr,
T(-)
= exp (
for all t < T (y). Thus, as (- 0, the unique solution to (21) converges to v* (t)
1 - ert/ (1 - log e) for all t < T (-y), and the corresponding lower bound on T (') (i.e.,
(22)) converges to T'. Furthermore, by the condition that e-rtv (t) is non-increasing, any
function v (t) satisfying the constraints of (21) yields a lower bound on T (') that is greater
than (22) by at least an amount proportional to supt<i) v* (t) - o (t)v. Therefore, for
any fixed 6 > 0, there exists ( > 0 such that if both -y (t) > er (1/ (1 - logE) - ) for all
t < T (-y) and T ( y) < T - (1/r) log (1 - ( (1 - log e)) (which converges to T' as - 0),
then supt<§t(-) V* (t) - V (t) I< 6.
Thus, I have shown that, for any 6 > 0 and K > 1, there exists ( (K) > 0 such that if
u* (}) > 1/ (1 - loge) - ( (K), then sujpt<1') e rt v (t) - v* (t) < 6/K. I now argue that,
for K sufficiently large, there exists (' E (0,( (K)) such that if u* () > 1(1 - log e) -
then in addition supt>h e lv (t) - v* (t)| < 6. To see this, note that as K - 00,
T (-y) -+ T' uniformly over all postures y such that supt<1) ert  l (t) - v* (t)| < 6/K.
Choose K* > I such that e-r(y) - e-rT' < 6/2 and v* i(a)) < erY) for any such
posture -y, and suppose that a posture -y is such that sipt<j() e-rt l (t) - v* (t) < 6/K
but e-rt0 v (to) - v* (to)| > 6 for some to > T (a). Then v* (to) < ertoo, so it follows that
e-rto0 * (to) + S < e- rov (to). Therefore,
max ert (1 (t)) > e-tOv (to) > .
t>T(y)
By the definition of T (-y), this implies that there exists t] E [t ('-) , T (-y)] such that
e-Irt (1 - -Y (ti)) > , or equivalently - (t1 ) < 1 - er t lo. Hence,
U* (}) min e-T'ty (t) < e-rt (1 - erti )t<T(y)
<; e--y) 1 l-06) = e-d -rly _
< e-T' 6/2 = 1/ (1 - log e) - 6/2.
Therefore, taking ( min {( (K*) , 6/2} completes the first step of the proof.
Step 2:
I show that if y, (t) -+ y (t) for all t E R+ for some posture y, and suiptER+ e ov (t) - v, (t)
0, then -y = *. First, note that if -y (t) < y* (t) for some t C R+, then there exist N > 0
and q > 0 such that y, (t) < y* (t) - q for all n > N. Since v, (t) > 1 - 7 (t), this implies
that v, (t) > 1 - * (t) + t = v* (t) + i for all n > N, a contradiction.
It is more difficult to rule out the possibility that 7 (t) > y* (t) for some t E R+. Suppose
that this is so. Since -y and -y* are right-continuous, there exist q > 0 and an open interval
1o C R+ such that 7 (t) > y* (t)+,q for all t E lo. If it were the case that 7, (t) ;> '* (t) +,11/2
for all t E 1o and n sufficiently large, then the condition SuPtCR+ -rt V * (t) - Vn (t)I -- 0
would fail, so this is not possible."4  Hence, there exists ti E lo and ni > 0 such that
, (t 1) < a* (ti) + iq/2. Since _Y, and -y* are right-continuous, there exists an open interval
I1 C I0 such that Yn (t) < y* (t) + rj/2 for all t E 1. Next, it cannot be the case that
7Y (t) > -)* (t) + q/2 for all t E Ii and n > ni (by the same argument as above), so there
exists t2 E I1 and n 2 > ni such that 7fl2 (t 2 ) < Y* (t2)+q/2. As above, this implies that there
exists an open interval 12 C I, such that 7'n2 (t) < y* (t) + 7/2 for all t E I2. Proceeding in
this manner yields a sequence of open intervals {Im} and integers {nm} such that Im+1 C I,
nmI > n,,, and X, (t) < y* (t) + 1)/2 for all t E Im and m E N. Let I = )cN Im, a non-
empty set (possibly a single point), and fix t E I. Then _Yn (t) < y* (t) + q/2 for all m E N,
and since nm+1 > nm for all m E N this contradicts the assumption that ') (t) - y (t). 0
"To see this, fix N > 0, suppose that 7, (t) > y* (t) + 7/2 for all t C 1o and
n > N, and denote the length of Io by 2A and the midpoint of Io by to. Noting that
y* (to) < 1 - )/2, there exists N' > 0 such that -, (t) > 1 - vn (t) > 1 - v* (t) -
ert (1 - e-A) (1 - y* (to) - r/2) = y* (t) - e (1 - e-A) (1 - y* (to) - r/2) for all t c R+ and n >
N'. Therefore, v, (to) < max {1 - y* (to) - r/2, e- (1 - y* (to + A)) + (1 - e-rl) (1 - y* (to) - r/2) } <
max { 1 - y* (to) - 7/2, 1 - y* (to) -(1 - -rA) r/2} = v* (to) - (1 - e-rA) r/2 for all n > max {N, N'}, a
contradiction.
2.10 Appendix B: Omitted Proofs for Sections 2.5 and 2.7
Proof of Proposition 2. Lemmas 2 through 4 apply to any posture, whether or not it
is constant. In addition, if -y is constant then T (') T (y). Thus, Lemma 4 implies that
u* (a') = Inint<T(%) e 7rt e rT(y)y.
t, so, by the definition of T (-y),
exp (
Furthermore, A (t) = r (1
-r (
-y) /y and p (t)
I 1 
1
T (7y) = - log E
if 7 < 1, and T (-y) = o0 if -y = 1. Therefore,
max e- rT(y),
yE[0,1]
max exp
yE[O,1) 1-
Note that (23) is concave in -y. Hence, the first-order condition
1::=::- ' 2log e,(1- -E)2
which has a solution if e < 1, is both necessary and sufficient. Solving this quadratic
equation yields
2 - log e - (loge) 2 4logE
-7Y
Finally, substituting (24) into (23) yields U* = exp (- (1 - -*)) *.
Proof of Corollary 2. By (24), -* loge = (1 - -*)2 for all e.
u* (e)U* (W) (1 -oge) exp (1 - -*)) -*
exp(-*)
_+.
The derivative of (25) with respect to -y* is negative for all - C [0, 1].
0 for all
log e ) (23)
(24)
Therefore,
(25)
-= E
Since -y* is an
increasing function of E, this implies that u* (E) /fi* (E) is decreasing in E. In addition, by
(24), lim- 1 * = 1 and liin,,o,* = 0. Therefore, (25) implies that lim,- 1 u* (E) /U* (E) - 1
and lim.o 0 u* (E) /U* (E) = e. m
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Theorem 2 goes through for any decreasing Pareto
frontier G, with the modifications that v (t, -1) now equals max,>t er(T-t) # (-Y (T)) rather
than inax;>, erT- (1 -t) (t)) (with the analogous modification for v (t)), and that the
imaxmin posture is now given by -.y* (t) = min {etu*, 1} for a value of u* that may differ
from 1/ (1 - log e). Therefore, it suffices to show that, for any ui E [0, 1], the posture
, (t) = min {ert ui, 1} corresponds to a weakly higher concession rate A (t), for all t, when the
Pareto frontier is @ o # than when it is #. Note that the set of times at which A (t) is given
by (5) is the same for either Pareto frontier, because 0 o # (u) = 1 if and only if # (u) = 1.
Hence, since Q and V) are concave and thus differentiable almost everywhere, it suffices to
show that
r@ (0 (ertui)) - 7' (0 (e'ui)) ' (ertui) rertui r# (ertui) - #' (edui) rertui
1 - 7P (# (ertui)) 1 - # (ertui)
for all t E R+ and it, E [0, 1]; or, dividing both sides by r and writing a for ert ui,
(# ) -0 W ' (# (W) #' (U) U # (M -0' (U) U
1 (# (u)) - 1 -(u)
for all u E [0, 1]. This inequality may be rearranged as
'0(0 (u)) - # (u) - ((1 - (u)) 0' ( ()) - (1 - (# (u)))) #' (u) u > 0. (26)
The maintained assumptions on V) imply that 7P (x) > x and (1 - x) @' (x) > 1 - 0 (x) for
all x C [0, 1], so V (# (u)) - 0 (u) > 0 and (1 -- (u)) V' (# (u)) - (1 - V (# (u))) > 0. Since
4' (u) < 0 and u > 0, it follows that (26) holds. m
Proof of Proposition 4. Lemmas 2 through 4 continue to hold, replacing r with r1 or
r2 as approp2riate. In particular, A (t) =; and the same argument as in the proofr,) s a propiat. Inpariculr, (t)- '1 v(t) I
of Theorem 2 implies that the unique maxmin posture -y* satisfies y* (t) = min {er-tu*, 1},
where u* is the (unique) number such that the time at which j* (t) reaches 1 equals T (-*).
Thus, given posture y*, it follows that \ (t) = r 2 (1-eitu*) +rieru =r - r1 - r 2 . NowThus, given postureeri tu* ' '
exp (- ~ (r 2 e + r1 - r 2 dt exp 1 (2 rlY) + (r1 - r2 ) I (*))
Setting this equal to E and rearranging implies that T (y*) is given by
e-rjTfY*) - !u*log -+ i) uEri (+*) 1. (27)
T2 (r2
Using the condition that erT(-*)u*= 1, this can be rearranged to yield (13). Finally,
there is a unique pair (* i ( that satisfies both (27) and erT(*)U* = 1, because the
curve in U* space defined by (27) is upward-sloping, while the curve defined by
e rT(y*)u* 1 is downward-sloping. m
Proof of Corollary 3. As ri/r2 -> 0, (13) becomes u* (1 + log u*) = 1, which has unique
solution u* = 1. Therefore, limr/r 2 O * (e) 1.
Suppose that E < 1. For any sequence of relative discount rates {r1/r2},, the sequence of
corresponding values of u* (E) has a convergent subsequence. Suppose that {r1 /r2}m
and the corresponding values of u* (E) converge to some u*. Then (13) becomes u* 0,
because E < 1 and u* < 1. Therefore, liml/roo U* (E) - 0. 0
Proof of Corollary 4. After such a decrease in rI/r 2 and E, the right-hand side of (13)
increases if u* is held constant. If ri/r 2 < 1, then the left-hand side of (13) is increasing in
u* and the right-hand side of (13) is non-increasing in u*. Therefore, if r /r2 < 1, such a
decrease in r1/r 2 and E leads to an increase in u* (E). *
Proof of Lemma 5. The fact that Q2AT (7Y) c- Fl immediately implies that ?AT _t
U () = in t T e-ty (t). Therefore, it suffices to show that uRAT (y) < mnin<;T(, ert (t).U '  Illlit T(y,) e 1 rt to (y e
Let T= min argmaxt ert (1 - -y (t)). Note that T is well-defined and finite because 7' (t)
is lower semi-continuous and liin,, e -t (1 - 7 (t)) 0. In addition, v (t) =e 1 - (i
for all t < t, which implies that A (t) = p (t) 0 for all t < T. Hence, the mixed strategy
7r2 coincides with y for all t <iT.
Let 6r2 E E 2 be identical to the -y-offsetting strategy og with the exception that player
2 accepts at date (i, -1) if player 1 follows -y until time T. Then, under strategy T2,
player 2 always demands U2 (t) = 1 and only accepts player l's demand if player 1 follows
y until time T. Since the mixed strategy 7r' coincides with -y for all t < T, it follows that
suip I (TI, b 2) = e ( U1 (72, 72 ), and therefore r2 E E* (2). In addition, it is
clear that a2 E E (-)i), and furthermore EE* (uk) (by Lemma 4), and T E E * (7') (by
Lemma 3). Summarizing, I have established that the arrows in the following diagram may
be read as "is a best-response to" :
U 2  <_ 7F2
Therefore, the set {7', 2} x {9, 92} has the best-response property given posture Y, which
implies that { 2', } x {O2, 02} C QIRAT (y). Hence, uRAVT (7) < sup0, U1 (a 1 , ao) = U1 (a', ol) =
mint<r y) e rt, (t). 0
Proof of Theorem 4. Observe that a posture y in discrete-time bargaining game
g induces a "continuous-time posture" ^y (i.e., a map from R+ -+ [0, 1]) according to
-, (t) = -y (min {T > t : r E' I}). That is, 's time-t demand is simply y's next demand
in g. I henceforth refer to a posture } in g as also being a continuous-time posture, with
the understanding that I mean the posture ^y defined above.
However, a may not be a posture in the continuous-time bargaining game of Section
2.3, because it may be discontinuous at a non-integer time. To avoid this problem, I
now introduce a modified version of the continuous-time bargaining game of Section 2.3.
Formally, let the continuous-time bargaining game gts be defined as in Section 2.3, with
the following modifications: Most importantly, omit the requirement that player i's de-
mnand path u : [t, t + 1) -> [0, 1] (which is still chosen at integer times t) is continu-
ous. Second, specify that the payoffs if player i accepts player j's offer at date (t, -1) are
(e rt (1 - liM illfTt Uj (T)) , e-rt lim infT t Uj (T)) (because limr, uj (T) may now fail to exist).
Third, add a fourth date, (t, 2) to each instant of time t. At date (t, 2), each player i
announces accept or reject, and, if player i accepts player j's offer at date (t, 2), the game
ends with payoffs (e-rt (1 - lm infit Uj (T)) , e- lim infrit uj (T)). Adding the date (t, 2)
ensures that each player has a well-defined best-response to her belief, even though uj (t)
may now fail to be right-continuous. One can check that the analysis of Sections 2.3 and 2.4,
including Lemmas 2 through 4 and Theorem 2, continue to apply to the game gcs with the
exception that in g"ts the maxmin posture ,* is not in fact unique; however, every niaxmin
posture corresponds to the continuation value function v* (t) (by the same argument as in
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2)." Because of this, for the remainder of the proof I slightly
abuse notation by writing u* (-i) for player l's maxmin payoff given posture 'y in the game
9 cts rather than in the model of Section 2.3. Importantly, u* (-) equals player l's maxmin
payoff given y in both gcts and in the model of Section 2.3 when -y is a posture in the model
of Section 2.3, but u* (-y) is well-defined for all -y : R+ -* [0, 1]. Similarly, I write u* (v)
for player l's maxmin payoff given continuation value function v : R+ - [0, 1]. This is
well-defined because u* (-y) = mint T e r-y (t) by Lemma 4, T depends on , only through
v (by Lemma 2), and it can be easily verified that mint<T e rt-y (t) = mint<r ect (1 - v (t))
(and thus depends on -y only through v). A similar argument, which I omit, implies that
one may write u*'g" (vgn) for player l's maxmin payoff given continuation value function v9"
in discrete-time bargaining game gn.
With this notation, I may state the following lemma, from which Theorem 4 follows:
Lemma 6 Let {g,} be a sequence of discrete-time bargaining games converging to con-
tinuous time. There exists a sequence of postures { y9n} with 9-y' a posture in gn and
limn- U*'9" ( /9n') > u*. In addition, for any sequence of functions {v9-} such that vg,, Is
a continuation value function in gn and limn, vg" (t) exists for all t C R+, it follows that
limn-,c u* " (vgn) exists and equals lim,_.x u* (vgn).
Proof. I first introduce some additional notation. Let Eg be the set of player i's strategies
in gcts with the property that player i's demand only changes at times t E Ig, player i only
accepts player j's offer at times t E I?, and player i's action at time t only depends on past
play at times T E Ii U 1q. One can equivalently view Eg as player i's strategy set in g itself.
Thus, any belief 7r2 in g may also be viewed as a belief in g'ts (with supp (7 2) C E).
"6The reason I did not use the game gets in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 is that it is difficult to interpret the
assumption that player i can accept the demand lim infIt uj (r) at time t, since the demand U, (T) has not
yet been made at time t for all T > t. Thus, I view the game g's as a technical construct for analyzing the
limit of discrete-time games, and not as an appealing model of continuous-time bargaining in its own right.
Let ,gr' be given by -yg' (t) = (n/ (n + 1)) y* (max {T < t : T E If"}) for all t E R+,
with the convention that max {T < t : T E I}- 0 if the set {T < t : r E Ign} is empty. I
first claim that lim u* (39"') > u*.4 7  To show this, I first establish that T (7ygn') <
min {T > T' : T E Ifj } for all n, where T' is defined as in the proof of Theorem 2. Since
-y* (and thus 7y9n') are non-decreasing, supT>t e-r(r-) (1 - 79n' (r)) = 1 - y9n' (t). Therefore,
by Lemma 2, T (?9n') satisfies
/ ,.t(b"') r (n+1 - -. * (max {T < t : r E If"}))
CX* (max {r < t : T E I1f"}) t OI(-yn')
te ," n ,(9")
Now
exp
< exp
< exp -
Jb"')r (n+1 - y* (max {r < t : r E I1"}))
( y * (m ax T < _ tr E I "}
S(1- Y* (t)) dt) (0)
. o y*(t) 1y* (m1ax {r < i(-y"')
in ax T~flyg"T')I _Y)
J~ma~r~bs"):r If" r 
1 - y*(t)) + *()
Sy* (t)
U
y* (max {r < t : T E If"})
7* (t)
(28)
y* (max {r < t : T E Ifn})
y* (t)
: E If")
(29)
If TQ( 9n') > min {r > T' : T E Ifj}, then max T < t (-yg') : T E Ifn > T' and there-
fore (29) is less than e, which contradicts (28). Hence, t (Qyn') < min {T > T : E If-}
for all n. In addition, -y9 "' (t) is non-decreasing and 79n' (t) < 1 for all t, which im-
plies that T (.y9n') = T (Q 9 n'). Hence, by Lemma 4, u* (ygn') = mintsiaf"') e rt 9n' (t).
Since < (') min {T > T : C If } for all n, and {g,} converges to continuous time,
lim T (T9') < T 1 . In addition, limn_ SuPtE lnI (t) - y* (t)| = 0, so it follows that
limn- I* (W"); ie -y t = u*.
Next, I claim that U*'g" (-yn) > u* (i94) for any posture 79n in discrete-time bargaining
game g". To see this, note that if supp (7 2 ) C Eg" and o 2 CE E* " (7r2 ), then (-2 C E (7r2 ) as
well (i.e., there is no benefit to responding to a strategy in A (E9n) with a strategy outside
of Eg"). Therefore, if 7r1 E 11n"'9 " (i.e., if 7r1 is consistent with knowledge of rationality in
17Theorem 2 implies that limu* (-yg,') < u*, so this inequality must hold with equality. But only
the inequality is needed for the proof.
g,), then 7r 1 C f g'""; that is, l"' 9gn" g r 'Y
9fl .cts Now
U*'gn (7Yg) = sup inf U1 (01, T I)
,_1 Y~g 7 1 .1- lgng
> sup inf Ui (a 1, 7rI)
CncZ~g 7TErj9n,gtS
= * (7y9n)
u 1
where o7"" is defined in Definition 9, and the second line follows because Hg'' C j'9n ;
the third line follows because ui (-yg, "")n SUP ,g innf , s yn ni (ai 071) by Lemma
4, and Eggn c ~ C Y: 9 t s U w)b emSE 1; and the fourth line follows by Lemma 4.
Combining the above claims, it follows that lim-, U* 9'" (y 9r') > li" u (79e') >
U* ('i). This proves the first part of the lemma.
For the second part of the lemma, fix a sequence of continuation value functions {v9 }
(with v9 a continuation value function in discrete-time game gn) converging pointwise to
some function v : R+ -+ [0, 1]. I have already shown that u*'9 " (7"n) > u* (-)9) for any
posture 7y9n in game gn, or equivalently u*'" (vg-) > u* (v9,). This immediately implies that
lin_ I*'1 (vn) > lim sup_, UT (van) for every convergent subsequence of {u*'9" (vaj}.
Hence, I must show that lim_, u*'g" (vg-) < lim infn-, u* (vg,) for every convergent sub-
sequence of {u*'9 n (vgn)}. I establish this inequality by assuming that there exists i? > 0
such that lim *'" (vn) > lim inf. u* (vgn") + q for some convergent subsequence of
{u*'9" (vgn)} and then deriving a contradiction.
Let tt (i) = min {T > t : T E JIfn} be the time of player i's next demand at t. Given
continuation value function v9n, fix any corresponding posture ,yg, let y n be defined as
follows: First, 7y"n demands 7}"l(ht) = 79n (h') for all t E jiq". Second, yn accepts
player 2's demand at time t E I29 with probability
p" (t) =n mit,1)
n" (t)
where
Tr (ax e r(t-T)vgn (7) -va (t)
p<t: 1 - v9" (t)
if {T < t :T E I", T,"xl (2) t} is non-empty and vg (T) < 1 for all time T in this set, and
p' (t) z 0 otherwise; and
inax ~1;"tTG9 ( - p ()) - 0X (t) =max { ,.
Let 1' be the supremum over times t at which n (tnext (2)) pn (tnt (2)) =p" , (tn" (2)),
and let
sup argmax e -,n (t)
t>T4:
By an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3, if 79" (t) < rj for some t < T", then there
exists a belief 7T2 C A (Eg") and strategy 0 2 E such that 7 2 (79") > e, o2 E E*'9 (7r2), and
the demand }9 (t) is accepted under strategy profile (Y 9n, 72 ). In particular, u (79", U 2 ) <
;. Thus, by the hypothesis that lim 1 _. ,u*'n (ou") > liminf_.i4 (van) +o , there must
exist N > 0 such that 79g (t) ;> 1 for all t < T h and all n > N, and hence vgn (t) < 1 - 17 for
all t < Tn and all n > N.
Let r" assign probability F to 79g and probability 1 - E to 1}9"n, and fix n E E*,gn (7rn)
with the property that a2 always demands 1 and rejects player l's demand at any history
at which player 1 has deviated from ygun (which is possible because rn assigns probability 0
to such histories, except for terminal histories), as well as at any history at which player 2
is indifferent between accepting and rejecting player l's demand, given belief nr. Note that
,9- is a best-response to og in g,. This implies that u*9 " (-}gn) < Us" (-}9n, an) for all n.
Thus, to show that lim-n *' (van) < liminf-o u* (v24) + U  (the desired contradiction),
it suffices to show that lim-o u " (7n, an) < lim infn-o U* (vn) + 17.
Observe that pf (t) satisfies
exp (-r (t - T)) (p" (t) (1) + (1 - p" (t)) vn (t)) ;> v" (T)
for all T < t such that T E If" and Tr"' t (2) = t. Hence, it is optimal for player 2 to reject
player l's demand -y at any time T at which X (rnext (2)) p" (r net (2)) = p" (Tnext (2)),
given belief r2. Therefore, u" (y9n, o) = mint<Tn e-rt (1 - v9n (t)). Now u* (vgn) =
min<T(v9n) ert (1 - vgn (t)), and limn_. T (v9") = T (v). Hence, showing that limn_" Tn =
T (v) = T would imply that limnou (g 9 n, o = liminf_,, u* (vg"), yielding the desired
contradiction.
To see that lim_, T" T, first fix to < T and note that for all 3 > 0 there exists N' > 0
such that, for all t < to and all n > N', if gn (t) = 2 then mini {T t : r E If", Tge, (2) = t } >
t - 3 (if this set is non-empty). Next, since both e-tv (t) and e -rvig (t) are non-increasing
(by the same argument that showed that e-rtv (t) is non-increasing) and v9 (t) -+ v (t) for
all t E R+, it follows that for all 3' > 0 there exists 3 > 0 such that t < to and T E [t - 6, t]
implies that leer(Tt)Vg (T) - V (t, 1) < 3'. Since 1 - v (t) > ij for all t < T, combining
these observations and letting S be the (countable) set of discontinuity points of v (t), for
all 3' > 0 there exists N" such that if t = s"ext (2) for some s E S O [0, to], and n ;> N", then
p" (t) v(t,-1) v(t) < 6'." Hence,
lim 1 (1 - pn (sext (2))) = J (1 - p (s)) (30)
scSn[o,to] scSn[o,to]
for all to < T.
Finally, I establish that, whenever v is continuous on an interval [to, t,] with t_ < T,
/r 0  rv (t v' (t),
lImn1 (1 - p" (t)) = exp -] t) L VM dt = exp A (t) dt . (31)
n-oo 1 - oVt
ttEI "O t,oo] to to0
I will prove this fact by showing that the limit as n -- o of a first-order approximation of
the logarithm of J Jsn (1 - p" (t)) equals -
2 t 1 0- I v(t)
Let {ti,gt, 2,gn ... ,tK(n),gn = {t E [to, to] : pf (t) > 0}, with tk,g,, < tk+1,g, for all k E
{1,. . . , K (n) - 1} and all n E N; note that K (n) is finite because 12- n [to, t,] is finite, and
that in addition tnext (1) < tk+1,g0 for all k (where tnext (1) tgel (1) to avoid redundant
'S is countable because e-to (t) is non-increasing, and monotone functions have at most countably many
discontinuity points. Unlike in Section 2.4, S need not be a subset of N here.
notation). Furthermore, since e-"r'vg (T) is non-increasing,
t"ak (1) E
for allkCE {0, 1,.. , K(n) - 1}.
arginax
T<tk+1,
9 n
reeifr, (2)=tk+1,gn
Therefore,
er(tk+1,g -7)vgn (T)
(1 - p" (t))
"in
-r<t n.:
TC 9 E I e " t. (2)=tk,9,,
gn
T niE(
T< Ikg,,
TCfjI" T'1'X'( 2 )=tk~g
1 -e(tk,gnT)Vgn (-)
1 - Vg- (tk,gn)
1 e r(tkgn -Tg (--)
C -r(tn( (1tkV, next9n (tk9g
H~~~~9 etlk 0 9 gn(nx( k=i1 e1'(tk+gn (1)) (et(1)) )
r(tnex , (1)-tK(n),gn) O (ne t
Next, taking a first-order Taylor approximation of log (1 - erxvgn (t)) at x 0 yields
log (1 - errxvn (t)) = log (1 - vgn (t)) - _XV()+ 0 (X2)1 - vi ()
Therefore, a first-order approximation of the logarithm of (32) equals
K (n)-1
-) gn (tnext ())
-(tk+1,gn 
- tk,gn) 1 - Vgn (next
+log I - '(tI9n tOnnI))g," (t"xt (1))) -log (1 - e
I now show that
K(n)-
lim
n-+=1
- (tk+1,g i to0to rv (t)- dt1- v (t)
k=1
K(n)
k=1
K(n)
k=1
(9'-)"
(33)
er(tlg n _tnext (1))Vg, (tnext0,9n 0,9n
)9 tK(n) ,g gn v K(n),gn
Tv g" (tnext (g)
-tk n) 
-'Nex- 
-1)1 - v9- kggn
lim log (I - er(tlg t,- 9 v(1))v9n
f - o (
- log (1 - e((') 9 () t("n) v 9 " (t" (1))))
(34)
which completes the proof of (31). Equation (34) is immediate, because, since o is continuous
on [to, too], both the left- and right-hand sides equal
log (1 - V (to)) - log (1
To establish (33), let
fn (t) = exp
1+)
and
f (t) exp
v (t)) .
1 - 9" (t)
rV (t)
1- Vg(t
For all n > N, it can be verified that both f" (t) and f (t) are non-increasing on the interval
[to, too], using the facts that e-tvg- (t) and e-rV (t) are non-increasing, and that vg (t) <
1-ilforalln > N andt<to <T. Fix( > 0 andm C N. Because vg, (t) - v (t) for all
t E R+, there exists N"' > N such that, for all n > N"', Ifn (t) - f (t)j < ( for all t in the
set
to, (m - 1) to +too (m - 2) to + 2too
m -t
Since both fn and f are non-increasing on [to, t0o], this implies that
If n (t) - f (t)I < (+ max
kE{1,...,K(n)-1}
(m - k)to + ktoo)
m -k - 1) to + (k + 1) t )
for all t E [to, too]. Since f is continuous on [to, to.], taking m -+ oo implies that |f" (t) - f (t)I <
(L1-71) too) for all t E2( for all t E [to, to], and therefore rv -(t) _ rv(t)
and
(to""xt (1))
< 2( exp (Ir
[to, t,]. Hence,
K(n)-l Inx K(n)-1 Next M
(t1 -,g )1 - von lim) - urn -- (tk+1,g, - tk,gn) tn:t
EW~ I~)- -t -g -tx M) --o 1 rv (V~ ()
K(n)-1k-n Irvn = (k,gn )
=lim K(- tk1,-- tk~. rV (tkg)
n-*oo 
- (t)k= 1(tg)
too
- f(t)dt,
to
where the first equality follows because Z:i?>-I (tk+1,gn - tkg) < too - to for all n C N, the
second follows because tngj (1) E [tk,gn , tk+1,gn] and v is continuous on [to, to], and the third
follows by definition of the (Riemann) integral.
Combining (30) and (31), it follows that
Hl 7 (1-p"(s)) = exp - A (s) ds) ] (1 - p(s))
sEI "n[0,t] JoES[o,t]
for all t < T. This implies that lim_, T T, completing the proof of the lemma. *
I now complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Let {g, } be a sequence of discrete-time bargaining games converging to continuous time.
Recall that u*'9 " su1p ,gn u*" (29"). Thus, there exists a sequence of postures {79n}, with
gu a posture in gn, such that limn-oo lu - U* "" (79n)| = 0. Let {v9n} be the correspond-
ing sequence of continuation value functions. Because e-t v (t) is non-increasing and the
space of monotone functions from R+ -> [0,1] is sequentially compact (by Helly's selection
theorem or Footnote 43), this sequence has a convergent subsequence {Vgk } converging to
some 1 on PR,.
I claim that v u= *. Toward a contradiction, suppose not. Since v* is the unique maxmin
continuation payoff function in gts, there exists r > 0 such that u* > limk,, u* (v9k) + q.
By Lemma 6, limk,o u*'g (V9) = lmko u* (vok). Finally, again by Lemma 6, there exists
an alternative sequence of postures {79k'} such that limkoo ni 9k (yk') ; u. Combining
these observations implies that there exists K > 0 such that, for all k > K,
U 1 k k) > u* - 'q/3 > u* +pk 27)/3 1 ~jk + 71/3,
which contradicts the fact that limk, a-l' -- ,'9k (,9)| = 0. Therefore, o = v*. Since
this argument applies to any convergent subsequence of {vg-}, and every subsequence of
{vg72} has a convergent sub-subsequence, this implies that v9" -> v* pointwise.
A similar contradiction argument shows that liink-oc, U(k) - u*, for any convergent
subsequence {Vuk} { Vn}. Since limk_,,, lU*' 9 k - '*Yk (-y9k)I = 0, it follows that U*9,k .*
And, since this argument applies to any convergent subsequence of {v}, this implies that
U'1 g U*. U
3 Cooperation with Network Monitoring
3.1 Introduction
The question of how groups can sustain cooperation and the related question of what kinds
of groups can sustain cooperation best are fundamental in the social sciences (Olson, 1965;
Ostrom, 1990; Coleman, 1990; Greif, 1993; Putnam, 2000). In economics, existing work
on the theory of repeated games provides a framework for answering these questions when
individuals can perfectly observe each other's actions (e.g., Abreu, 1988), but has much less
to say about the more realistic case where monitoring is imperfect. This weakness is partic-
ularly acute in settings where public signals are not very informative about each individual's
actions and high quality-but dispersed-private signals are the basis for cooperation. Con-
sider the construction of a series of infrastructure projects in a small village (wells, schools,
roads, etc.). The quality of each project is a poor signal of each villager's contribution to its
construction, but each villager may always know whether the other members of her household
worked on the project. Similarly, the stock price of a Fortune 500 company is a poor signal
of each employee's effort, but each employee may observe her officemates' effort; and price is
a poor signal of each firm's output in a large market, but each firm may observe the output
of its local competitors. Thus, it is certainly plausible that local, private monitoring plays
a larger role than public monitoring in sustaining cooperation in many interesting economic
examples, and very little is known about how cooperation is best sustained under this sort
of monitoring.
This paper studies cooperation in repeated games with network monitoring, where in
every period a network is independently drawn from a (possibly degenerate) known distrib-
ution, and players perfectly observe the actions of their neighbors but observe nothing about
any other player's action. Each player's action is simply her level of cooperation, in that
higher actions are privately costly but benefit others. The main result is that, under some
assumptions on the stage game, each player's expected discounted level of cooperation is
maximized (in sequential equilibrium) by grim trigger strategies, in which each player coop-
erates at a fixed level in every period unless she ever observes another player fail to cooperate
at her prescribed level, in which case she stops cooperating forever. I then apply this result
to derive comparative statics on the maximum (equilibrium level of) cooperation in two im-
portant special cases: equal monitoring, where in expectation players are monitored "equally
well"; and fixed monitoring networks, where the monitoring network is constant over time.
For example, I provide a simple characterization of when maximum cooperation is increasing
in group size with equal monitoring, and show that more central players in fixed monitoring
networks have greater maximum cooperation.
The fact that maximum cooperation is sustainable in grim trigger strategies follows from
a novel kind of "strategic complementarity" that emerges in repeated cooperation games
with network monitoring. The key observation is that the highest action that a player
is willing to take at any on-path history is non-decreasing in the actions of every other
player at every on-path history; this is because a player benefits when her opponents take
higher actions and, with network monitoring and grim trigger strategies, deviating makes
every on-path history weakly less likely. When players' utility functions are separable
and concave in actions, and players' observe the realized monitoring network at the end
of every period, this complementarity implies that maximum cooperation is sustainable in
grim trigger strategies.49 In the leading case where every player's maximum cooperation is
below the first-best level, this result characterizes the equilibrium that maximizes utilitarian
social welfare at any fixed discount factor, which is usually impossible in repeated games
with imperfect monitoring.
The result that grim trigger strategies sustain maximum cooperation implies particularly
sharp comparative statics in games with equal monitoring. The most striking result is that,
when all players benefit equally from all other players' actions (i.e., when a player's level of
cooperation is her contribution to a global public good), maximum cooperation is determined
by the product of two terms: the marginal benefit a player receives from another player's
49 Interestingly, maximum cooperation may not be sustainable in grim trigger strategies when players do
not observe the realized monitoring network at the end of every period (Example A2). Roughly speaking.
this is because in more complicated strategy profiles differences in players' beliefs about each other's histories
can be exploited to provide stronger incentives for cooperation than are possible in grin trigger strategy
profiles.
action, and the effective contagiousness of the monitoring technology, defined as
ooZ 6'E [number of players who learn about a deviation within t periods].
t=0
In particular, one monitoring technology supports greater maximum cooperation than an-
other if and only if its effective contagiousness is higher; all other properties of the monitoring
technology (the variance of the number of players who learn about a deviation within t pe-
riods, the identity of these players, etc.) are irrelevant for supporting cooperation.
This characterization of comparative statics on maximum cooperation in games of global
public good provision with equal monitoring leads to three more special comparative statics
results. First, if the marginal benefit a player receives from another player's action is inde-
pendent of group size (the case of pure global public goods), then maximum cooperation is
increasing in group size as long as monitoring does not degrade with group size so quickly
that the expected number of players who learn about a deviation within t periods is decreas-
ing in group size (for some t). On the other hand, if this marginal benefit is proportional to
the reciprocal of group size (the case of divisible global public goods), then maximum coop-
eration is decreasing in group size whenever the expected fraction of players who learn about
a deviation within t periods is decreasing in group size. For example, maximum cooperation
is increasing in group size with pure global public goods but decreasing in group size with
divisible global public goods when the monitoring technology is either random matching or
monitoring on a fixed circle. Finally, holding group size fixed, making monitoring more
uncertain in the second-order stochastic dominance sense reduces maximum cooperation.
The last part of the paper studies games with a fixed monitoring network (without equal
monitoring). I introduce a new notion of network centrality and show that more central
players have greater maximum cooperation, thus linking the graph-theoretical property of
centrality with the game-theoretic property of maximum cooperation. I also provide simple
graph-theoretic tools for determining which players are more central than others, and show
that centrality can also be used to determine which of two networks supports greater maxi-
mum cooperation; for example, adding links to the monitoring network necessarily increases
all players' maximum cooperation, which formalizes the idea that individuals in better-
connected groups have greater capacities for cooperation. Finally, I show that adding links
to the monitoring network is always stable when players only benefit from their neighbors'
contributions (the case of local public goods), but that in general players may wish to sever
links in the monitoring network in order to facilitate free-riding on others' cooperation.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 relates this paper to the literature. Section
3.3 describes the model. Section 3.4 presents the main result that maximum cooperation
can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. Section 3.5 derives comparative statics in games
with equal monitoring. Section 3.6 studies games with fixed monitoring networks. Section
3.7 concludes and discusses directions for future research. Appendix A contains omitted
examples, and Appendix B contains omitted proofs.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper lies at the intersection of the literature on repeated games with community
enforcement and the literature on repeated public good provision. The study of repeated
games with community enforcement was pioneered by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994),
who show that cooperation is sustainable in a modified version of grim trigger strategies
in the (two-action) prisoner's dilemma with random matching when the discount factor is
sufficiently high. Two comments are in order. First, these papers, along with much of the
subsequent literature (e.g., Deb, 2009; Takahashi, 2010) focus on the case of sufficiently high
discount factors and do not characterize efficient equilibria at fixed discount factors, unlike
my paper. Second, a key concern in these papers is ensuring that players do not prefer to
cooperate off the equilibrium path. The issue is that grim trigger strategies may provide
such a strong incentive to cooperate on-path that players prefer to cooperate even after
observing a defection. Ellison resolves this problem by introducing a "relenting" version of
grim trigger strategies tailored to make players indifferent between cooperating and defecting
on-path, and then noting that cooperation is more appealing on-path than off-path (since
off-path at least one opponent is already defecting). This issue does not arise in my analysis
because, with continuous action spaces, players must be just indifferent between taking their
prescribed actions and shirking on the equilibrium path, as otherwise they could be made
to take slightly higher actions. By essentially the same argument as in Ellison, this implies
that players weakly prefer to shirk off-path. Hence, the key contribution of this paper is
showing that grim trigger strategies provide the strongest possible incentives for cooperation
on-path, not that they provide incentives for shirking off-path.
The maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained for given discount factors has
been considered to some degree in the small existing literature on repeated public good provi-
sion. Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) study repeated provision of divisible public goods with
a particular form of imperfect public monitoring, and present numerical evidence suggesting
that in this context small groups can provide higher payoffs when only trigger strategies
are considered; however, trigger strategies are not optimal in their model, and they do not
characterize optimal equilibria. Bendor and Mookherjee (1990) ask when "multilateral"
punishments, in which player i may punish j if j cheats in her relationship with k, can
improve on "unilateral" punishments, where this behavior is not present, in a repeated col-
lective action game with perfect monitoring. They find an ambiguous relationship between
group size and maximum cooperation. Pecorino (1999) studies repeated public good pro-
vision with perfect monitoring. He shows that public good provision is easier in larger
groups with perfect monitoring, because shirking-and thus inducing everyone else to stop
cooperating -- is more costly in larger groups. Haag and Lagunoff (2007) study repeated
collective action games with perfect monitoring when players have heterogeneous discount
factors. Restricting attention to equilibria in which the same action is played every period,
they show that maximum cooperation is increasing in group size, a result that in their model
depends on heterogeneous discounting. In contrast, I show that equilibria in which the same
action is played every period sustain maximum cooperation in my model, and I assume com-
mon discounting. Both Pecorino and Haag and Lagunoff suggest in their conclusions that
imperfect monitoring might lead to less cooperation in large groups, but do not pursue this
possibility in their papers. None of these papers characterize maximum cooperation in
games with imperfect monitoring.
The paper most closely related to mine is Ali and Miller (2011). Ali and Miller study a
network game in which links between players are recognized according to a Poisson process,
and when a link is recognized the linked players play a prisoner's dilemma with variable
stakes, and can also make transfers to each other. In their model, equilibria exist in grim
trigger strategies with binding on-path incentive constraints, and these equilibria are optimal
for symmetric networks; this result is similar to my main result, with the differences that Ali
and Miller study staggered prisoner's dilemmas with transfers rather than repeated cooper-
ation games, the underlying network in their model is fixed over time, and they show that
grim trigger strategies sustain maximum cooperation only for symmetric networks. Like
my model, Ali and Miller's features smooth actions and payoffs, so that, with grim trigger
strategies, binding on-path incentive constraints imply slack off-path incentive constraints.
Unlike my analysis, Ali and Miller's does not emphasize strategic complementarity. Ali and
Miller also discuss network formation and comparisons among networks, developing insights
that are complementary to mine.
Finally, this paper is a contribution to the study of repeated games with private moni-
toring. By restricting attention to cooperation games with network monitoring, I am able
to characterize efficient equilibria at fixed discount factors, whereas most papers in this lit-
erature study more general games and either prove folk theorems (Compte, 1998; Kandori
and Matsushima, 1998; Matsushima, 2004; Harner and Olszewski, 2006; Fong et al, 2007;
Yamamoto, 2009; Sugaya, 2010) or study robustness to small deviations from public mon-
itoring (Mailath and Morris, 2002, 2006; Sugaya and Takahashi, 2010).'" My approach
is based on using the strategic complementarity discussed in the introduction to derive an
upper bound on each player's maximum cooperation, and then showing that this bound can
be attained with grim trigger strategies. In particular, I make no attempt to characterize
the entire set of sequential equilibria, or any large subset thereof. It would be interesting to
see if similar indirect approaches, perhaps also based on strategic complementarity, can be
useful in other classes of repeated games with private monitoring of applied interest.
3.3 Model
There are N players; I also write N for the set of players, abusively. In every period
t N ={0, 1, .. .}, every player i simultaneously chooses an action ("level of cooperation,"
"contribution") xi E R+. The players have common discount factor 6 E (0, 1). If the
5
'For folk theorems for repeated games with a fixed monitoring network, see Ben-Porath and Kahnenan
(1996) and Renault and Tomala (1998).
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players choose actions x = (X1,..., XN) in period t, player i's expected period-t payoff is
, (W fij (Xl) -Xi,
where the functions fij : R+ -+ R+ satisfy
" fij (0) = 0, fij is non-decreasing, and fij is either strictly concave or identically 0;
e limn,-, (zjyi fl, (x)) - x = -oo, and limnx, ( M , fi,j (x)) - X < 0.
The assumption that fij is non-decreasing for all i f j is essential for interpreting og
as player j's level of cooperation. Note that the stage game is a prisoner's dilemma, in
that playing xi = 0 ("defecting," "shirking") is a dominant strategy for player i in the stage
game. The second assumption states that the cost of cooperation becomes infinitely greater
than the benefit for sufficiently high levels of cooperation. Concavity and the assumption
that ui (x) is separable in (XI,. .. , XN) play important roles in the analysis, and are discussed
below.
Every period t, a monitoring network L = {li,j,t}ijENxN, 'i,j,t E {0, 1}, is drawn inde-
pendently from a fixed probability distribution y on {0, 1}N 2. At the end of period t, player
i observes h,= {zit,... , ziN,t, Lt}, where zi,j,= xjt if li,j,t = 1, and zi,jt 0 if li,j,t = 0.
That is, at the end of period t, player i observes the action of each of her out-neighbors
and also observes the realized monitoring network Lt." Assume that Pr (li,j = 1) = 1
for all i E N; that is, there is perfect recall. A repeated game with such a monitoring
structure has network monitoring, and the distribution p is the monitoring technology. Let
ht- (hi,o, hi,,, . , hi,t) be player i's private history at time-t, and denote the null history
" The assumption that each player observes the realized monitoring network was erroneously omitted
from an earlier version of this paper but plays an important (but subtle) role in the analysis, as discussed in
Section 3.4.
5
2 The model is agnostic as to whether players observe their realized stage-game payoffs. That is, fi, (xj)
is player i's expected benefit from player j's action, and player i may only benefit from player j's action
when 1ij,t = 1. However, some combinations of assumptions on fij and y are not consistent with this
interpretation, such as monitoring on a fixed network with global public goods, where Pr (li,j,t = 1) = 0 but
fi, / 0 for some i, j E N. An alternative interpretation is required in these cases: for example, the infinite
time horizon could be replaced with an uncertain finite horizon without discounting, with payoffs revealed at
the end of the game and 6 viewed as the probability of the game's continuing. I thank a referee for helpful
connuents oii this point.
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at the beginning of the game by h0 = ho for all i. A (behavior) strategy of player i's, ac,
specifies a probability distribution over period t actions as a function of h'.
Many important repeated games have network monitoring, including random matching
(as in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), with the modification that players observe the
realized monitoring network) and monitoring on a fixed network. To fix ideas, note that a
repeated game in which players observe the actions of their neighbors on a random graph
that is determined in period 0 and then fixed for the duration of play does not have network
monitoring, because the monitoring network is not drawn independently every period (e.g.,
player i observes player j's action in period 1 with probability 1 if she observes it in period
0, but she does not observe player j's action with probability 1 in period 0).
Throughout, I study sequential equilibria (SE) of this model with the property that, for
every player i, time t, and monitoring network Li', for t' < t, the sum ET t [s (ai (hj)) |L
is well-defined; that is, lim8 _.0o _5tE j (o(j (h )) ) L,] exists. This technical
restriction ensures that players' continuation payoffs are well-defined, conditional on any past
realized monitoring network. Let ESE be the set of SE strategy profiles. The main object
of interest is the SE that sustains each player's maximum (equilibrium level of) cooperation,
defined as follows.
Definition 13 Player i's maximum cooperation is
00
x- sup (1- ) t E [a, (ht)]
CrG ZSE =
A strategy profile a sustains player i's maximum cooperation if o- ESE andx= (1 - ) 0  tB [o-i (ht)].
My main result (Theorem 5) shows that there exists a grim trigger strategy profile that
simultaneously sustains each player's maximum cooperation, and the applied analysis in
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 focuses on this equilibrium. This equilibrium is particularly important
when it is also the SE that maximizes social welfare. This is the primary case of interest
1 3 It suffices for this paper to define a sequential equilibrium as a strategy profile in which, for every player
i and private history h', player i's continuation strategy is optimal given beliefs about the vector of private
histories (hj) _ that are updated using Bayes' rule whenever possible. In particular, sequential equilibrium
could be replaced with "perfect Bayesian equilibrium."
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in the literature on public good provision, where the focus is on providing incentives for
sufficient cooperation, rather than on avoiding providing incentives for excessive cooperation.
For example, the grim trigger strategy profile that simultaneously sustains each player's
maximum cooperation also maximizes utilitarian social welfare if x* is below the first-best
level for every i E N. Letting f denote the left-derivative of fj,i (which exists by concavity
of fjj), this sufficient condition is
Z f (x*) > 1 for all i E N.
j7 i
This condition can be checked easily using the formula for (x)I given by Theorem 5. In
addition, a straightforward extension of Theorem 5 shows that if the grim trigger strategy
profile that sustains each player's maximum cooperation also maximizes utilitarian social
welfare, then it is effectively the only SE that does so, in that every such SE has the same
path of play.
3.4 Characterization of Maximum Cooperation
This section presents the main theoretical result of the paper, which shows that all players'
maximum cooperation can be sustained simultaneously in a grim trigger strategy profile.
I first define grim-trigger strategies.
Definition 14 A strategy profile o is a grim trigger strategy profile if there exist actions
(xi)N such that o, (h') = x if zij,, C {x, 0} for all zip, E hi, and all r < t, and aTi (ht) =0
otherwise.
In a grim trigger strategy profile player i's action at an off-path history h' does not
depend on the identity of the initial deviator. In particular, by perfect recall, player i plays
xi = 0 in every period following a deviation by player i herself. Also, if a grim trigger
strategy profile a sustains each player's maximum cooperation, then under a each player i
plays x* at every on-path history.
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Next, I introduce an important piece of notation: define D (T, t, i) recursively by
D(T, t, i) 0 if T < t
D (t, t, i) {i}
D (T + 1, t,i) = D (T, t, i) U {j : z, =- x, for some k E D (T, t, i)} if T > t.
That is, D (T, t, i) is the set of players in period T who have observed a player who has
observed a player who has observed... player i since time t. The set is important because
j e D (T, t, i) is a necessary condition for player j's time T history to vary with player
i's actions at times after t. In particular, if players are using grim trigger strategies and
player i defects at time t, then D (T, t, i) is the set of players who defect at time T. Note
that the probability distribution of D (T, t, i) is the same as the probability distribution of
D (T - t, i) -D(T - t, 0, i), for all i andT > t.
I now state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 5 There is a grim trigger strategy profile o-* that sustains each player's maximwum
cooperation. Furthermore, (x*) N is the (component-wise) greatest vector (xi)7 I such that
xi (1 6) Pr (J E D (t, i)) fi, (xj) for all i E N. (35)
t=o Jyi
Theorem 5 is intuitive: one's first thought might be that grim trigger strategies sustain
each player's maximum cooperation. In addition, given that grim trigger strategies sustain
each player's maximum cooperation, equation (35) is almost immediate: the left-hand side
of (35) is the cost to player i from conforming to o-*; and the right-hand side of (35) is the
benefit to player i from conforming to o*, which is that, if player i deviated, she would lose
her benefit from player j's cooperation whenever j e D (t, i). Thus, (35) states that the
vector of maximum cooperations is the highest vector of cooperations that equalizes the cost
and benefit of cooperation for each player. In addition, it is easy to compute the vector
*N(xi) i, as discussed in Footnote 64 in Appendix B.
However, Theorem 5 is not true without the assumptions that player i's utility function
is separable in (x 1 ,. . ,XN) and that each player observes the realized monitoring network
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at the end of each period, as shown by Examples Al and A2 in Appendix A. It is not very
surprising that an assumption on utility functions like separability is required; for example,
if the players' actions are substitutes, greater cooperation may be sustainable when players
take turns cooperating (as in Example Al). In contrast, the role of the assumption that
players observe the realized monitoring network is quite subtle and is discussed below.
The key idea behind Theorem 5 is that a player is willing to cooperate (weakly) more at
any on-path history if any other player cooperates more at any on-path history, because the
first player is more likely to benefit from this increased cooperation when she conforms than
when she deviates. 4 Thus, there is a kind of strategic complementarity between the actions
of any two players at any two on-path histories. This suggests the following "proof' of
Theorem 5: Define a function Q that maps the vector of all players' on-path actions at every
on-path history, 7, to the vector of the highest actions that each player is willing to take
at each on-path history when actions at all other on-path histories are as in x, and players
shirk at off-path histories. Let X be an action greater than any SE action, and let X be the
vector of on-path actions X. By complementarity among on-path actions, iterating # on
X yields a sequence of vectors of (on-path) actions that are all constant across periods and
weakly greater than the greatest fixed point of 4, and this sequence converges monotonically
to the greatest fixed point of p. Therefore, the greatest fixed point of # is constant across
periods, and it provides an upper bound on each player's maximum cooperation. Finally,
verify that the grim trigger strategy profile with on-path actions given by the greatest fixed
point of $ is a SE. "
The problem with this "proof' is that, while the highest action that a player is willing
to take at any on-path history is non-decreasing in every other player's on-path actions, it
is decreasing in her own future on-path actions. Hence, the function # as defined in the
previous paragraph is not isotone, and thus may not have a greatest fixed point. This
problem may be addressed by working not with players' stage-game actions o, (hi), but
' This observation relies on the assumption of network monitoring, since otherwise a deviation by the first
player may make some on-path histories more likely.
55For this last step, one might be concerned that grim trigger strategies do not satisfy off-path incentive
constraints, as a player might want to cooperate off-path in order to slow the "contagion" of defecting, as in
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). As discussed in Section 3.2, this problem does not arise with continuous
actions and payoffs.
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rather with their continuation actions, X - (1 - 6) ZT --to- (h[). Indeed, it can be
shown that
E [Xlh|] <_ r--' tZPr(j ED (r, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, i))jf (E [Xh ,j E D (r, t,i) \D(r - 1,t,i))
T=t jfi
for every player i and on-path history h'; this intuition for this inequality is that, if player i de-
fects at time t, then player j starts shirking at time T with probability Pr (j E D (T, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, i)),
and this yields lost benefits of at least fij (E [XjIhtj E D (T, t, i) \D (r - 1, t, i)]) to player i
. This inequality yields an upper bound on player i's expected continuation action, E [Xflh],
in terms of her expectation of other players' continuation actions only. This raises the pos-
sibility that the function ch could be isotone when defined in terms of continuation actions
Xi, rather than stage-game actions. For an approach along these lines to work, however,
one must be able to express E [Xj/j E D (r, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, )] in terms of E [XT Ihj] for
player j's private histories hT. By the assumption that past realizations of the monitoring
network are observable,
E [Xjlj e D(T, t, i) \D(T - 1, t, i)] =E [E [XjlhT] j E D(T, t, i) \D(r - 1, t, i)
so such an approach is possible. However, if past realizations of the monitoring network
are unobservable, this may be impossible. The problem is that, if past realizations of the
monitoring network are unobservable, disagreement between players i and j about player j's
continuation action in states of the world where j E D (T, t, i) (but player j is not aware of
this fact) may be leveraged to provide stronger incentives for player i to cooperate at time t
without increasing player j's expected continuation action at time T (from his perspective)
by so much that he prefers to shirk. This is illustrated by Example A2 in Appendix A,
which shows that a player's maximum cooperation may not be sustainable in grim trigger
strategies when past realizations of the monitoring network are unobservable.
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3.5 Equal Monitoring
This section imposes the assumption that all players' actions are equally well-monitored in
a sense that leads to sharp comparative statics results. In particular, assume throughout
this section:
" Parallel Benefit Functions: There exists a function f : R+-> R+ and scalars a j E R+
such that fi,, (x) = aij f (x) for all i, j E N and all x E R+.
0 Equal Monitoring: Egoto Pr (k E D (t, i)) a -- o o EgjPr (k E D (tj))ay
for all i, j E N.
Parallel benefit functions imply that the importance of player j's cooperation to player i
may be summarized by a real number a,,. With this assumption, equal monitoring states
that the expected discounted number of players who may be influenced by player i's action,
weighted by the importance of their actions to player i, equals the expected discounted
number of players who may be influenced by player j's action, weighted by the importance
of their actions to player j, for all i, j E N. To help interpret these assumptions, note that
if aij is constant across players i and j then, for generic discount factors 6, equal monitoring
holds if and only if E [#D (t, i)] = E [#D (t, j)] for all i, j E N and t E N; that is, if and
only if the expected number of players who find out about a defection by player i within t
periods equals the expected number of players who find out about a defection by player j
within t periods.
Section 3.5.1 derives a simple and general formula for comparative statics on maximum
cooperation under equal monitoring. Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 apply this formula to the
leading special case of (global) public good provision, where asj = a for all i f j; that
is, where all players value each other's actions equally. Section 3.5.2 studies the effect of
group size on public good provision, and Section 3.5.3 considers the effect of "uncertainty"
in monitoring on public good provision.
3.5.1 Comparative Statics Under Equal Monitoring
The section derives a formula for comparative statics on maximum cooperation under equal
monitoring. The first step is noting that each player's maximum cooperation is the same
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under equal monitoring.
Corollary 5 With equal monitoring, x* = x* for all i, j E N.
Thus, under equal monitoring each player has the same maximum cooperation x*. I wish
to characterize when x* is higher in one game than another, when both games satisfy equal
monitoring and have the same underlying benefit function f. Formally, a game with equal
monitoring F = (N, ( 'i,)(ij)ENxN , , ) is a model satisfying the assumptions of Section
3.3 as well as equal monitoring. For any game with equal monitoring F, let x* (F) be the
maximum cooperation in F, and let
DO
B (F) -(1 - 6) E 6t Pr (j E D (t, i))a,
t=o j:i
be player i's benefit of cooperation (i.e., the right-hand side of (35)) when f (xj) = 1 for all
j E N, which is independent of the choice of i E N by equal monitoring. The comparative
statics result for games with equal monitoring is the following:
Theorem 6 Let F' and F be two games with equal monitoring. Then x* (F') > x* (F) if
B (F') > B (F), with strict inequality if B (F') > B (F) and x* (F') > 0.
Proof. Since x* = x* for all i E N, (35) may be rewritten as
00
X* (1 - )Z 6 Pr (j E D (t, i)) aij f (x*) = B (F) f (x*).
t=0 j: i
Hence, x* (F) is the greatest zero of the concave function B (F) f (x) - x. If B (F') >
B (F), then B (F') f (x* (F)) - x* (F) > B (F) f (x* (F)) - x* (F) = 0, which implies that
x* (F') > x* (F). If B (F') > B (F) and x* (F') > 0, then either x* (F) = 0 (in which
case x* (F') > x* (F) trivially) or x* (F) > 0, in which case B (F') f (x* (F)) - x* (F) >
B (F) f (x* (F)) - x* (F) = 0, which implies that x* (F') > x* (F). m
Theorem 6 gives a complete characterization of when x* (F) is greater or less than x* (F'),
for any two games with equal monitoring F and F'. In particular, maximum cooperation is
higher when the expected discounted number of players who may be influenced by a player's
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action, weighted by the importance of their actions to that player, is higher. For example,
in the case of global public good provision (where all players value all other players' actions
equally), maximum cooperation is greater when the sets D (t, i) are likely to be larger; while
if each player only values the actions of a subset of the other players (e.g., the other members
of her household, office, or local market), then maximum cooperation is greater when, for
each player i, the intersection of the sets D (t, i) and the set of players whose actions she
values is likely to be larger. Hence, Theorem 6 characterizes how different monitoring
technologies sustain different kinds of cooperative behaviors.
3.5.2 The Effect of Group Size on Global Public Good Provision
This section uses Theorem 6 to analyze the effect of group size on maximum cooperation in
the leading special case of global public good provision, where oij = a for all i f j. I first
discuss general considerations and then present examples.
In the case of (global) public good provision,
cc
B (F) = a Z ' (E [#D (t, i)) - 1).
t=o
Thus, for public goods, all the information needed to determine whether changing the game
increases or decreases the maximum per capita level of public good provision is contained
in the product of two terms: the marginal benefit to each player of public good provi-
sion, a, and (one less than) the effective contagiousness of the monitoring technology,
oc 6'E [#D (t, i)]. Information such as group size, higher moments of the distribution
of #D (t, i), and which players are more likely to observe which other players are all irrele-
vant. In particular, the single number Z t StE [#D (t, i)]-the effective contagiousness-
completely determines the effectiveness of a monitoring technology in supporting public good
provision.
This finding that comparative statics on the per-capita level of public good provision are
determined by the product of the marginal benefit of the public good to each player and
the effective contagiousness of the monitoring technology yields useful intuitions about the
effect of group size on the per capita level of public good provision. In particular, index
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a game F by its group size, N, and write a (N) for the corresponding marginal benefit of
contributions and 0 6tE [#D (t, N)] for the effective contagiousness (I use this simpler
notation for the remainder of this section). Normally, one would expect a (N) to be de-
creasing in N (a larger population reduces player i's benefit from player j's contribution to
the public good) and Z'O 6tE [#D (t, N)] to be increasing in N (a larger population makes
it more likely that player i's action is observed by more individuals), yielding a tradeoff
between the marginal benefit of contributions and the effective contagiousness. Consider
again the example of constructing a local infrastructure project, like a well. In this case,
a (N) is likely to be decreasing and concave: since each individual uses the well only occa-
sionally, there are few externalities among the first few individuals, but eventually it starts
to becomes difficult to find times when the well is available, water shortages become a prob-
lem, etc.. Similarly, a0 6E [#D (t, N)] is likely to be increasing, and may be concave
if there are "congestion" effects in monitoring. Thus, it seems likely that in typical appli-
cations a (N) ZE7G 6t (E [#D (t, N)] - 1), and therefore per capita public good provision, is
maximized at an intermediate value of N.
Theorem 6 yields particularly simple comparative statics for the leading cases of pure
public goods (a (N) = 1) and divisible public goods (a (N) = 1/N), which are useful in
examples below.
Corollary 6 With pure public goods (a (N) = 1), if E [#D (t, N')] > E [#D (t, N)] for all t
then x* (N') > x* (N), with strict inequality if E [#D (t, N')] > E (#D (t, N)] for some t > 1
and x* (N') > 0.
With pure public goods, x* (N) is increasing unless monitoring degrades so quickly as
N increases that the expected number of players who find out about a deviation within t
periods is decreasing in N, for some t. This suggests that x* (N) is increasing in N in many
applications.
Corollary 7 With divisible public goods (a (N) = 1/N), if E #D (t, N')] /N' > E (#D (t, N)] /N
for all t then x* (N') > x* (N), with strict inequality if E [#D (t, N')] IN' > E [#D (t, N)] IN
for some t > 1 and x* (N') > 0.
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With divisible public goods, x* (N) is increasing only if the expected fraction of players
who find out about a deviation within t periods is non-decreasing in N, for all t. This
suggests that, with divisible public goods, x* (N) is decreasing in many applications.
The following two examples demonstrate the usefulness of Theorem 6 and Corollaries 6
and 7. An earlier version of this paper (available upon request) contains additional examples.
Random Matching Monitoring is random matching if in each period each player is linked
with one other player at random, and li,j,t = j,i,t for all i, j C N and all t. This is possible
only if N is even.
It can be show that, with random matching, E [#D (t, N)] is non-decreasing in N and
is increasing in N for t = 2. Therefore, Corollary 6 implies that, with pure public goods,
niaximunm cooperation is increasing in group size.
Proposition 6 With random matching and pure public goods, if N' > N then x* (N') >
x* (N), with strict inequality if x* (N') > 0.
However, it can also be shown that Et 5tE [#D (t, N')] /N' <Zo o'E [#D (t, N)] /N
whenever N' > N, N' and N are sufficiently large, and 6 < 1/2. In this case, Theorem 6
implies that, with divisible public goods, maximum cooperation is decreasing in group size.
Proposition 7 With random matching and divisible public goods, if 6 < 1 then, for any
> 0, there exists N such that x* (N') < x* (N) if N' > (1+ - ) N > N, with strict
inequality if x* (N') > 0.
Monitoring on a Circle Monitoring is on a circle if the players are arranged in a fixed
circle and there exists an integer k > 1 such that li,,t = 1 if and only if the distance between
i and j is at most k.
It is a straightforward consequence of Corollary 6 that maximum cooperation is increasing
in group size with monitoring on a circle and pure public goods.
Proposition 8 With monitoring on a circle and pure public goods, if N' > N then x* (N') >
x* (N), with strict inequality if x* (N') > 0.
111
Proof. E [#D (t, N)] min {1 + 2kt, N}, so N' > N implies that E [#D (t, N')] > E [#D (t, N)]
for all t, and E [#D (t, N')] > E [#D (t, N)] for t = N'. The result follows from Corollary
6. m
Finally, Corollary 7 implies that maximum cooperation is decreasing in group size with
monitoring on a circle and divisible public goods.
Proposition 9 With monitoring on a circle and divisible public goods, if N' > N then
x* (N') < x* (N), with strict inequality if k < (N' - 1) /2 and x* (N') > 0.
Proof. E [#D (t, N)] /N =m {(1 + 2kt) /N, 1}, so N' > N implies that E [#D (t, N')] <
E [#D (t, N)] for all t, and (if k < (N' - 1) /2) E [#D (t, N')] < E [#D (t, N)] for t = 1.
The result follows from Corollary 7. m
3.5.3 The Effect of Uncertain Monitoring on Global Public Good Provision
This section provides a result comparing monitoring technologies in terms of the maximum
level of global public good provision they support, for a fixed group size. As discussed
in the previous subsection, a monitoring technology supports greater maximum coopera-
tion in global public good provision if and only if it has greater expected contagiousness,
o E [#D (t)], where the parameter N is omitted because it is held fixed in this sub-
section. I compare "less certain" monitoring, where it is likely that either a large or small
fraction about the population finds out about a deviation, with "more certain" monitoring,
where it is likely that an intermediate fraction of the population finds out about it, in the
sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Under fairly broad conditions, more certain
monitoring supports greater maximum cooperation.
The analysis of this subsection relies on the following assumption, which states that the
distribution over #D (t + 1) depends only on #D (t).
* There exists a family of functions {g: {0,... , N} - [0, 1]}_ with such that, when-
ever #D (t) = k, Pr (#D (t + 1) = k') = gk (k'), for all t, k, and k'.
This assumption is satisfied by random matching, for example, but not by monitoring on
a circle, because with monitoring on a circle the distribution of #D (t + 1) depends on the
identities of the of the members of D (t).
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Given a probability mass function gk, define the corresponding distribution function
Gk (k') = 0 g, (s). Recall that a distribution G strictly second-order stochastically
dominates Gk if Z1N=0 7 (s) 9k (s) s=0 r) gk (s) for all increasing and strictly concave
functions i7 : R - R. The following result compares monitoring under {. k}t1 and {gk 1.
Theorem 7 Suppose that Gk (k') and Gk (k') are decreasing and strictly convex in k for
k E {0,... , k'} and k' G {0, ... , N}, and that Gk strictly second-order stochastically dom-
inates Gk for k E {1,..., N - 1}. Then maximum cooperation is strictly greater under
a monitoring technology corresponding to {k )N}=1 than under a monitoring technology
corresponding to {gk (} 1.
The condition that Gk (k') is decreasing and convex in k means that, as the number of
defectors in period t (or, more generally, #D (t)) increases, the probability that there are
fewer than k' defectors in period t + 1 decreases at a decreasing rate. The condition that ok
strictly second-order stochastically dominates Gk means that, for any number of defectors k
in period t (other than 0 or N), the distribution of the number of defectors in period t + 1
under G1. strictly second-order stochastically dominates the number of defectors in period
t + 1 under Gk.
The intuition for Theorem 7 is fairly simple: If Gk strictly second-order stochastically
dominates Gk for all k, then under GOk it is more likely that an intermediate number of players
find out about an initial deviation each period. Since Gk (k') and Gk (k') are decreasing
and convex in k, the expected number of players who find out about the deviation within
t periods increases in t more quickly when it is more likely that an intermediate number
of players find out about the deviation each period. Hence, Et. E [#D (t)] is strictly
higher under a monitoring technology corresponding to {k (.)IN 1 than under a monitoring
technology corresponding to {gk (.)N, and the theorem then follows from Theorem 6.
3.6 Fixed Monitoring Networks
This section studies both global and local public good provision with network monitoring
when the monitoring network is fixed over time. That is, throughout this section I make
the following assumption on the (deterministic) monitoring technology.
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* Fixed Undirected Monitoring Network: There exists a network L = (uli)(hij)GEN u
that li,j,t = lij = lj,i for all t.
I also assume that the stage game satisfies one of the following two properties, where
N (i) is the set of player i's neighbors in L.
" Global Public Goods: ui (x) = ( , f (x)) - xi.
" Local Public Goods: u (x) = (ZjEN(i) f (x) - xi.
The extensions of all of the results in this section to directed networks is straightforward.
I discuss below where the assumption of global or local public goods can be relaxed.
Section 3.6.1 introduces a new definition of centrality in networks, and uses Theorem
5 to show that more central players have greater maximum cooperation. This result not
only allows for comparisons among players in a given network but is also the key tool for
comparing maximum cooperation across networks. In particular, Section 3.6.2 shows that if
player i' in network L' is more central than player i in (connected) network L, then for every
player j in network L there exists a corresponding player j' in network L' such that player
j''s maximum cooperation is greater than player j's; in this sense, network L' "dominates"
network L in terms of supporting cooperation. Finally, Section 3.6.3 remarks on the stability
of monitoring networks, emphasizing differences between the cases of global and local public
goods.
3.6.1 Centrality and Maximum Cooperation
Theorem 5 provides a general characterization of players' maximum cooperation as a function
of the discount factor and benefit functions. Here, my goal is to provide a partial ordering
("centrality") of players in terms of their network characteristics under which higher players
have greater maximum cooperation for all discount factors and benefit functions. Intuitively,
player i is "more central" than player j if i has more neighbors (within distance t, for all
t E N) than j, i's neighbors have more neighbors than j's neighbors, i's neighbors' neighbors
have more neighbors than j's neighbors' neighbors, and so on. Formally, let d (i, j) be the
distance (shortest path length) between players i and j, with d (i,j) oc if there is no path
between i and j. The definition of centrality is the following.
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Definition 15 Player i is 1-more central than player j if, for all t E N, # {k E N :d (i, k) < t} >
# {k E N d (j, k) < t}. Player i is strictly 1-more central than player j if in addition
#{k E N d (i,k) < t} > #{k e N :d (j,k) < t} for some t.
For all integers s > 2, player i is s-more central than player j if, for all t E N, there
exists a surjection : {k E N : d (i, k) < t} -+ {k E N : d (j, k) < t} such that, for all k with
d (j, k) < t, there exists k' E @/7 (k) such that k' is s - 1-more central than k. Player i is
strictly s-more central than player j if in addition k' is strictly s - 1-more central than k for
some t, @, k, and k'.
Player i is more central than player j if i is s-more central than j for all s E N. Player
i is strictly more central than player j if in addition i is strictly s-more central than j for
some s E N.
As a first example, consider five players arranged in a line (Figure 4). Player 3 is strictly
more central than players 2 and 4, who are in turn strictly more central than players 1 and 5.
To see this, note first that player 3 is strictly 1-more central than players 2 and 4, who are
in turn each strictly 1-more central than players 1 and 5. For example, player 2 is strictly
1-niore central than player 5 because player 2 has 3 neighbors within distance 1 (including
player 2 herself), 4 neighbors within distance 2, and 5 neighbors within distance 3 or more;
while player 5 has 2 neighbors within distance 1, 3 neighbors within distance 2, 4 neighbors
within distance 3, and 5 neighbors within distance 4 or more. Next, suppose that player 3 is
s-more central than players 2 and 4, and that players 2 and 4 are both s-more central than
players 1 and 5. Then it is easy to check that player 3 is also s + 1-more central than players
2 and 4, who in turn are both s + 1-more central than players 1 and 5; for example, one
surjection @ : {k C N d (2, k) < 2} -- {k E N : d (5, k) < 2} that satisfies the terms of the
definition is given by @ (1) = @ (2) = 5, '4 (3) = 3, @ (4) = 4 (noting that a player is always
more central than herself, because in this case V) can be taken to be the identity mapping).
Thus, by induction on s, player 3 is strictly more central than player 2 and 4, who are in
turn strictly more central than players 1 and 5.
The main result of this section states that, with either global or local public goods,
more central players have greater maximum cooperation, regardless of the discount factor o
and benefit function f. The result can easily be generalized to allow for utility functions
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Figure 4: A Five-Player Example
intermediate between global and local public goods, where a player's benefit from another
player's action is a decreasing function of the distance between them."' The proof uses a
monotonicity argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5, which shows that more
central players cooperate more at every step of a sequence of vectors of cooperations that
converges to the vector of maximum cooperations.
Theorem 8 With either global or local public goods, if player i is more central than player
j, then x* > x*. The inequality is strict if player i is strictly more central than player j and
x* > 0 for all k E N.
The proof of the strict inequality in Theorem 8 uses the following important lemma.
Lemma 7 Player i is more central than player j if and only if for all t E N there exists
a surjection $ : {k e N : d (i,k) t} {k e N : d (j,k) < t} such that, for all k with
d (j, k) < t, there exists k' E --1 (k) such that k' is more central than k.
Proof of Theorem 8. I prove the result for global public goods. The proof for local
public goods is similar.
Let N : -+ Rf, be defined as in the proof of Theorem 5; with a fixed monitoring
network and global public goods, this simplifies to
di( (xj) = 6d (ii)f (xj) for all i.
jj=
As in the proof of Theorem 5, define of recursively by x= X (a constant defined in Step
la of the proof of Theorem 5) and x+1 = # ((x)<_ . The proof of Theorem 5 shows
that x = ljimm+ Xm.
5 Formally, Theorem 8 holds whenever there exist a function f : R+ -4 R+ and constants nd e R+ such
that ad > ad+1 > 0 for all d E N and ui (x) = adJ~f (x7 )) - 1 for all i E N.
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Suppose that player i is more central than player j. I claim that x' > x' for all
m E N, which proves the weak inequality. Trivially, x = X > X = X1. Now suppose
that x' > x whenever player k' is more central than player k, for some m E N. Since
player i is n + 1-more central than player j, for any t E N there exists a surjection @
{k E N : d (i, k) < t} --+ {k E N : d (j, k) < t} such that, for all k with d (j, k) < t, there
exists A' E 0 (k) such that k' is m-more central than k. Since x' > x', this implies
that kd(k)<t f (Xf (x). This holds for all t, which implies that x7+1
(1 - ) k:d(i,k)<t f (,') > (1 - 3) Eo 6' Ek:d(j,k)<t f+1. It follows by
induction that x' > xT for all m E N.
To prove the strict inequality, suppose that player i is strictly more central than player
j and that x* > 0 for all k E N. Rewrite (35) as
X = d(ij)f (X)). (36)
Suppose that i is more central than j and strictly 1-more central than j, let x* mink 4
(which is positive by assumption), and let d be the diameter of L (i.e., the maximum distance
between any two path-connected nodes in L). Then, by Lemma 7 and (36), x > x* +
3 d-- min {, 1 - 6} f (x*), as player i has at least one more distance-t neighbor than player
j for some t E N.W Therefore, there exists E1 > 0 such that x* - x5 > E1 > 0 whenever i
is more central than j and strictly 1-more central than j. Now suppose that there exists
:, > 0 such that x4 - x > E, > 0 whenever i is more central than j and strictly s-more
central than J. Suppose that i is more central than j and strictly s + 1-more central than j.
Then x* > x + d- I max {S, 1 - 6} f (E,), by Lemma 7 and (36), which implies that there
exists E,+1 > 0 such that x* - x > E,+1 > 0. By induction on s, it follows that x* > x*
whenever i is strictly more central than j. m
Four remarks on Theorem 8 are in order. First, the conclusion of Theorem 8 would still
hold for local public goods (but not global public goods) if the definition of centrality was
weakened by specifying that player i is 1-more central than player j whenever #N (i) >
"The min {6, 1 - 6} term corresponds to the possibility that player i may have one more distance-d
neighbor than player j, or may have one more distance-d - 1 neighbor and the same number of distance-d
neighbors.
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#N (j) (by the same proof). Thus, players' maximum cooperations can be ordered for
more networks with local public goods than with global public goods. Second, the fixed
point equation (36)-which is substantially simpler than the general fixed point equation
(35)-orders players' maximum cooperations for any fixed monitoring network.
Third, Theorem 8 provides a new perspective on the Olsonian idea of the "exploitation of
the great by the small." Olson (1965) notes that small players may free ride on large players
if larger players have greater private incentives to contribute to public goods. Theorem 8
illustrates a reason why larger players might be expected to contribute disproportionately
much to public goods even if they do not have greater private incentives to contribute: larger
players may be more central, in which case they may be punished more effectively for shirking.
While this "exploitation" implies that more central players receive lower payoffs than less
central players with global public goods, Corollary 11 below implies that more central players
receive higher payoffs than less central players with local public goods, because with local
public goods the benefit of having more neighbors more than offsets the cost of contributing
more.
Fourth, my definition of centrality is related on an intuitive level to existing centrality
measures based on players' neighbors' characteristics, such as Bonacich centrality (Bonacich,
1987).58 My definition of centrality is a partial order, as it ranks players in a way that is
invariant to the benefit function and discount factor, so a more direct comparison with
Bonacich centrality results from comparing players' maximum cooperation for a fixed bene-
fit function, f, and discount factor, 6; in this case, 6 is analogous to the decay factor in the
definition of Bonacich centrality, #. There are two differences between a player's maximum
cooperation and Bonacich centrality. First, a player's maximum cooperation depends on
other players' maximum cooperations through the concave function f, while this dependence
in linear for Bonacich centrality. An important consequence is that the vector of players'
maximum cooperations is unique, while the vector of players' Bonacich centralities is deter-
mined only up to multiplication by a constant. Second, player i's maximum cooperation
depends on player j's maximum cooperation only through the distance between i and j, not
through the number of paths between i and j (as in Bonacich centrality). This reflects the
58I thank a referee for pointing out this connection.
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fact that only the time it takes for player j to learn about a deviation by player i is relevant
for computing player i's maximum cooperation.
For general monitoring networks, it may be difficult to verify that one player is more
central than another, making it hard to apply Theorem 8. Sometimes, however, symmetries
in the network can be exploited to determine which players are more central than others
more easily. The remainder of this section shows how this can be done. Corollary 8 states
that, if player i is closer to all players k # i, j than is player j, then player i is more central
than player j. Corollary 9 shows that if players i and k are in "symmetric" positions in the
monitoring network (in that there exists a graph automorphism p on L such that k = p (i))
and player k is more central than player j, then player i is more central than player j as
well.5
Corollary 8 If d (i, k) < d (j, k) for all k i, j, then player i is more central than playerj.
Player i is strictly more central than player j if in addition the inequality is strict for some
k # i j.
Corollary 9 If there exists a graph automorphism p : N -~ N such that p (i) is more central
(resp., strictly more central) than j, then i is more central (resp., strictly more central) than
J-
The example in Figure 5 illustrates the usefulness of Corollaries 8 and 9.0 First, Corol-
lary 8 immediately implies that player 3 is more central than players 1 and 2, and that
player 5 is more central than players 6 and 7. Second, observe that the following map p is
an automorphism of L: p (1) = 7, p (2) = 6, p (3) = 5, p (4) = 4, p (5) = 3, p (6) = 2, and
p (7) = 1. Thus, Corollary 9 implies that each player in {3, 5} is more central than each
player in {1, 2, 6, 7}. Given this observation, it is not hard to show that player 4 is more
central than each player in {1, 2, 6, 7}. Finally, neither of players 3 and 4 are more central
59A graph automorphism on L is a permutation p on N such that li,j = lp(i),p(j) for all i, j e N. That is,
a graph automorphism is a permutation of vertices that preserves links.
6 
"This example is the same as that in Figure 2.13 of Jackson (2008), which Jackson uses to illustrate
various network-theoretic concepts of centrality. As shown in the text, my definition of centrality is similar
to the concepts discussed by Jackson in that players 3, 4, and 5 are all more central than players 1, 2, 6,
and 7. One impotant difference between my definition and those discussed by Jackson is that my definition
gives a partial order on nodes, while all the definitions discussed by Jackson give total orders.
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Figure 5: A Seven-Player Example
than the other, as player 3 has more immediate neighbors while player 4 has more neighbors
within distance 2. Therefore, Theorem 8 does not say whether player 3 or player 4 has a
higher maximum cooperation. This is reassuring, because one can easily construct examples
in which x* > x* and others in which the reverse inequality holds: for example, if f (x) = Vx
(with global public goods), then x* - 2.638, x* 3.425, and x* 3.475 if 6 = .5, whereas
if 6 = .4 then x* = 1.378, x* - 1.849, and x* 1.839. Indeed, it is not surprising that
player 3 contributes more relative to player 4 when 3 is lower, as in this case the fact that
player 3 has more immediate neighbors is more important, while player 4's greater number
of distance-2 neighbors matters more when 3 is higher (since 62 is low relative to 3 when 3 is
low). However, there are networks in which a player i is not more central than player j but
nonetheless x* > x* for every concave benefit function f and discount factor 6, as shown by
Example A3 in Appendix A.
3.6.2 Comparing Networks
This section shows that centrality is a key tool for comparing different networks in terms
of their capacity to support cooperation, not just for comparing individuals within a fixed
network. To see this, note that the "more central" relation can be immediately extended to
pairs of players in different (connected) networks L' and L by specifying that player I' E L'
is more central than player i E L if player i' is more central than player i in the network
consisting of disjoint components L' and L. With this definition, the result is the following.
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Theorem 9 For any network L' and connected network L, if there exists players i' E L'
and i E L such that player i' is more central than player i, then there exists an surjection
V: L' -- L such that, for all j e L, there exists j'E $-7 (j) such that x*, > x*.
Proof. Let d be the diameter of L. Since player i' is more central than player i, Lemma
7 implies that there exists a surjection {j L' : d (i',j) d} -> {{j E L : d (i, j) dj}}
such that, for all j with d (i, j) < d, there exists j' E $/1 (j) such that j' is more central
than j. By Theorem 8, x, > x* for any such j'and j. Finally, {j L : d (i,j) } L,
by definition of d and the assumption that L is connected. m
It is easy to see that Theorem 9 applies if L' D L, in which case any surjection @ : L' -> L
such that @ (i) = i for all i C L satisfies the condition of the theorem. This implies
the following corollary, which formalizes in a natural way the widespread idea that better-
connected societies can provide more public goods. 61
Corollary 10 Adding links to a network weakly increases each player's maximum coopera-
tion.
However, Theorem 9 is much more general than this. For example, if L' is a circle
with N' nodes and L is a circle with N nodes, then Theorem 9 applies whenever N' > N.
Similarly, if L' is a symmetric graph of degree k' on N nodes and L is a symmetric graph
of degree k on N nodes, then Theorem 9 applies whenever k' > k. Finally, the example
in Figure 6 shows that Theorem 9 can even apply if L' and L have the same number of
nodes and the same number of links (here, six and seven, respectively), because a simple
application of Lemma 7 and Corollary 8 shows that players 1, 2, 5, and 6 are more central
than players 7, 8, 11, and 12, and that players 3 and 4 are more central than players 9 and
10.
3.6.3 Network Stability
This section briefly considers the implications of allowing players to sever links in the moni-
toring network before the beginning of play. I assume that the resulting equilibrium involves
" An earlier version of this paper proves that adding a link to a network strictly increases the maximum
cooperation of every player in the same component as the added link, if the maximum cooperation of every
such player is strictly positive.
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Figure 6: Comparing Networks with Theorem 9
each player making her maximum contribution with respect to the remaining monitoring net-
work. I show that, with local public good provision, no player ever has an incentive to sever
a link, but that this is not true with global public good provision. Given that adding any
link to a monitoring network increases all players' maximum cooperation (by Corollary 10),
these results suggest that it may be easier to sustain monitoring networks that support large
maximum cooperation with local public goods than with global public goods.
With local public goods, every player is made worse-off when any link in the monitoring
network is severed. This implies that any monitoring network is stable, in that no individual
can benefit from severing a link; if players can also add links, then only the complete network
is stable. Note that a less restrictive definition of local public goods is needed for this result.
Corollary 11 Suppose that L' contains more links than L. If ui ((xjN ') = (ZjN(i) fii (Xj))
xi for all i e N, then every player i's payoff when all players make their maximum contri-
butions is weakly greater with monitoring network L' than with monitoring network L.
Proof. Note that (35) simplifies to x* = iE N(i) f * (). Therefore,
ni ( (X.) = 1 fi,j (X*) -x =( -6 fi,j (X*)) (37)
(jEN(i) jEN(i)
The set N (i) is weakly larger in L' than in L (in the set-inclusion sense), and by Corollary
10 every player's maximum cooperation is weakly greater with monitoring network L' than
with monitoring network L. Hence, the result follows from (37). m
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Corollary 11 does not hold with global public goods. The key difference between global
and local public goods is that with global public goods a player can benefit from another
player's cooperation even if she is not observed by the other player, and in this case her own
maximum cooperation is lower. Formally, with global public goods (37) becomes
ui ((x*)N 1) Z (I _ 6d(ij))f ()
This equation clarifies the tradeoff player i faces when deciding whether to sever a link
with player j: severing the link increases d (i, k) for some players k E N, which increases
ni ((x*) 1 ) (by reducing player i's maximum cooperation, x), but also decreases x* for
some players k E N, which decreases wi ((x) ). It is easy to construct examples where
the first effect dominates (e.g., three players arranged in a line with f (x) = x2 and = .8).
3.7 Conclusion
This paper studies repeated cooperation games with network monitoring and provides com-
parative statics on the maximum equilibrium level of cooperation with respect to group size
and structure. The key theorem, which underlies all the results in the paper, is that maxi-
mum cooperation can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. This theorem is driven by the
strategic complementarity, in repeated cooperation games with network monitoring, between
any two player's actions at any two on-path histories. With equal monitoring, maximum co-
operation is typically increasing in group size with pure public goods and decreasing in group
size with divisible public goods; in general, comparative statics on maximum cooperation
depend on the product of the marginal benefit of cooperation and the effective contagious-
ness of the monitoring technology. Less uncertain monitoring, which in some cases may be
interpreted as reliable local monitoring rather than unreliable public monitoring, sustains
greater rnaxinium cooperation. With a fixed monitoring network, more central players have
greater maximum cooperation. In addition, all players have greater maximum cooperation
when the network is better connected, though better connected networks are more likely to
be stable with local public goods than with global public goods.
I conclude by discussing directions for future research. First, my analysis of optimal
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equilibria with network monitoring may facilitate further investigations of the relationship
between public and private monitoring as means of supporting cooperation. In many eco-
nomic examples, it seems likely that only extremely weak incentives can be provided by
public monitoring, but this intuition is not captured clearly by existing models of repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring. A model in which players learn about each other's
actions through both network monitoring and imperfect public monitoring could clarify the
extent to which large groups are able to avoid the problems associated with public monitoring
by relying on local, private monitoring of the kind studied in this paper.
Second, grim trigger strategies are fragile in that one instance of shirking eventually leads
to the complete breakdown of cooperation. This is especially problematic in (realistic) cases
where the cost of cooperation is stochastic and is sometimes prohibitively high. Hence,
extending the model to allow for stochastic costs of cooperation is important for deriving
more robust predictions about which strategies best sustain cooperation, and this also seems
to be an interesting and challenging problem from a theoretical perspective.
Finally, my analysis makes strong predictions about the effects of group size and structure
on the level of public good provision, and on how these differ depending on whether the public
good is pure or divisible and whether it is global or local. A natural next step would be
to study these predictions empirically. This would be easiest to pursue experimentally,
but some insight can be gained from recent field data. For example, Karlan et al (2009)
find that indirect network connections between individuals in Peruvian shantytowns support
lending and borrowing, consistent with my finding that more central individuals have higher
capacities for cooperation. Allcott et al (2007) provide suggestive evidence that greater
network closure may lead US high school students to help each other more both socially
and academically; Allcott et al interpret this evidence as indicating that network closure
leads to provision of higher-value public goods, but it can also be interpreted as indicating
that network closure leads to provision of more local public goods, which is consistent with
my model (interpreting network closure as smaller distance to individuals whose actions one
values; cf Theorem 6). Finally, Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2010) find that
favor-exchange networks in rural India exhibit high support, the property that linked players
share at least one common neighbor. While it seems natural that support (which is the key
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determinant of cooperation in Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan's model) should be
correlated with my measure of maximum cooperation, it would be interesting to study the
precise relationship between the two concepts, and in particular to determine which measure
better predicts cooperation in which environments.
3.8 Appendix A: Omitted Examples
3.8.1 Example Al: Counterexample to Theorem 5 with Non-Separable Utility
This example shows that a player's maximum cooperation may not be sustainable in grim
trigger strategies if utility is not separable. 2 The intuition is that, if players' actions are
substitutes, they may benefit from taking turns cooperating.
There are three players. Monitoring is perfect. Utility functions are
S-.01 x + 1
+.01 X3 +1
S-I.01 X2 + 1
- min {x 2 - 1, 0} min {x 3 - 1, 0} - X1
- min {x -
- min {x -
1,0} min {x3
1, 0} min {x2
- 1, 0} - X2
- 1, 0} - X 3 .
Note that every player's utility function is increasing and strictly concave in every other
player's action and that ua (0, 0, 0) = 0 for all i E N. Let 6 = .8.
First, consider equilibria in grim trigger strategies. By the same argument as in the
case with separable utility, player i's maximum cooperation in grim trigger strategies is the
greatest value of xi such that there exists a vector (xi)> satisfying
X1 = .8 (.01 x+ -. 01 I 3 + 1 - min {x 2 -
X2 = .8 (.01 I 1 + .01 x 3 + 1 - min {xi -
X3 = .8(.01 X1 +-.01 X2 - 1 - min{1 -
1, 0}min {x 3 - 1, 0})
1, 0} min {x 3 - 1, 0})
1,0}min{x 2 - 1,0}).
It can be easily verified that the the solution to this problem involves x1 = X2 = X3 < 1, and
computation yields xi e .7728.
62I thank Gabriel Carroll for help with this example.
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ui ((Xi)_ )
U2 ((Xi)3-)  _
t3 (& i=~~
= .01
= .01
= .01
V~X2
Vx1
JViT
Next, consider the following non-grim trigger strategy profile. On-path, player i plays
xi = 1.099 in period t if t f i mod 3 and plays xi = 0 in period t if t = i mod 3. Thus, each
player takes every third period off from cooperating. Each player i plays xi = 0 in every
subsequent period if she ever observes a deviation. To verify that this strategy profile is a
SE, the key incentive constraint to check is that player i does not prefer to deviate to xi = 0
in a period t = i + 1 mod 3. If she conforms in such a period, her payoff equals
1 - .83 (.01/1.099 + 1 - 1.099 + .8 (.01 1.099 + 1 - 1.099) + .82 .01 1.099 + .01 1.099 + i))
while if she deviates to xi = 0, her payoff equals .01 1.099+1, which is strictly less. Finally,
player l's equilibrium cooperation in this SE equals
f 3 (1.099 + .8 (1.099)) ~~ .8107,1 - .83
which is greater than .7728, her maximum cooperation in grim trigger strategies.
3.8.2 Example A2: Counterexample to Theorem 5 with Unobserved Monitoring
Network
This example shows that a player's maximum cooperation may not be sustainable in grim
trigger strategies if the realized monitoring network is unobserved.
There are three players. Player 1 is observed by player 2 with probability 1/2 and
is never observed by player 3. Players 2 and 3 always observe each other. Player 1
observes nothing. The realized monitoring network (drawn independently every period) is
unobserved; in particular, Player 3 does not observe when player 2 observes player 1 and
when he does not. For each player i, ui ((xj 3 1 ) = x) - xi, and 6 = .5. I will
show that player l's maximum cooperation in grim trigger strategies equals .25, but that
there exists a SE in which player l's equilibrium cooperation equals 0.2505.
First, consider grim trigger strategies. By the same argument as in the case where the
monitoring network is observable, player i's maximum cooperation in grim trigger strategies
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equals xi, where (zi)- is the greatest vector satisfying
xi = (1 - 6) E Pr'(j  - D (t, i))V- for all i.
t=o ji
This may be rewritten as
3/2 ( /2
1- 6/2 £2+ 1-6/2) £3
X2 = 6 £3
X3 6V3 £-
Solving this system of equations with 3 = .5 yields x1 = X2 = X3 = .25. Hence, player l's
maximum cooperation in grim trigger strategies equals .25.
Next, consider the following strategy profile. Player 1 plays i= .2505 in every period.
Players 2 and 3 each have two on-path actions, denoted 4, L ', 4, and xH, with 4 < 4'
and xL < oj; these numbers are defined below. Player 2 plays X2 = XH in period 0. At
subsequent odd-numbered periods t, player 2 plays 4' with probability 1 if he observed
player l's period-t -- 1 action, and otherwise plays each of xoH and 4 with probability .5.
At subsequent even-numbered periods t, player 2 plays o' with probability 1 if he observed
player l's period-t - 2 action, and otherwise plays each of 4' and 4L with probability .5.
Thus, if player 2 observes player l's action in period t, he then plays 4' with probability 1
in both periods t + l and t + 2. Finally, player 3 plays £3 X3 in period 0, and in every
period t ;> 1 he plays ' if player 2 played X in period t - 1, and plays 4 if player 2 played
4 in period t - 1. If any player i observes a deviation from this specification of on-path
play (i.e., if any player deviates herself; if player 2 observes x1 # .2505 or observes player 3
failing to take her prescribed action; or if player 3 observes £2 {4, Xo }), she then plays
xi = 0 in all subsequent periods.
Before presenting the equations that define £L , H L, and x£H and verifying that the
resulting strategy profile is a SE, I discuss why it is possible that a strategy profile of
this form sustains a greater maximum cooperation of player l's than does any grim trigger
strategy profile. The key is that the difference between player l's expectation of player 3's
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continuation action when player 1 cooperates and when player 1 shirks, conditional on the
event that player 2 observes player 1 (which is the only event that matters for player l's
incentives), is larger than in any equilibrium in grim trigger strategies. To understand this,
consider what happens after period 2 sees player 1 take action .2505 in period t -1, for t odd.
Conditional on this event, player l's expectation of player 3's action in both periods t+I and
t+2 equals x2; but player 3's expectation of her own action in period t+2 after seeing player
2 play H in period t is less than 4/ (because he is not sure that player 2 observed player 1 in
period t -1). Indeed, when player 3 sees player 2 play X in period t, he would not be willing
to play 4' if he knew that player 2 had observed player 1 in period t -1 (as this would require
him to play xH in period t + 2 in addition to t + 1). Thus, there is disagreement between
player l's expectation of player 3's continuation action, conditional on player 2 observing
player 1, and player 3's (unconditional) expectation of player 3's continuation action, and
this disagreement improves player l's incentive to cooperate without causing player 3 to
shirk.
I now define x, L H xL and xH. For clarity of exposition, I begin by defining the first
three numbers in terms of 43. First, let 4/X - /' - .1. This gap between 4 and 3/
differentiates the resulting strategy profile from a grim trigger strategy profile. Next, I want
player 2 to be indifferent among contributing 0, 4 , and o4 at every on-path history, which
is the case if
S - x = 6 X - XL = 0.
H H H
In order to satisfy this condition, let 4' = .5 4'and x .5 /V -. 1).
Given these definitions of 4I, oH, and 4 in terms of x, I define x' to be the number
that makes player 3 indifferent between actions x H and 0 after he sees player 2 play 4' in
an odd-numbered period t - 1; intuitively, this is the binding incentive constraint for player
3 because the fact that player 2 plays 4H in period t is evidence that he observed player
1 in period t - 1, in which case he plays x2 with probability 1 in period t + 1 and thus
requires player 3 to play x Hin period t + 2 in addition to t + 1. To compute this number,
note that player l's continuation action does not depend on player 3's strategy, so player 3
is indifferent between contributing x4 and 0 if and only if (1 - 6) xH equals the difference
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in player 3's continuation value following actions xH and 0, excluding player l's actions.
Clearly, this continuation value equals 0 after action 0, as players 2 and 3 play 0 in every
period after player 3 plays 0. To compute this continuation value after action x 1 , note that
the probability that player 2 observed player l's action in period t - 2 conditional on his
playing xy in period t - 1 equals - 2/3. Therefore, player 3's assessment of the2 ~.5+.5(.5)
probability that player 2 plays x2 in period t equals
2 1
- (1) + - (.5) = 5/6.3 3
In contrast, player 3's assessment of the probability that player 2 plays X2 in every period
T > t + 1 equals .5 (1) + .5 (.5) = 3/4. Hence, since player 3's assessment of the probability
that he himself plays x' in period T + 1 equals his assessment of the probability that player
2 plays 4' in period r, for all T, his continuation value after playing x4 in t equals
5(( H)~ ~) I L-4)+~ 4 H~) +1 ( XL _ XL))
6(1 - 6) (-x (_ + 6(-x3 + 4FXH- 6x3 + - 3x
- I I/( _ ). (38)
2 +, /2 - x +3 - .1) /2 - 1 -3 .1
Define x' to be the number such that (.5) x equals (38). Computing this number yields
H .25384, and thus A .16307, 4 .25191, and A .20191.
It remains to show that this strategy profile is a SE. The one-shot deviation principle
applies, by standard arguments. Player 2 is indifferent among actions 0, 4 , and x at every
on-path history, and clearly weakly prefers to play 0 at every off-path history, so he has no
profitable one-shot deviation (as any deviation yields a lower stage-game payoff and a weakly
lower continuation payoff than does x 2 = 0). It is also straightforward to verify that the fact
that player 3 has no profitable deviation after seeing player 2 play 4' in an odd-numbered
period implies that he has no profitable deviation at any history; in particular, all other
one-shot incentive constraints of player 3's are slack. Finally, player l's most profitable
deviation at any on-path history is playing x1 = 0. If player 1 conforms in period t, for any
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t > 1, her expected payoff equals
( xH +VxH) (V2L+ xL)- .2505 .71709.
If player 1 deviates to x1 = 0 in an odd-numbered period, her expected payoff may be shown
to equal
(1- ) +- + (+ 2) (
+ 11-+ 2  + X + (1 + +)( .7167
If player 1 deviates to x1 = 0 in an even-numbered period t > 2, her expected payoff is strictly
less than this; intuitively, this is because if player l's period-t deviation is unobserved, player
2 plays oH in period t + 1 with probability 3/4 if t is odd but plays xH with probability
only 1/2 if t is even. In addition, it is clear that the difference between player l's expected
payoff from conforming and from deviating to x1 = 0 in period t = 0 is the same as the
difference between her expected payoff from conforming and from deviating to x1 = 0 in any
other even-numbered period. Therefore, player 1 does not have a profitable deviation at any
on-path history. Finally, it can be verified that deviating to x1 = .2505 is not profitable for
player 1 at any off-path history, and it is clear that no other off-path deviation is profitable.
3.8.3 Example A3: Centrality is not Necessary to Order Maximum Coopera-
tions
The following example shows that player i's maximum cooperation may be greater than
player j's for all discount factors 6 and benefit functions f even if player i is not more
central than player j.
The monitoring network consists of two components, as shown in Figure 7: Component
1 is four players on a line, and Component 2 is four players in a star. Let x = of for
either of the peripheral players in Component 1 (i E {1, 4}), let y y' for either of the
central players in Component 1 (i E {2, 3}), let x'j x for any of the peripheral players in
Component 2 (i E {6, 7, 8}), and let yp yn for the center player in Component 2 (i = 5).
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Figure 7: Example A3
Note that, for example, player 6 is not more central than player 1, and player 5 is not more
central than player 2. However, I claim that, for any discount factor 6, benefit function f,
and integer m E N, x' > x" and y' > y", and therefore that x* > x* and y* > y*. Hence,
it is not always necessary that one player is more central than another to be able to order
their maximum cooperations for all discounts factors and benefit functions.
The proof that x" > x" and y' > y'" for all m c N is by induction. Specifically, I show
that these inequality hold for m E {1, 2}, and then show that they hold for m + 1 if they
hold for m and n - 1, for all m E N. Trivially, xi = Xi y1 = y = X. Observe that
"+1 = (6 +6 2) f (y") +3f (X")
yMn+1 = 6f (y 7) + (6 + 62) f (Xm)
rn+1 
- 6f (yn) + 26 2 f (X2)
1
y+1 = 36f (x).
Y2 2S
Therefore, x = (6 + 62 + 63) f (1) (6 + 26 2) f (?) x2, and y = (26+ 62) f ()
36f(X) =y2.
For the inductive step, suppose that 4m > x",y y", X 1  7 ",and y y". I
show that x2+1 2 <+1 and y"+ 1 > yn+1. First, note that
m+1 -n+1 = 36f (x") - 6f (y") - (6 + 62) f (X")
= 6 (f (x2) - f (y7") + (1 - 6) f (x2) + (1 + 6) (f (x2) - f (xI")))
and
x2 +1 -x n+1 =f (y") + 262f (x2") - (6 + 62) f (n) _ 63f (,n)
=- 6 ((f (X2) - f (y") + (1 - 6) f (X2)) + f (y") - f (y) + 62 (f (X)
By hypothesis, x'" > x'" and y" > y", so to show that both of these expressions are non-
negative it suffices to show that f (x2) - f (y!") + (1 - 6) f (x2) is non-negative. This is
trivial if xm" > y", so suppose that x" < ymf. By concavity of f, this implies that
f(x) - f (y") -f' (x;") (y - 1")
=f(xm") (6f (Yr"- 1) + (6+62)f(x;",- 1) of(y7-1) - 23 2 f (.(-)),
where f' denotes the left-derivative of f. In addition, f (0) = 0 and concavity of f imply
that
f(xW) > f (x') X"
= f'(x")(3f (y7- 1)+236 2 f (11)).
Combining these inequalities yields
> f /)(x") f (y!"-1) (1 + 6) f (x+1) + f (y;"l) + 26f (x' ")
> of' (x") (-f (x7"1) + 6f (x "-1) + (1 - 3) f (y" 1))
> 0,
where the second inequality follows because f (y2") ; f (yl"1), f ( -) ;> f (x1), and
f (x2" 1 ) > 0; and the third inequality follows because the fact that y"n ;> x" ; > x m -1
implies that -f (x ") + 6f (x 12 ) + (1 - 3) f (y2"1) > 0, and f' is non-negative.63
"
3The intuitive fact that y"-1 > xrn- can be verified by a separate inductive argument.
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f( ar)))
+ (- )f (y;"-1) + 26 (1 - 6) f (x2-
3.9 Appendix B: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5. There are three steps. Step 1 shows that there exists a (component-
wise) greatest vector (si)N satisfying (35), and also makes the technical point (used in Step
2d) that there exists an upper bound X E R+ on any player's expected action, conditional
on any set of monitoring realizations, at any time in any SE. Step 2 shows that ij is an
upper bound on player i's maximum cooperation, x*. Step 3 exhibits a SE in grim trigger
strategies, a*, such that (1 - 6) E0 0 StE [a' (hi)] = si for all i, which proves that x* = si
for all i.
Step 1a: There exists a number X E R+ such that for every a E ESE, player i, time t, and
set of monitoring realizations up to time t, F, E [oX (hi)|F] < X and Zg fi,j (X) - < 0.
Proof: Recall that (1 - 6) co E_ E [.j ((,s (h;))N 1) F] is well-defined for all
sets of monitoring realizations, F, by assumption. The assumptions that fij is concave for
all i, j E N and lim , oc fji (x)) - x = -oo for all i imply that there exists a number
X* E R+ that maximizes (z3 , fji (W)) - x. For every player i, let i' E R+ be the number
such that the sun of the players' continuation payoffs from period t onward equals 0 when
player i plays X in period t, every player j -f i plays x in period t, and every player j
(including player i) plays xz in every subsequent period; that is, X is defined by
(1 -6) ( fi+ ()) () +f (' -+ ,) 0.
\ j f J ( /j*) k gfij}
+ a( ( f, (z))
\jEN \k7 j//
Let X' mnaxiEN X. Note that (1 - 6) E0ti 6-T N E uj ((Uk (h T))N F < 0 when-
ever E [uT (h) F] > X' for some player i. Since ht determines the monitoring realization
up to time t, and thus whether F has occurred, (1 - 6) E t 6T-E U ((O-k (h ))N_ F]
E [(1 - ) E u ((Uk (h ) ) ht] F. Therefore, there exists a player j such
that, if E [oT (ht) F] > X' then (1 - 6) E' 3-t E [U ((0k (h )) h < 0 with positive
probability. But (1 - 6) _, t-tE H ((ok (hT)) ) '> 0 at any on-path history h
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because o E ESE and 0 is each player's minmax value. Hence, E [ci (h') F] < X' for every
player i.
Finally, for every player i, the assumption that lim 1 (o i fi (x)) - X < 0 (combined
with concavity of fij) implies there exists a number Xi E R+ such that (zj, .f' (kj))
Xi = 0 and (zo fiJ (x)) - x < 0 for all x > X. Taking X max {X', maxiEN XiI + 1
completes the proof.
Step 1b: There exists a greatest vector (i)N satisfying (35), and sc < X for all i.
Proof: Define the function R :N R by
6t E Pr (J E D (t, i)) f1 (xa) for all i.
t=o j$i
The fixed points of # are precisely those vectors satisfying (35).
In addition, (( 6t Z 3 # 2 Pr C D(t)) X)X,((1 - 6) Pr (jED(, i)) fig ( -))-X
Observe that c0 is isotone.
< 0 for every player i, which
implies that # ((X) ) (X)1. Hence, the image of the set [0, X] N under # is contained
in [0, ]N. Therefore, Tarski's fixed point theorem implies that # has a greatest fixed point
(Ni) _ in the set [0,X]N. Finally, if xi > X for some player i, then there exists a player
j (possibly equal to i) such that ((1 - 6) _tO ot Ekgj Pr (k C D (t, j)) fj,k (k)) - Xj < 0.
This implies that every fixed point of # must lie in the set [0,1 X] N and it follows that (ij)N
is the greatest vector satisfying (35)."
Step 2a: If o- C ESE, then for every player i and every on-path history ht,
6 T - tE [o-i (h)| ht] < (1 E ) -T Pr (j C D(r, t,
T=t jpi
i)) EB [fj (ox (hj)) h ,j E D (, t i)]
(39)
Proof: Fix strategy profile o-, player i, and on-path history ht. For any player j and
history hJ, let E [fj (o (hT)) h, 0] be the expectation of fj (o (h)) conditional on each
an aside, note that the vector (i)_ (which by Theorem 5 equals (x*)N 1) may be easily computed
by iterating # on X 
_=., Thus, computing the vector of maximum cooperations is like computing the
greatest equilibrium in a supermodular game (cf Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
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(1 - 6)
T-t
#i ((Xj)N 1)=(
player k #/ I following Uk, player i following a, at every time T < t, history h' being reached,
and player i playing x = 0 at every time r > t. If a E ESE, then player s's expected
payoff from conforming to a from ht onward is weakly greater than her expected payoff from
playing x = 0 at every time T > t. That is,
Tit
- oi (liT) I h' ))jht,0]
T~t
or, equivalently,
00
h'] < (1- )Z Z (E [fi,j (o-j (hT)) |ht] - E [fij (ag (h7)) 1h', 0])
Tt j
(40)
Observe that, conditional on the event j ( D (T, t, i), the probability distribution over
histories h' does not depend on player i's actions following history ht. Therefore,
E [fj (aj (hi)) ht,j ( D (r,t,i)] = E [ (cg (hj)) Ih, 0, j D (T, t, i)]
Hence, the right-hand side of (40) equals
(1 - S) [ 5-T  Pr (j E D (T, t, i)) (E [fi,j (uj (h)) hj E D (T, t, i)] - E [fi,j (u. (hI)) ht,
T=t j pi
which is not more than the right-hand side of (39). Therefore, the fact that (40) holds for
all players i and on-path histories ht implies that (39) holds for all players i and on-path
histories h'.
Step 2b: For every player i, define the random variable Xt by
Xt - (1 - 6) Z 
-tac (h T)
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(1 - 6)Z E [aj (h )
r=t
0, j E D (T.
fij (07 T)j (hj6 T-t E (E fij (aj (hT))
-
J: 4 i
The right-hand side of (39) is not more than
T=t j-fi
(41)
Proof: Fix a player j.To simplify notation, define the random variable X by Xf
(1 - 6) _,- 3T fij (o-j (hT)); this notation is used only in this step of the proof. Note that
(1 - 6) E [fi, (oa (hT)) hj D(, t, i)] =E [X,_ Iht,j E D(r, ti)1 -SE [XT hj E DC (, t, i)]
Therefore,
= 
t Pr
T-t
= 
6 t
= 6
(j E D(,t, i)) (E [XTh ,j E D(Tt,i)] -SE [XtlI h!, j E D (r, t, i)])
Pr (j ED (T, t, i)) E [X I |ht,j E D (Tt, i)]
-Pr(j E D(T- 1, t, i)) E [XiT hj,j c D (T - 1, t, i)]
Pr (j E D (T, t,i) \D (T - 1, t, i)) E [X jht, jE D (T, t, j) \D (T - 1, t, i)]
-Pr (j D (T - 1, t, i)) E [X h ,j E D (T - 1, t, i)
- Pr (jE D (r -1,t, i)) E[X j E r-1,t )
6Tt Pr(j ED (T, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, )) E
T=t
6Tt Pr (j E D (T, t, i) \D(T - 1, t, i))
= >1ST 
t Pr (j E D(r, t, i) \D(r - 1, t, i)) fj (E [X h ,j E D ('r,t,i) \D(- 1, t,i)])
T=t
where the second equality uses the fact that Pr (j E D (t - 1, t, i)) = 0, the third equality
uses the fact that D (T - 1, t, i) C D (r, t, i), and the inequality uses concavity of fij and
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f(E (
( ) -fiST (og (hs)) |ht, D (r, t, ) \D (r - 1,
S=T
- 7- (hj) Iht, j D ( t, i) \D (T
-) S ~
-t E Pr(jEcD(T, t,i)\D( - 1, t,i0))fij(E [X/|h', JEcD (rt, i)\ D(T -- 1, t,1) 1)).
(1 - T)o-t Pr (j T D (, t, i)) E [fij (o-j (hT) ) |h', jED (T, t, *)]
S Pr (jED(r, t, i) \D (r - 1, t, i)) E XiT jht E D (r, t, i) \D (r 1 t,i)
Jensen's inequality. Summing over j # i completes the proof.
Step 2c: If ( E ESE, then for every player i, time t, and subset of monitoring realizations
up to time t, F,
E [X F]
< 6 T Pr(j E D (-, t, i) \D (T - 1, t,i))jf, (E [XjlI C D (T, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, i),F])
7-=t j:?4i
Proof: If a E ESE, then (39) and Step 2b imply that, for every player i and every on-path
history h',
E [X' h] < T Z Pr
isii
(j D (T, t,i) \D(T- 1,t,i))jfi, (E [XjIht,j E D (T, t,i) \D(T - 1, t,i)])
Thus, by concavity of fij, and Jensen's inequality,
E [IE [X|ht] |F]
00
< Z (5T -tPrj E D (Tt,i) \D (T - 1, t, i))jf, (IE [E [XjIhtj C D (T, t, i) \D (r - 1,t,i)] IF]).
Finally, the assumption that ht (or ht) determines the monitoring realization up to time t
(and thus whether the events j E D (T, t, i) \D (r - 1, t, i) and F have occurred) implies that
E [E [Xt|ht] IF] = E [X|F],
and
E [E [X7lh7,T j E D (T, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, i)] IF] IE [X|j ED (r, t, i) \D ( - 1, t,i) , F]
Step 2d: If a C ESE, then E [X] < 24. In addition, if 0 E ESE and E [X?] = si for all i,
then cri (ht) = ii for every player i and on-path history ht.
Proof: Define x recursively, for all m E N, by letting x. X and letting x 1
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#i ((X Ni) for all i. I first claim that E [XIlF] < x for every player i, time t, subset of
monitoring realizations up to time t, F, and number m e N. The proof is by induction on
m. For m = 1, the result follows because E [aj (h[) F] < X for all T > t, by Step la, and
therefore E [XilF] = (1 - 6) _t6Z-A E [o (h[) F] < X. Suppose the result is proved for
some m E N. Then
E [X |F]
< E 6 Pr (j E D (T, t, i) \D (T - 1, t, i))f, (E [XT lj E D (T, t, i) \D (T - 1, t,i) , F])
T-t Jmi
=E1-6 P r (j D ( r, t, i)) 7t fijj ( (X
T t J: i
-' (E~)3 tPrj D (Tt )) fij (Xmf)
T t
m+1
where the first inequality follows by Step 2c and the second inequality follows by the inductive
hypothesis.
Since # is isotone, zij < x for all m E N, and in addition 2i < #i (limm-'oo x). Also,
# is continuous, which implies that #i (limm-oo x') = limm-oo x'. The fact that ± is
the greatest fixed point of # thus implies that i = limm--oo xm . Therefore, the fact that
E [XIlF] < x for all m C N implies that E [XIlF] < ii. Taking t = 0 and F 0 yields
E [XO] < ii.
Step 3: Let o-* be the strategy profile given by o (ht) = x2 if Zi,jT E {ij, 0} for all
zi,j,T C h', and o* (hi) = 0 otherwise, for all i. Then a* E ES, and E [X]= i for all i.
Proof: It is immediate that E [X'] = zj for all i. To see that o-* E ESE, note that the
one-shot deviation principle applies, by standard arguments. I first show that no player has
a profitable one-shot deviation at any on-path history, and then show that no player has a
profitable one-shot deviation at any off-path history.
Fix a player i and an on-path history ht. If ,i - 0, then it is clear that player i does not
have a profitable deviation at h. So suppose that frj > 0. Player i's continuation payoff
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if she conforms to o* equals J fj (is) - 23. The most profitable deviation from a* is
playing xi = 0, as every other deviation yields the same continuation payoff and a lower
stage-game payoff. I claim that player i's continuation payoff (including period t) after such
a deviation equals
oo
(1 - 6) E o T-t Y Pr (j V D (T, t, i)) fij (ij) .(42)
T=t ji
Given this claim, the difference between player i's payoff from conforming to a* and from
playing her most profitable deviation equals
0o
(1 - T-) E Pr (jED (r, t, i)) fijg (J2 3) - sj,
Tt j~xi
which equals 0 because the vector (2) N satisfies (35). Therefore, to show that player i has
no profitable deviation, it suffices to prove that player i's continuation payoff after playing
xi = 0 at on-path history ht equals (42).
If player i deviates from a* at on-path history ht and j V D (r, t, i) for some player j and
time T, then u7 (h') = 25. Hence, the claim that player i's continuation payoff equals (42) is
equivalent to the claim that uT (hT) 0 wheneverj D (T, t, i) and Pr (j E D (T, t, i)) > 0.
Thus, suppose that player i plays xi = 0 at on-path history ht, that Pr (j E D (T, t, i)) > 0,
and that the monitoring realization up to time T, WT , is such that j E D (T, t, i) given wT and
Pr ((L,), W = T) > 0. I claim that a* (hJ) = 0 given wT . This claim is trivial if Si = 0,
so assume that z > 0. Proceed by induction on r: If T = t + 1, then zj,i,t = 0 given
o so the fact that 0 V {<j, 0} implies that aj (hT) = 0. Suppose that the claim holds
for all T < To, and consider the case where T = To + 1. Since j E D (,To + 1, t, i), player
j observes the action of some player k E D (To, t, i) at time To given WT, and the fact that
Pr ((L,)' = o T ) > 0 implies that Pr(j E D (ro + 1, ro, k)) > 0. Since zy > 0, the fact that
Pr(j E D (To + 1, To, k)) > 0 implies that si > 0, by the definition of (2ii) N 1 . Therefore,
by the inductive hypothesis, or* (h O) = 0 given W T , and 0 V {4, O}. Hence, ao (hT) = 0,
completing the proof of the claim.
It remains only to show that no player has a profitable deviation at any off-path history.
Intuitively, given that each player i is indifferent between playing x = -i and xi = 0 at every
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on-path history h', this follows from Ellison's (1994) observation that a player's incentive to
cooperate in a grim trigger strategy profile is reduced after a defection by another player.
Formally, for any subset of players S C N, define D (T, t, S) by
D(T,t,S) 0 if T < t
D(t,t,S) S
D (r + 1, t, S) D (T, t, S) U {j : z XkT = zk for some k E D (r, t, S)} if r > t;
note that this generalizes the definition of D (T, t, i). Fix a player i and an off-path history
ht. If player i has a profitable deviation from a* at ht, it must be playing X = ^., as all
other actions yield the same continuation payoff as x = 0 and a strictly lower stage game
payoff. By a similar argument to that in the previous two paragraphs, if D (t) is set of
players such that zi,j, {sy, 0} for some zij, E h', then the difference between player i's
payoff from conforming to o-* and her payoff from deviating to xi = s (and subsequently
following o*) equals
00
2 - Z Pr (j ED (r t, b (t)) \ (D (T, t,b (t)\{i}) U D (T, t + 1,1)) fij ( .)
T=t jgi
00
> - 6 TtZ Pr(j c D (r, t, i) \D (T, t + 1, i)) fi (2 )
T~t =A i
00
= 2 - Z (Pr C D (r, t,i)) - Pr(j e D (T, t + 1,i))) fi ()
1 6
where the last equality follows because _' F-t Ej, Pr (j c D (T, t, i)) fij ( ) =zj/ (1 - 6)
and _, t6-t E , Pr (j C D (T, t + 1, i)) fij ( y ) = 6i / (1 - 5). Hence, player i does not
have a profitable deviation at history ht for any set b (t), and therefore player i does not
have a profitable deviation at history ht for any belief about the vector of private histories
(h ) N .Sj-1*
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Proof of Corollary 5. By Theorem 5, it suffices to show that s, = -j for all i, j G N.
Let x" be defined as in Step 2d of the proof of Theorem 5. I claim that x' = x' for all
i, j E N and m E N. The proof is by induction. For m = 1, xi = xi = X. Suppose the
result is proved for some m E N; that is, that there exists x' E N such that x" = xm for all
k E N. Then
XM+1 t Pr (k C D (t, i)) akf (X") (by parallel benefit functions)
t=0 k+i
= (1 - )Z ZPr (k E D (t, i))a,k f (x m )
t=0 k+i
= (1 -)Z ZPr (k E D (t, j)) a,k f (x') (by equal monitoring)
t=0 k+j
=~~ (1 -E) Pr (k E D (t, j)) aj,k f (X'k
t=O k+j
proving the claim. Finally, j = limm-,o x" = limm-o x' = Jj. U
Proof of Proposition 6. Since N and N' are even, it must be that N > 2 and N' > 4.
By Corollary 6, it suffices to show that E [#D (t, N')] > E [#D (t, N)] for all t and that
E [#D (2, N')] > E [#D (2, N)]. Since #D (1, N') = #D (1, N) = 2 with probability 1, it
follows that E [#D (2, N')] = " (4) + N (2) > N-2 (4) + N (2) = E [#D (2, N)].
To show that E [#D (t, N')] > E [#D (t, N)] for all t, I show that the probability distri-
bution over random matchings among N players may be parametrized so that #D (t, N') >
#D (t, N) for all t and all realizations of the monitoring technology. The proof is by induc-
tion on t. Suppose that #D (t, N') > #D (t, N). First, renumber the N' players so that
D (t, N) C D (t, N'), and let S = D (t, N) to simplify notation. Next, assume without loss
of generality that in period t the random matching among N players is obtained by first
randomly matching N' players and then randomly rematching those players in 1..... , N}
who were matched with players in {N + 1,... , N'} with other such players. Note that
#D (t + 1, N') > #S+# {j E N'\S :j,i,t = 1 for some i E S}, while #D (t + 1, N) = #S+
# {j E N\S : -,i,t = 1 for some i E S}. If a player i E S matches with a player j E N\S
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in the random matching among N players, then either i also matches with j in the random
matching among N' players or i matches with a player k E {N + 1 ... , N'} C N'\S. Hence,
# {j E N'\S : lj,i,t = 1 for some i E S} > # {j E N\S : lj,i,t = 1 for some i E S}, and there-
fore #D (t + 1, N') > #D (t + 1, N). m
Proof of Proposition 7. By Theorem 6, it suffices to show that for any 7 > 0 there
exists N > 0 such that, if N' > (1 + '}) N > N then ZE0 6t (E [#D (t, N')] - 1) /N' <
0o at (E [#D (t, N)] - 1) /N, or equivalently ZE 6t (NE [#D (t, N')] - N'E [#D (t, N)] - N' - N)
0. For any t and any E > 0, there exists N" such that E [#D (t, N')] - E [#D (t, N)] < E for
any N', N > N", as the probability that any two defectors match with each other within the
first t periods when there are either N' or N players converges to 0 as N -> C0O. Furthermore,
E [#D (t, N')] - E [#D (t, N)] < 2', since #D (t, N') < 2' and #D (t, N) > 0. Therefore,
for any <' > 0, there exists N' such that Z 0 at (E [#D (t, N')] - E [#D (t, N)]) < E' for any
N', N > N', as each of the first T terms in the sum converges to 0 as N' -> oO, for any T,
and the sum of the remaining terms is less than Z T , which converges to 0 as
T - oo, under the assumption that 3 < 1. Let E' = 267, let N' (') be the corresponding
N' and let N = (1 + -y) N' ('), which guarantees that N > N' (y) if (1 + -y) N > N. Then,
L at (NE [#D (t, N')] - N'E [#D (t, N)] + N' - N)
t=o
N (iat (E [#D (t, N')] - E [#D (t, N)]) - (N' - N) Z t (E [#D (t, N)] - 1)
< N (26) - (N' - N) Z a' (E [#D (t, N)] - 1)
t=o
< N (26() -- (N' - N) (26)
< 0,
where the first inequality follows because N', N > N' ('y), the second inequality follows be-
cause EZ'O atE [#D (t, N)] > 1+26, and the third inequality follows because N' > (1 + 7) N.
U
Proof of Theorem 7. Let gk (k') = Pr (#D (t) = k'l #D (0) = k), let Gt be the corre-
sponding distribution function, and let Et [k'] EN= k'gt (k'). By Theorem 6, it suffices
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to show that E o otj [k'] > Ego S tEgt [k'].
I claim that Oi strictly second-order stochastically dominates G' for all t > 1 and
k E {1, ... , N - 1}, which is equivalent to Ek0 O (s) < E>I G' (s) for all t > 1 and
k' E {k,... , N - 1}.5 The proof is by induction on t. The t = 1 case is the assumption
that Ok strictly second-order stochastically dominates Gk. Assume the result is proved for
t - 1. Then
k' k' s
5 . (s) (r) 0, (s)
s=O s=O r=O
k' k'
t- 1(M)Z C(S)
r=O s=r
k' k'
- '- (r) Or (s)
r=O s=O
k' k'
< (,r) 7 Gr s
r-O s=O
k/ k'
< g'- (r)E G,(s)
r=O s=0
k'
=Gt (s),
s=O
where the first line follows because 5t (s) =Z> .-V (r) 0, (s), the second line reverses
the order of sums, the third line follows because G, (s) = 0 if s < r, the fourth line follows
because 0, (s) strictly second-order stochastically dominates G, (s) for all r E {1, .. k,
the fifth line follows because O0-1 (r) strictly second-order stochastically dominates G.- (r)
(by the inductive hypothesis) and Ej G, (s) is decreasing and strictly convex in r for
r E {0, .... , k'} (because G, (s) is decreasing and strictly convex in r for r = {0,. , s}
and s E {0, ... , N }, so the sum of such functions is decreasing and strictly convex in r for
r = {0, ... , k'}), and the sixth line follows from undoing the rearrangement of the first two
lines for G' (s) rather than Gt (s). This proves the claim.
Trivially, E0 [k'] = Ego [k'] = 1, and Egg [k'] > Eg, [k') because Gk second-order stochas-
65 Note that this claim implies that [o 3'E1 k'] > 0 6tEg, [k'], but not necessarily that
ZOC 6tE-1 [k'] > Yco 6t Eg [k'], which is what needs to be shown.
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tically dominates Gk. I now show that that E [k'] > Et [k'] for all t ;> 2. This follows
because
k'
Egt [k'1] = (s) E [k']
s=0
kk
> 1(s) E [k']
s=0
> gt ( s) E,i [k' ]
s=0
E t [k']
where the first line follows by the law of iterated expectation, the second line follows because
G's (k') second-order stochastically dominates G;- (k') if t > 2 (by the claim), the third
S9line follows because lE93 [k'] is increasing and strictly concave in s for s E {0, .. . , N} (since
Gk (k') is decreasing and strictly convex in k for k E {,... , k'} and ' E {0, N}) and
01-' (s) strictly second-order stochastically dominates G'- (s) (by the claim), and the fourth
line follows from undoing the rearrangement of the first line. Summing over t completes the
proof. m
Proof of Lemma 7. If such a surjection exists for all t E N, taking t 0 implies that
player i is more central than player j.
For the converse, I first claim that if player i is s-more central than player j, then player i is
s -I-more central than player j. The proof is by induction on s. If i is 2-more central than j,
then for all t E N there exists a surjection ) : {k E N : d (i, k) < t} -> {k C N : d (j, k) < t},
and therefore # {k E N : d (i, k) < t} > # {k E N : d (j, k) < t}, so i is 1-more central than
J. Suppose that if i' is s - 1-more central than j' then i' is s - 2-more central than j',
for all i', j' C N, and suppose that i is s-more central than j. Then for all t E N there
exists a surjection 4 : {k E N : d (i, k) < t} -+ {k C N : d (j, k) < t} such that, for all k with
d (j, k) < t, there exists a k' C - (k) such that k' is s - 1-more central than k. By
hypothesis, this implies that k' is s - 2-more central than k, which, by the definition of
s - 1-more central, implies that i is s - 1-more central than j. This establishes the claim.
The claim shows that, for any players i and k, the set of players k' such that d (i, A") < t
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and k' is s-more central than k is weakly decreasing in s (in the set-inclusion sense). Since
the sets {k E N : d (i, k) < t} and {k E N : d (j, k) < t} are finite, this implies that there
exists s E N such that, for all k with d (j, k) < t, the set of players k' such that d (i, k') < t
and k' is s-more central than k is the same for all s > s. Hence, if player i is more central
than player j, there exists a surjection 4 : {k G N : d (i, k) < t} -> {k E N : d (j, k) < t}
such that, for all k with d (j, k) < t, there exists a player k' E 4-1 (k) such that k' is s-more
central than k for all s ;> s. By the claim, k' is also s - m-more central than k for all n, so
k' is s-more central than k for all s E N and is therefore more central than k. *
Proof of Corollary 8. It is immediate that player i is 1-more central than player j, and
that player i is strictly 1-more central if at least one of the inequalities is strict. Suppose
that player i is s-more central. To see that player i is s + 1-more central, for any t let '
be any surjection such that V (k) = k if d (j, k) < t and V) (i) = j. Then @ satisfies the
conditions in the definition of centrality, because every player k is s-more central than herself
and player i is s-more central than player j by hypothesis, and player i is strictly 1-more
central than player j if at least one of the inequalities is strict. 0
Proof of Corollary 9. Since #{k : d(i,k) t} = : d (p(i),k) t} for all t (as p
preserves distance), it is clear that i is 1-more central than j whenever p (i) is 1-more central
than j. Suppose that i is s-more central than j whenever p (i) is s-more central than j, for
all i, j E N. Let V) : {k E N : d (p (i) , k) < t} -+ {k E N : d (j, k) < t} be a surjection such
that, for all k with d (j, k) < t, there exists k' E ' (k) such that k' is s-more central than
k. I claim that 0 o p is a surjection from {k E N : d (i, k) < t} -> {k E N : d (j, k) < t} such
that, for all k with d (j, k) < t, there exists k" E (0 o p) 1 (k) such that k" is s-more central
than k. This follows because, if d (p (i) , k') < t then d (i, p- 1 (k')) < t, and if k' is s-more
central than k, then p-1 (k') is s-more central than k as well, by hypothesis. It follows by
induction that i is more central than j. The argument for i strictly more central than j is
similar. m
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4 Dynamic Monopoly with Relational Incentives
4.1 Introduction
The possibility of trade is often threatened by the possibility of opportunism. For example, a
consumer who purchases a good from an online retailer must trust that the good will actually
be delivered-as taking legal action in the case of nondelivery would be very costly-and
must also believe that the retailer is not about to cut its price dramatically. Fortunately, long
term incentives can mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior: in the above example, the
retailer may both deliver the good and keep prices high in order to preserve its standing with
its consumers, even if it has no fear of the legal consequences of nondelivery. In particular,
either failing to deliver the good or cutting prices may lead consumers to believe that the
firm will not deliver the good in the future, as either of these actions could be interpreted
as an indication that the firm is trying to maximize its short run profits and then quit the
market." This reasoning suggests that a seller who is tempted to fail to deliver her product
may still do quite well if the future is sufficiently important. This paper studies this idea
in the context of both non-durable and durable goods monopoly, focusing primarily on the
more involved durable goods case.
The above intuition contrasts starkly with the Coase conjecture (Coase, 1972) that a
patient durable-goods seller that cannot commit to future prices earns little profit. As
we will see, the Coase conjecture relies on the assumption that the seller is committed to
delivering the good at her quoted price. In particular, the Coasian temptation to cut
prices is absent when a price cut leads to a continuation equilibrium in which no consumers
make purchases (expecting nondelivery) and the seller never delivers (expecting no future
purchases).67 Thus, even if the seller cannot commit to a price path she can still earn high
profits if she is not committed to delivering the good, either." This suggests that the Coase
"An alternative story, discussed below, is that the retailer is contractually obligated to deliver something
but that the quality of the good it delivers is unverifiable. In this case, it is natural to think that a price
cut may suggest to consumers that the retailer intends to deliver a low quality good. For an example of
an online market in which lower-priced goods seem to be of extremely low quality, see Ellison and Ellison
(2009).
670f course, the seller now has an incentive to fail to deliver the good, so the result that the seller can
earn high profits is not trivial.
6 8This reasoning is similar to Bernheim and Whinston's (1998) point that if some aspects of behavior are
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conjecture may not apply to any institutional setting: If the seller can legally commit herself
to both a price path and delivery of the good, she should do so. If she can legally commit
herself to delivery, but not to a price path, she should not.6
9
,
70
Throughout, I consider an infinitely-repeated interaction between a monopoly seller and a
continuum of buyers, where in every period the seller first sets a price, consumers then choose
whether or not to pay, and finally the seller chooses whether or not to deliver the good to each
consumer. All actions are perfectly observable. If the good is non-durable and consumers
are anonymous, I completely characterize the optimal perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this
game for the seller: if the seller is sufficiently patient, she sets the static monopoly price
each period and delivers the good to all consumers who purchase, while if she is less patient
she charges a higher price in order to reduce the quantity demanded and thereby reduce her
temptation to fail to deliver.7 1
When the good is durable, the structure of any equilibrium in which the seller delivers
the good is complicated: sales must continue forever, since the seller would never deliver the
good to the last consumer, and the price path must fall slowly enough that consumers do
not always wait for lower prices but quickly enough that sales do not occur so rapidly that
the seller gives in to her temptation to fail to deliver. Indeed, with a general distribution
of consumer valuations, it is very difficult to construct any equilibria in which the seller
always delivers the good.7 I therefore take an indirect approach to analyzing this model by
first considering an auxiliary model where the seller has the ability to set a maximum sales
quantity each period in addition to the price, thereby rationing the good. The main result
noncontractible it is often optimal to fail to contract on other aspects as well.
"This is a slight oversimplification as there will be many equilibria in the model, not all of which yield
high profits. For example, if consumers believe that the monopoly will never deliver the good unless it
legally commits itself to do so, then of course so commiting is the right move. On the other hand, the
dynamic contracting literature often uses profit maximization as an equilibrium refinement and it does not
seem more unreasonable than usual to do so here.
701n some environments, the seller may be "automatically" commited to delivering the good, for example
if nondelivery is viewed by courts as breaching an "implicit" contract. To address this issue, in Section 7 I
show that my results extend to a setting where in each period the seller has an exogenous chance of being
unable to deliver the good. In such a setting the issue that nondelivery may be viewed as breaching an
implicit contract may not arise, since nondelivery always occurs occasionally.
7 1The first part of this statement also holds when consumers are non-anonymous, in contrast with the
results of Hart and Tirole (1988). See the discussion following Proposition 10.
2As discussed below, it is much easier to construct equilibria in which the seller sometimes fails to deliver
the good, but these equilibria may he unappealing for other reasons.
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in this model with rationing, which I see as being of some independent interest, is that using
rationing is never optimal for the seller. I then show that the seller's optimal profit in the
original model must exceed her profit in any equilibrium involving rationing.
This observation allows us to derive a lower bound on the seller's profit in the original
model-where constructing equilibria is very difficult-by constructing simple equilibria in
the model with rationing. In particular, I construct equilibria in which price is constant over
time but quantity sold every period is restricted via rationing. These quantity restrictions
lead to positive residual demand, which gives the seller a reason to deliver the good. I show
that a patient seller can approximate her static optimal profit level by setting price equal to
the static monopoly price every period and selling to those consumers who are willing to buy
at this price at a constant rate. Furthermore, for any discount factor 6, the seller's optimal
profit is at least as high as the static monopoly profit of a seller with cost of delivering the
good equal to c/6, where c is the cost of delivering the good in the dynamic model, as this is
precisely the profit level that can be attained by setting price equal to the static monopoly
price of a seller with cost c/ and then selling (at cost c) at the fastest rate at which the
seller is willing to deliver in the dynamic model. I also use the relationship between my
model and the model with rationing to show that the best equilibria for the seller in which
she delivers the good to all consumers who purchase involve a strictly declining price path
that asymptotes to a price no lower than c/.
I proceed as follows: Section 4.2 relates this paper to the literatures on the Coase
conjecture, strategic rationing, and relational contracting. Section 4.3 introduces the general
model of both durable and non-durable goods monopoly with relational incentives. Section
4.4 analyzes the model in the simpler case of a non-durable goods monopoly. It is included
both for completeness and because of connections between it and the subsequent analysis of
the durable goods model. Section 4.5 introduces the model with a durable goods monopoly,
as well as the model with rationing, and studies the connection between the two, ultimately
showing that the best equilibrium without on-path non-delivery for the seller in the model
without rationing yields profit at least as high as that in any equilibrium without on-path
non-delivery in the model with rationing. Building off this insight, Section 4.6 presents my
main results on the durable goods model: profits are bounded from below by those of a static
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monopoly with cost c/6, and the best equilibrium price path along which the seller always
delivers strictly declines over time and asymptotes to at least c/6. Section 4.7 extends the
analysis to a setting in which the seller is sometimes (exogenously) unable to deliver the
good, where the assumption that the seller has the option of nondelivery seems particularly
appropriate. Section 4.8 concludes and discusses some applications and empirical predictions
of the model. Several proofs are deferred to Appendix A, and Appendix B discusses equilibria
in which the seller does not always deliver the good along the equilibrium path.
4.2 Relation to the Literature
As indicated above, my results stand in stark contrast with the Coase conjecture (Coase,
1972), which was formalized and explored by Stokey (1982), Bulow (1982), Fudenberg,
Levine, and Tirole (1985), and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986).4' My model would
coincide with the standard "no-commitment" durable goods monopoly model if the seller,
while still lacking commitment power over prices, was committed to delivering the good to
all consuiers who purchase. In this sense, my model has "less commitment" than this
standard "no-commitment" case, though of course the reason the seller does better in my
model is not that it has less commitment power but rather that committing to delivering the
good to all consumers who purchase may not be wise, as after making such a commitment
the seller is tempted to cut prices.
The literature on the Coase conjecture draws a sharp distinction between the "gap case"
"Some of the many influential papers in the subesequent literature, in addition to those discussed in
the text, are Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987) on durable goods oligopoly; Sobel (1991) on
the entry of new consumers; Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski (1989) on finite populations; Bond and
Samuelson (1987), Karp (1996), and Deneckere and Liang (2008) on depreciation; Kahn (1986) and McAfee
and Wiseman (2008) on capacity constraints; Olsen (1992) on learning by doing in production; Cabral,
Salant, and Woroch (1999) and Mason (2000) on network externalities; Dudine, Hendel, and Lizzeri (2006)
on storable goods; Deneckere and Liang (2006) and Horner and Vieille (2009) on interdependent values;
Biehl (2001) on changing consumer valuations; and Board (2008) on time-varying demand. There is also
a large literature on durable goods monopoly with bilateral offers, the early part of which is surveyed in
Section 10.4 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
7In traditional Coase conjecture papers, like Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985); Gul, Sonnenschein,
and Wilson (1986); and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), the model may be interpreted as a monopoly selling
to either a continuum of consumers with a known distribution of valuations or to a single consumer with
uinknown valuation. In the current paper, only the first interpretation is applicable, as in the single-buyer
case the monopoly would never delivery the good after the buyer purchased, so there would be no equilibrium
in which trade occurs.
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in which the lowest consumer valuation is strictly greater than the seller's marginal cost
and the alternative "no-gap case." In the gap case, Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985)
and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) show that there is generically a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, which is Markovian and satisfies the Coase conjecture. In the no-gap
case, a seminal paper by Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) constructs non-Markovian equilibria
that yield static monopoly profits as the discount factor approaches one. The reason for
the difference between the cases is that in the gap case the seller is always tempted to cut
prices to the lowest consumer valuation, which allows the problem to be solved by backward
induction, while in the no-gap case the possibility that price may fall to marginal cost very
quickly if the seller deviates from a prescribed price path allows the seller to maintain high
prices in equilibrium. This distinction between the gap and no-gap cases does not arise in
my model, since in my model the off-path expectation that prevents the seller from cutting
prices is that the seller will not deliver the good, not that the seller will rapidly cut prices.
My analysis of durable goods monopoly does more than showing that the possibility of non-
delivery allows Ausubel and Deneckere-style equilibria to be constructed in the gap case,
however: as indicated above, I also provide a natural lower bound on seller payoffs for a fixed
discount factor 6 and prove that, for any 6, the best equilibrium for the seller in which there
is no non-delivery has declining prices converging to a price no lower than c/6. Results for
fixed 6 and characterizations of optimal equilibria are rare in the durable-goods monopoly
literature. For example, for 6 bounded away from one, none of the early papers on the
Coase conjecture cited above contain results about optimal seller profits or the asymptotic
behavior of the optimal price path.
Because my approach relies on comparing the model to an auxiliary model in which the
seller is able to ration the good, the paper connects to the literature on strategic rationing.
One lesson from this literature is that rationing in the absence of an efficient resale market,
i.e., when the highest-valuation consumers do not always receive the good when there is a
shortage, can help the seller both when it can commit to a price path (Van Cayseele, 1991)
and when it cannot (Denicol6 and Garella, 1999). Both Van Cayseele and Denicol6 and
Garella consider short finite horizons and state that rationing in the presence of an efficient
resale market is never optimal. As part of the analysis of the durable-goods model, I show
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that this result holds in an infinite-horizon setting." My focus is very different from that
of Van Cayseele and Denicol6 and Garella, as they are interested primarily in cases where
allowing rationing can increase profits, while I am interested precisely in cases where allowing
rationing cannot increase profits, so that I can use the model with rationing to derive results
about the model without rationing.
Finally, my paper is related to the literature on relational contracting, particularly that
part of the relational contracting literature that studies durable goods with hidden quality,
which originated with the famous papers of Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1982,
1983) ." While traditional models of durable goods monopoly can be thought of as "rela-
tional" in that they study the effect of dynamic incentives on a seller's decision to cut prices,
I go further and assume that dynamic incentives also govern the seller's decision to deliver
the good. Thus, the difference between my model and the existing literature on dynamic
seller is that I move a decision-delivery-from formal to relational enforcement. Also, the
equilibria I construct induce cooperation through the Nash threat of breaking off trade, as in
many relational contracting models (e.g., Bull, 1987; Levin, 2003). Indeed, a key difference
between my model and traditional models of dynamic monopoly is that my model admits a
Nash equilibrium in which the seller receives her minmax value.
4.3 Model
Throughout, consider a seller who can provide a good at marginal cost c > 0 facing a
continuum of consumers of mass 1 with valuations (per period in the case of non-durables, net
present value in the case of durables) v - F(v) with bounded support [v, V) with v > 0, > c,
and F continuously differentiable with strictly positive density f. There is a continuum of
consumers with each valuation in [v,], so that if a random fraction x of consumers receive
the good in some period then that fraction x of consumers with every valuation receive the
good. I do not make any assumptions as to whether v is greater than or less than c, i.e.,
as to whether we are in the gap or no-gap case. Let pm be the static monopoly price of a
7The relevant result (Proposition 13) assumes that the seller has the option of failing to deliver the good,
but the proof shows that the result continues to hold when the seller does not have this option.
"For an up-to-date survey of this rapidly expanding literature, see Malcomson (2009). For a recent
contribution with some similarities to the current paper, see Masten and Kosovd (2009).
151
seller facing consumers with valuations v - F(v) and marginal cost c.
The traditional "no-commitment" model of dynamic monopoly is the following infinitely
repeated game:
1. At time t E {0, 1, .. .}, the seller chooses a menu of price-delivery probability pairs
{(pt,xt,)} .,
2. Every consumer either selects a price-delivery probability pair (pt,n, Xt,) {(ptn, Xn)}
or rejects. Consumers who select (pt,n, Xt,) pay pt,, and receive the good with prob-
ability Xt,. The seller gets payoff pt,, - c from each consumer who pays Pt, and
receives the good, and gets pt,n from each consumer who pays pt,, and does not receive
the good. A consumer with valuation v who pays Pt,n gets payoff v - Pt,n if she receives
the good and gets payoff -Pt,n if she does not receive the good.
3. Repeat 1-2, discounting by (common) discount factor 6.
In the current model, the seller has the option of nondelivery. The game becomes:
1. At time t E {0, 1,.. .}, the seller chooses a menu of prices {pt,,} .
2. Every consumer either selects a price Pt,n E {pt,, or rejects. Consumers who select
Pt,n pay Pt,n Let Qt, be the mass of consumers who pay Pt,n.
3. For each pt,,, the seller chooses what fraction Xt, E [0, 1] of those Qt, consumers
who pay pt,n receive the good. Each consumer who pays Pt,n receives the good with
probability xt,. Payoffs are as above.
4. Repeat 1-3, discounting by 6.
I assume that players use strategies that depend on consumers' decisions at time t only
through Qt,. This entails assuming that the seller does not condition her strategy on play
by measure 0 sets of consumers, as is standard in the durable goods monopoly literature,
as well as that consumers are anonymous.77 In particular, the seller cannot discriminate
among consumers on the basis of their past play in either her pricing or delivery decisions.
77See the discussion following Proposition 10 for more on this point.
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Crucially, I assume that all decisions of the seller are publicly observed. Formally, let
the history ht at the start of period t be
({Po,n} , {Qo,n} , {xon} , - - -, {Pt-1,n) , fQt-1,nl , {xt-1,)) -
Each of the seller's (pure) strategies is a pair of maps from histories ht to {pt,n}, where
Pt,n E [0, oc) for all t, n, and from histories (ht, {Pt,n} , {Qt,n}) to Xt,n C [0, 1] for all Qt,n; while
a consumer's (pure) strategy is a map from histories (ht, {Pt,n}) to {{Pt,n} , 0}, corresponding
to accepting a price pt,n or rejecting. Note that, for any strategy profile, changing the
strategy of a single consumer does not affect the probability distribution over histories ht for
any t; that is, a deviation by a single consumer does not affect the path of play.
Throughout, the solution concept is pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which
I simply abbreviate as PBE. Of course, the assumption that the seller uses a pure strategy
does not imply that she chooses xt, E {0, 1}, but rather than she does not randomize over
different choices of {Pt,n} or {Xt,n}. I have not explored whether mixed strategy equilibria
can differ substantially from pure strategy equilibria; however, the main results that the
seller can earn high profits in equilibrium can only be strengthened by considering mixed
strategy equilibria.
I observe immediately that in either the non-durable or durable goods version of the
model there is a Nash equilibrium in which consumers reject all price offers and the seller
sets Xt,n = 0 for all t, n. The threat of reversion to this equilibrium following any deviation
may induce the seller to conform to a prescribed price path as well as to deliver the good
to those consumers who purchase. No such Nash equilibrium exists in the traditional no-
commitment model.
I make frequent use of the following definition:
Definition 16 A PBE is optimal if there is no other PBE that yields strictly higher payoff
for the seller.
Finally, I briefly note an alternative interpretation of the model in terms of product
quality. Suppose that the seller is (for whatever reason) contractually obligated to deliver
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at least a low-quality good (at cost normalized to zero) to any consumer who purchases and
is able to deliver a high-quality good at additional cost c, and that quality is noncontractable.
If every consumer has valuation zero for the low-quality good, the model is unchanged, with
"low-quality delivery" substituted for "nondelivery." This interpretation depends on every
consumer's having valuation zero for the low-quality good, and thus may be most attractive
when quality is extremely difficult to verify. For example, the good may be a complicated,
high-tech upgrade of an existing piece of hardware or software, which has no value at all for
consumers if it is not superior to the original product, and outside observers are unable to
verify whether the "upgrade" is in fact better than the original."
4.4 Non-Durable Goods Monopoly
In this section, each consumer demands one unit of the good each period, and v is a con-
sumer's per-period valuation. I also assume, for this section only, that v -F(v) is weaklyf W)
increasing, so that in the static monopoly allocation every consumer with positive virtual
surplus receives the good.79
The main result in this section is that, in the optimal equilibrium," the seller sets the
(single) price equal to the static monopoly price if she is sufficiently patient, and otherwise
sets the lowest price at which she is willing to deliver the good. The intuition is that
the seller's incentive to fail to deliver the good is increasing in quantity; so if the seller is
impatient she must restrict quantity in order to credibly commit to delivery; and the most
profitable way to do this is to increase price. In particular, the seller sets p = max {p"m, c/S}
every period. To see why c/ is the lowest price at which the seller is willing to deliver the
good, let D (p) -1 - F (p) be demand at price p, and note that in every period the seller
gains cD (p) from failing to deliver and gains 1 (p - c) D (p) from delivering. The latter is
"My results do not apply if consumers have positive valuations for the low-quality good, since in this
case the model need not have a Nash equilibrium that yields zero profit. However, two recent papers
illustrate interesting phenomena that may occur in such settings. Inderst (2008) shows that a durable goods
monopoly that sells low- and high-quality goods may serve the entire market in the first period, selling the
low-quality good to low-valuation consumers as a means of committing itself not to subsequently offer the
high-quality good at a lower price. Hahn (2006) shows that this logic may provide an incentive for a durable
goods monopoly to introduce a damaged version of its good and argues that this often has negative welfare
consequences.
"This assumption is for technical convenience only.
80The proof of Proposition 10 shows existence and uniqueness of an optimal equilibrium.
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weakly greater than the former if and only if p > c/6. The idea of the proof is to first note
that the seller can in effect commit to any price path, since deviations in price-setting may
lead consumers to believe that the seller will not deliver the good and thus lead to zero sales;
next observe that the best dynamic sales mechanism for the seller is stationary, as increasing
one period's profits also relaxes the seller's incentive compatibility (willingness to deliver)
constraints from earlier periods; and finally use standard static mechanism techniques to
characterize the optimal stationary mechanism that is incentive compatible for the seller.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A.
Proposition 10 If V > c, the equilibrium path of the optimal PBE of the non-durable goods
model is given by Pt,n = max {p ,'} for all t,n, buyers accept if and only if v > pt,n, and
the seller delivers the good with probability 1 to all buyers who accept each period. That is,
the seller offers only a posted price p in every period, p = p m if 6 > ', and p - ' > ptm
if 6 <-. If V < c, there is no PBE in which the seller ever delivers the good or receives
positive payments.
Recall that I have assumed that buyers are anonymous. Nonetheless, it is not hard to
construct equilibria that yield static monopoly profits even if buyers are non-anonymous,
provided that 6 > c/p m . For example, let the seller set p = pm in every period and deliver
the good if and only if she has both always delivered the good to all consumers who have
purchased arid set p = pm in the past, and let each consumer purchase the good every period
if arid only if her valuation exceeds pm and the seller has always delivered the good to all
consumers who have purchased and has always set p = pm. In every period, the seller gains
cD (p"f) from failing to deliver and gains ', (pm - c) D (pm) from delivering, so the seller will
deliver if S > c/pm. This result differs dramatically from the classic analysis of non-durable
goods monopoly with non-anonymous consumers provided by Hart arid Tirole (1988). Hart
and Tirole show that, in a finite-horizon model with non-durable goods and non-anonymous
consumers, equilibrium is governed by the ratchet effect: in every PBE, if v > c, then pt = v
for all but the last few periods. Technically, the difference between my result and theirs
comes from the fact that the stage game in my model has a bad Nash equilibrium ("reject
any offer, never deliver"), which can be used as an off-equilibrium threat to prevent the seller
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from using information revealed early on against high-valuation buyers." The key economic
point is that the usual repeated game tradeoff between a short term gain from cheating and a
long term gain from cooperation on the part of the seller is absent in the Hart-Tirole model:
in their model, the seller is free to "cheat" by raising the price she charges to buyers that
reveal themselves to have high valuations, but buyers cannot credibly retaliate by refusing
to buy at the higher price. In my model, the option of the seller to fail to deliver the good
lets the buyer credibly punish the seller for raising the price, allowing the seller to "commit"
to keeping the price constant. On the other hand, I must now keep track of the seller's
incentive to deliver the good. If 6 > c/pmr, this incentive constraint is slack, so the seller
can attain her full-commitment optimum.
4.5 Durable Goods Monopoly and Rationing
4.5.1 Preliminaries
For the remainder of the paper, each consumer demands only one unit of the (durable) good,
and v is a consumer's net present value of receiving the good. In the traditional model of
this situation (see Section 4.3), Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonnenschein,
and Wilson (1986) show that the Coase conjecture applies if the lowest valuation v is greater
than c: for generic parameters there is a unique PBE, and as 6 goes to 1 the seller's profit
goes to v - c and the price drops to v very quickly.
The main result implies that the Coase conjecture does not apply to this model when the
seller has the option of nondelivery (see Section 4.3), which I call the "relational contracting
model," or IF. Much of the analysis focuses on a particular class of PBE, which I call "full-
delivery PBE." A full-delivery PBE is a PBE in which the seller sets xt,, = 1 for all n at all
histories on the equilibrium path. It is important to note that the seller may set xt,n < 1 off
the equilibrium path in a full-delivery PBE. A full-delivery PBE is a best full-delivery PBE
if there is no other full-delivery PBE that yields strictly higher payoff for the seller - I use the
word "optimal" for the best PBE overall and "best" for the best full-delivery PBE to help
81The infinite-horizon version of the Hart-Tirole model has equilibria that yield seller profits above v - c,
though how much above v - c has to our knowledge not been studied in the literature. Thus, it is possible
that some of the difference in results is due to the difference in time horizons.
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avoid confusion. Note that on the equilibrium path of a full-delivery PBE there is no reason
for the seller to offer a menu of prices, as each consumer will either accept the lowest offered
price or reject, so I simplify notation by writing pt for the lowest price offered by the seller
at time t on the equilibrium path. Furthermore, a consumer who pays pt always receives
the good at time t; I say that a consumer who pays pt at time t on the equilibrium path of
a full-delivery PBE purchases the good at time t. Since I have restricted attention to pure
strategy equilibria, every consumer purchases at exactly one time in every full-delivery PBE,
with the convention that a consumer who never receives the good "purchases" at t = 00.
Clearly, an optimal PBE of the relational contracting model can yield no higher payoff
to the seller than an optimal PBE of the "full-commitment" model in which the requirement
that the seller's strategy is sequentially rational is relaxed, and it follows from standard
results that an optimal PBE of this full-commitment model yields profits equal to optimal
static monopoly profits. The main result is the following, which implies that the Coase
conjecture does not hold in this game regardless of the relationship between v and c and also
provides a lower bound on the seller's profit for any fixed 6:
Theorem 10 In the relational contracting model:
1. An optimal PBE exists.
2. A best full-delivery PBE exists.
3. As 6 approaches 1, profit in a best full-delivery PBE approaches static monopoly profit.
4. If V > { and cost equals c, there exists a full-delivery PBE in which profit is strictly
greater than static monopoly profit when cost equals i.
5. If T > %, any best full-delivery PBE has a strictly decreasing price path and involves
positivc sales in every period.
6. If i > , Pt > max {v, } for all t in any best full-delivery PBE.
7. If V <, there is no PBE in which the seller ever delivers the good or receives positive
payments.
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Sections 5 and 6 devoted to establishing Theorem 10: parts 1 and 2 are proved in this
section (in Propositions 11 and 14) and parts 3 through 7 are proved in Section 4.6 (in
Propositions 15 through 18). I therefore take a moment to motivate devoting so much
attention to full-delivery PBE. Full-delivery PBE are those equilibria in which on-path
delivery is as in both the full-commitment model (in which the seller commits to both a price
path (p)t and a delivery path (x)t) and in the traditional no-commitment model described
in Section 4.3, which makes them a natural class of equilibria to study. Indeed, on-path
non-delivery-the equivalent of the seller selling "lottery tickets" that entitle consumers to
receive the good with some probability less than 1-may be unappealing in some settings,
for example if consumers can tell whether the seller has failed to deliver the good to anyone
but not whether the seller has delivered to some exact fraction of consumers. Furthermore,
Theorem 10 implies that the profit lost by the seller in a best full-delivery PBE as opposed
to an optimal PBE is bounded from above by the difference between static monopoly profit
when cost equals c and when cost equals c/6, which is small for o close to 1. Nonetheless,
I conjecture that in general the optimal PBE is not full-delivery, for reasons discussed in
Appendix B. Appendix B proves the analogs of parts 3 and 4 of Theorem 10 for non-full-
delivery equilibria directly, i.e., without relying on the connection between the relational
contracting model and the related model with rationing introduced below. The approach
of Appendix B also has the advantage of explicitly constructing equilibria in the relational
contracting model, while the approach taken in the body of the paper in nonconstructive.
Thus, there are at least two very different kinds of PBE that yield high seller profits: full-
delivery PBE with declining price paths, whose existence is proven nonconstructively in the
text; and non-full-delivery equilibria with constant price paths, which are constructed in
Appendix B.
I adopt a novel approach to proving Theorem 10. I first introduce the following variant
of the relational contracting model, in which the seller can artificially restrict the quantity
of the good supplied each period:
1. The seller chooses a price pt and a maximum quantity to supply qt E [0, 11.82
8 2For the remainder of the paper, qt refers to the quantity cap in period t and Qt refers to the number of
consumers who pay in period t (i.e., the period t quantity). By construction of the model with rationing,
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2. Every consumer chooses whether or not to accept pt. If less than qt consumers accept,
all consumers who accept pay pt. Otherwise, the qt consumer with the highest valu-
ations among those who accept pay pt. Formally, a consumer with valuation v who
accepts pays if and only if the mass of consumers with valuation strictly greater than
v who accept is strictly less than qt.
3. If measure Qt of consumers pay pt (which I call the period t quantity), the seller chooses
what fraction xt E [0, 1] of these consumers receive the good. Each consumer who
pays pt receives the good with probability xt.
4. Repeat 1-3, discounting by 6.
I have not allowed the seller to offer menus of prices as this would only complicate
notation, since I restrict attention to full-delivery PBE in what follows.
I call this game the "relational contracting model with rationing," or simply the "model
with rationing," or FR. 83 Optimal, full-delivery, and best full-delivery PBE in FR are defined
as in F. The main reason I introduce FR is that full-delivery equilibria in FR may have flat
price paths, while every full-delivery equilibrium in F must involve price cuts, as otherwise
there would be no way to delay sales and thereby induce delivery.84 Full-delivery equilibria
with flat price paths are easy to analyze, as consumers' incentives in such equilibria are trivial:
if the price is fixed at p in a full-delivery equilibrium, a consumer with valuation v > p wants
to purchase as soon as possible, while a consumer with v < p will never purchase. I will
show that full-delivery equilibria with flat price paths exist in FR that approximate static
monopoly profits for high 6. Furthermore, I will show that a price-quantity path (p, Q),
is a best full-delivery PBE price-quantity path in F if and only if it is a best full-delivery
Qt < q.
8In defining F I have made two assumptions on the rationing technology: that types "on the boundary"
between receiving the good and not do not receive the good, and that any rationing that occurs is "efficient,"
in that the highest-valuation consumers are eligible to receive the good. The first assumption is only for
technical convenience and simplifies the proof of Lemma 10. The second assumption is substantive, as Van
Cayseele (1991) shows that under full-commitment a monopoly can achieve profits above static monopoly
profits by using "inefficient" rationing. The second assumption is descriptive in the presence of a frictionless
resale market. Alternatively, one could view the model with rationing entirely as a technical aid in analyzing
the model without rationing.
"The results about FR, especially Proposition 13, may also be of independent value to readers interested
in strategic rationing.
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PBE price-quantity path in FR (Corollary 12, in Section 4.5.4). Therefore, the best full-
delivery PBE profit attainable by the seller is the same in F and FR, so the above observation
that simple full-delivery PBE exist in FR in which profits approximate static optimal profits
immediately yields part 3 of Theorem 10, even though no such simple full-delivery PBE exist
in F. The proofs of parts 2 and 4 through 7 of Theorem 10 also rely on Corollary 12, as we
will see; thus, Corollary 12 is the key to my approach to proving Theorem 10.
To summarize the above roadmap, Sections 4.5 and 4.6 establish the following chain of
inequalities:
Optimal PBE Profit in F > Best Full-Delivery PBE Profit in F (by definition)
= Best Full-Delivery PBE Profit in FR (by Corollary 12)
> Best Full-Delivery, Constant-Price PBE Profit in FR
(by Proposition 16)
= Static Monopoly Profit with Cost c/6 (by Corollary 13).
Before beginning the analysis of FR, I first prove part 1 of Theorem 10 directly. The
proof proceeds by first showing that the seller's profit is continuous in price-delivery paths
(p, x)t and then showing that any price-delivery path can be supported in PBE by endowing
consumers with the belief that the seller will never deliver the good if she ever deviates from
her prescribed price-delivery path. The details are deferred to Appendix A.
Proposition 11 (Theorem 10.1) An optimal PBE exists in F.
4.5.2 Existence of Best Full-Delivery PBE in the Model with Rationing
I now begin the analysis of the full-delivery PBE of F and FR and the relationship between
them. The goal of this subsection is to show that a best full-delivery PBE exists in FR.
Start with a definition:
Definition 17 Given a price path (p), a valuation v is generic with respect to (p), if
6' (v - pt) 7# 6"' (v - pt,)
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for all t f t'. If not, v is nongeneric with respect to (p.
That is, a valuation v is generic with respect to (p), if a consumer with valuation v is
not indifferent between purchasing at any two times t and t' when prices are given by (p),
For any price path (p)t, there are only countably many valuations which are nongeneric with
respect to (p)t, so the assumption that F admits a strictly positive density immediately
yields the following observation:
Lemma 8 For any price path (p)t, the set of valuations v C [v, V] that are generic with
respect to (p), has measure 1.
I now present a series of lemmas that are needed to prove existence of a best full-delivery
PBE in FR. The longer proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 9 simply states that any two consumers with the same valuation receive the same
payoff in any PBE, and consumers with higher valuations receive higher payoffs:
Lemma 9 In any PBE of F or FR, any two consumers with the same valuation, v, receive
the same PBE payoff, V,. If v > v', then V, > Vv,.
Proof. The first part follows because at any PBE a consumer with valuation v can deviate
to the strategy of another consumer with valuation v and receive the same payoff as him,
because the actions of a single consumer do not affect the path of play (in either F or FR)-
The second part follows because at any PBE a consumer with valuation v > v' can deviate
to the strategy of a consumer with valuation v' and receive a weakly higher payoff than him
(in FR, this relies on the fact that a consumer with higher valuation can purchase whenever
a consumer with lower valuation can do so), again because the actions of a single consumer
do not affect the path of play. m
The next two lemmas show that, across all full-delivery PBE, the price-rationing path
(p, q), uniquely determines the quantity path (Q),. Lemma 10 is not trivial because the set
of times at which a consumer is able to purchase under price-rationing path (p, q)t depends on
the timies at which higher-valuation consumers are purchasing. The intuition for the result is
that if a consumer with valuation v cannot purchase at the same set of times under two PBE,
then there must be a nontrivial mass of higher-valuation consumers who cannot purchase at
the same set of times under the two PBE, either, as otherwise almost all higher-valuation
consumers would purchase at the same times under both PBE and the original consumer
would not have been "rationed out" of purchasing at his preferred time. Therefore, there
can be no valuation v that is "approximately" the highest valuation that gets "rationed out,"
which implies that no valuation can be "rationed out."
Lemma 10 Given a price-rationing path (p, q), in FR and a valuation v that is generic with
respect to (p), there exists a time TV such that every consumer with valuation v purchases
at Tv in any full-delivery PBE in FR with price-rationing path (p, q)t.
Combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 10 immediately yields the following:
Lemma 11 Given price-rationing path (p, q)t, every full-delivery PBE in FR with price-
rationing path (p, q), has the same quantity path (Q)t.
In fact, this quantity path (Q), can be viewed as a continuous function of the price-
rationing path (p, q),:
Lemma 12 The unique quantity path (Q)t that may occur in a full-delivery PBE in 17? with
price-rationing path (p, q)t is continuous in (p, q)t in the product topology.
I now show that a best full-delivery PBE exists in the model with rationing (Proposition
12). This holds because the set of full-delivery PBE price-rationing-quantity paths can
be shown to be compact in the product topology,85 and the seller's profit is continuous in
price-rationing-quantity paths. It is straightforward to show that the set of full-delivery
PBE price-rationing paths is compact: the seller can be induced to set any price-rationing
path if consumers believe that she will never deliver the good if she sets the wrong path,
and the seller is willing to deliver Q units of the good if she is willing to deliver Q - E for
all small E. The difficulty is showing that small changes in the price-rationing path induce
small changes in the quantity path. This is taken care of by Lemmas 11 and 12, which are
both proved in Appendix A.
85Technically, this holds for price paths with pt E [v, v] for all t, which one can restrict attention to without
loss of generality.
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Proposition 12 A best full-delivery PBE exists in FR.
Proof. Let f be the set of full-delivery PBE price-rationing-quantity paths (p, q, Q), in FR
satisfying pt E [v, V] for all t. Note that if a PBE is best in the set of PBE with price-
rationing paths in F, then it is best overall, as any PBE with Pt > V for some t yields no
more profit than a PBE with an identical price-rationing path but with pt = V for all such
t instead, and similarly for pt < v. Given a price-rationing-quantity path (p, q, Q)t, the
associated profit for the seller is
00
E6' (pt - c) min {qt,Qt},
t=o
which is obviously continuous in (p, q, Q)t in the product topology. I will show that F is
compact in the product topology, and then apply Weierstrass's Theorem to complete the
proof.
Observe that F C HSJ ([_, i] , [0,1), [0, 1])t, which is compact by Tychonoff's Theorem.
Therefore, to show that f is compact in the product topology it suffices to show that _F is
closed in the product topology. To see that it is, consider a sequence of paths {(p, q, Q) C,, E
F converging pointwise to (p*, q*, Q*)t. I must show that there exists a full-delivery PBE
with price-rationing-quantity path (p*, q*, Q*)t. Consider the following strategy profile:
1. The seller sets price-rationing path (p*, q*)t and xt 1 as long as she has conformed
to this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt =, qt = 1, xt = 0 for all future
periods. In particular, the seller sets xt = 0 in any period in which has set pt f p*.
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at t accepts at t if
and only if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and Jt (v - p*) >
o' (v - p*) for all T > t.
To establish that this profile is a PBE, first observe that if the seller ever sets PT # p*, she
receives zero continuation payoff. Since this is her minmax value, she cannot receive con-
tinuation payoff strictly less than this in any PBE, so in particular her on-path continuation
value after T along (p, q, Q), is weakly positive for every n, so by continuity of profits in
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(p, q, Q) we see that her on-path continuation value after r along (p*, q*, Q*), is also weakly
positive. This implies that setting p, # p* on-path is not a profitable deviation. Similarly,
the fact that setting xt 1 is optimal on-path along (p, q, Q)t for all n implies that setting
Xt 1 is optimal on-path in this strategy profile, because the cost of delivery and on-path
continuation values are continuous in (p, q, Q) , while the payoff of zero that results from
deviating from the equilibrium path in this profile is at least as bad as the payoff from de-
viating in any PBE. Also, the seller's off-path play is optimal because off-path price-setting
does not affect her payoffs and off-path delivery imposes a positive cost at no benefit.
I next check that each consumer's play is optimal. It is again obvious that his off-path
play is optimal, as paying is costly and yields no benefit when the seller sets xt = 0. To see
that his on-path play is optimal given (p*, q*, Q*), note that accepting at t yields 6' (v - p*)
if he pays (i.e., if he is allowed to purchase the good) and his continuation payoff otherwise,
while rejecting always yields his continuation payoff, and o' (v - p*) is weakly greater than
his continuation payoff if 6t (v - p*) > ST (v - p*) for all r > t.
Finally, one must check that the prescribed consumer behavior actually induces quantity
path (Q*)t. By Lemma 11, for any price-rationing path (p, q), there is a unique quantity
path (Q)t that occurs in a full-delivery PBE with price-rationing path (p, q), and (Q)t is
continuous in (p, q) by Lemma 12. Therefore, the fact that (p, q) converges to (p*, q*),
implies that (Q)t converges to (Q*)t. Thus, there there exists a full-delivery PBE with
price-rationing-quantity path (p*, q*, Q*)t.
I have shown that F is closed, and therefore compact, in the product topology. Weier-
strass's Theorem now implies that there is a point in JF that maximizes profits, which
completes the proof. m
4.5.3 Nonoptimality of Rationing in the Model with Rationing
I now show that any best full-delivery PBE in FR involves no rationing on the equilibrium
path. This is the central step in showing equivalence of best full-delivery PBE in F and FR
(Corollary 12), which is in turn the main tool in proving Theorem 10.
By Lemma 10, the path of play of a full-delivery PBE is given by a price-rationing
path (p, q)t, up to differences in the play of the measure-0 set of consumers with nongeneric
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valuations with respect to (p)t. Let us write DT((p, q),) for the quantity demanded at time r
given price-rationing path (p, q)t, i.e., the measure of consumers who would prefer to receive
the good at time T at price PT than to receive their PBE payoff.86 Similarly, say that a
consumer demands the good at T if she prefers receiving the good at time 7 at price PT to
receiving her PBE payoff. Finally, say that rationing occurs along a price-quantity-rationing
path (p, q), if there exists a time T such that DT((p, q),) > q, > 0.87 Note that in a full-
delivery PBE in which D,((p, q),) < q-, a consumer with nongeneric valuation who demands
the good at T must purchase at T. 88
I show that every best full-delivery PBE in IR involves no rationing by arguing that any
full-delivery PBE involving rationing can be strictly improved upon by another full-delivery
PBE. The basic idea is that if rationing occurs at time t*, modifying the equilibrium by
slightly increasing price at V, such that quantity sold at t* remains constant, and using
additional rationing to ensure that quantity sold in every other period does not increase,
leads the timing of all sales to remain constant and therefore yields an increase in profits.
However, the proof is complicated by the fact that, without first ruling out rationing, I
cannot ensure that the price path is decreasing and cannot establish the usual skimming
property that higher-valuation consumers purchase earlier. The heart of the proof involves
showing that slightly increasing price at t* and using additional rationing to ensure that sales
do not increase elsewhere cannot lead to a decrease in sales at some other time T. If it did,
then those consumers who used to purchase at T must now purchase at some other time that
is better for them than T, as they still have the option of earning surplus by purchasing at 7.
And the fact that they have this new opportunity means that some other, higher-valuation
consumers must also be purchasing at a different time. Since higher-valuation consumers
must purchase at some point rather than never purchasing if lower-valuation consumers do
so, following this "trail" of consumers who purchase at different times ultimately shows
that every consumer (with generic valuation) who purchased before the price increase still
"'Throughout the paper, D (p) -- 1 - F (p) is the static demand at price p, while D, ((p, q),) is the time-r
demand in the dynanic model under price-rationing path (p, q)t.
7If qt = 0, it is irrelevant whether one considers the monopoly to be rationing at t or to be setting price
equal to infinity. I do not refer to this case as rationing for technical convenience.
"If D, ((p, q),) - q, this may fail for a measure-zero set of consumers who demand the good at r but
are unable to purchase at r due to rationing. Since measure-zero sets of consumers are irrelevant for the
analysis, I ignore this case in the discussion.
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purchases after the price increase. The details of the proof are deferred to Appendix A.
Proposition 13 In FR, no rationing occurs along a best full-delivery PBE price-quantity-
rationing path.
4.5.4 Equivalence of Best Full-Delivery PBE in the Model with and without
Rationing
We are finally ready to prove Corollary 12, which establishes a very close relationship between
best full-delivery PBE in the relational contracting model with and without rationing. The
intuition for Corollary 12 is simple: by Proposition 13, no rationing occurs on the equilibrium
path in a best full-delivery PBE of FR, and the worst possible off-path punishment (breaking
off trade) does not require rationing, so a best full-delivery PBE of FR can be no better than
a best full-delivery PBE of F. The details of the proof, which involves constructing a PBE
in F corresponding to a given price-quantity path in FR, and vice versa, is deferred to the
appendix. The constructed PBE have the same grim-trigger structure as the PBE described
in the proof of Proposition 12 and in Section 4.6.1.
Corollary 12 A price-quantity path (p, Q), is a best full-delivery PBE price-quantity path
in FR if and only if it is a best full-delivery PBE price-quantity path in F.
Corollary 12 combined with Proposition 12 immediately yields part 2 of Theorem 10:
Proposition 14 (Theorem 10.2) A best full-delivery PBE exists in F.
4.6 Properties of Best Full-Delivery Equilibria
4.6.1 High Profits and Super-Monopoly Pricing
In this subsection, I use the facts about FR and its relationship to F established in Section
to prove parts 3 and 4 of Theorem 10.
I first show that profits in a best full-delivery PBE in FR (which exists, by Proposition 12)
converge to the static monopoly profit as 6 approaches 1, which is not difficult. Corollary
12 then implies that the same is true in F. To see why payoffs in the best full-delivery
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PBE in FR converge to static monopoly profits as 6 approaches 1, let D (p) = 1 - F (p)-the
static demand at price p-and consider the following strategy profile, where y is a constant
in (0, - :
1. The seller sets price-rationing-delivery path pt = pm, qt =y (1 - )t D (pm), x= 1 as
long as she has conformed to this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = V,
qt = 1, xt = 0 for all future periods. In particular, the seller sets xt = 0 in any period
in which has set pt # p'.
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good accepts if and only if
the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and v > pm
That is, the seller keeps price fixed at the static monopoly price, pm, and sells to fraction
y of those consumers who demand the good each period, while consumers accept if and only
if v > pm and the seller has never deviated. It is clear that consumers' play is optimal,
and that the seller can never benefit from setting a different value of pt or qt, so checking
that this profile is an equilibrium reduces to checking that the seller prefers to deliver the
good. The proof of Proposition 15 shows that the seller does in fact prefer to deliver the
good if 1 < " -, and if 6 is close to 1 then this strategy profile yields approximately static
monopoly profits, as the cost of delay involved in selling to only fraction -y of the consumers
who demand the good each period is small. Therefore, profits in a best full-delivery PBE
in FR must approximate static monopoly profits for 6 close to 1 as well.
Proposition 15 (Theorem 10.3) For both F and FR, for all E > 0, there exists 6 < 1
such that, for all 6 > S, there exists a full-delivery PBE under which the seller's payoff is
within E of the static monopoly payoff.
Proof. I prove the result for FR below. Proposition 12 then implies that, for every 6 > 6,
there exists a best full-delivery PBE in FR under which the seller's payoff is within E of the
static monopoly payoff. Corollary 12 in turn implies that the same is true in F.
Recall that pm is the static monopoly price, so the static monopoly payoff is (pm - c) D(pm).
Suppose that pm > c, i.e., that positive profits are possible--the case where this fails is trivial.
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Consider the strategy profile described above, for -y some constant in (0, P c). It
is clear that each consumer's strategy is a best-reply. Note also that qt = Qt for all t
along the equilibrium path. To check that this profile describes a PBE, one must only
check that the seller has an incentive to deliver the good along the equilibrium path, since
any other deviation yields continuation payoff zero against positive continuation payoff from
conforming. This condition is
T gt+fT(Pt+T - c) > qtc for all t > 0.
T=1
For any t, this can be rewritten as
(1 - Y) t ( (1 D (p') (p" - c) ;> !)(1 - (p ") c,
or
(p M - c) >c.
Rearranging this inequality gives
< . (43)
Thus, the strategy profile above is a PBE for any y satisfying (43). Since p'" > c, there
exists y > 0 such that the strategy profile above is a PBE for high enough 6, in particular
for 6 > c.
Suppose that 6 > J and fix any positive -y satisfying (43). Note that this strategy
profile yields profit
f D(p')(p'" -C)1-6(1 - -Y)
for the seller. As 6 approaches 1, this converges to D(pm)(p m - c), completing the proof. n
The intuition for this result is that, for 6 high enough (6 > c/pm"), the seller can credibly
deliver the good to those consumers willing to pay the monopoly price at a fixed positive rate
y, and taking 6 to 1 means that the loss from delay involved in this strategy is insignificant.
Observe that, while the proof of Proposition 15 shows that, in FR, there exists a single
strategy profile which is a PBE for all sufficiently high 6 and which yields profits converging
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to static monopoly profits as 6 converges to 1, such a strategy profile need not exist in F.
Note that the strategy profile described in the proof of Proposition 15, with p = pm , is
not a best full-delivery PBE in FR for fixed 6 < 1. Indeed, there exist full-delivery PBE in
FR with constant price paths (i.e., pt = pt for all t, t') that yield higher profits. To see this,
consider the strategy profile in the proof of Proposition 15 with p m replaced by some price
p. Let
6p - c
op
The argument in the proof of Proposition 15 that led to equation (43) shows that -y* (p) is
the fastest rate at which the seller can sell in a full-delivery PBE in which price is fixed at
p. This implies that the seller's profit in the best full-delivery PBE with a constant price
path at p and a constant sales rate , is
-* ( -D(p)(p - c),
1I - 6(1 - -Y*(p))
which equals
D(p)(p - c). (44)
p - c )
Note that the first term of (44) represents the cost of the delay in sales required to induce
the seller to deliver, while the second term is simply the static profit at price p. Raising p
above pm yields a first-order increase in the first term in (44) and a second-order decrease in
the product of the second and third terms, so the seller does better to sell at price above pm
The intuition is similar to that of Section 4.4: raising price reduces quantity, which reduces
the seller's temptation to fail to deliver, and, with durable goods, this allows the seller to
sell at a faster rate. More specifically, the required delay in sales forces a seller who would
receive p - c per unit sold under full comrmitment to receive only p - ' per unit sold, so,
with a constant price path, a seller with cost c can do no better than imitating the pricing
of a static monopoly with cost c/6. That is, (44) equals
p - D(p),
from which it is clear that the best full-delivery, fixed-price PBE in which the seller sells at
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a constant rate is given by price p' (3), the monopoly price when cost equals c/6, and sales
rate -y = y*(p"' (i)). In fact, it is not hard to show that this is the best full-delivery, fixed-
price PBE overall: all that remains to show this is to establish that selling at the constant
rate -y* (p) is optimal given that prices are fixed at any given p, which follows from a standard
dynamic programming argument.89
Corollary 13 If v > j, the best full-delivery, constant-price PBE in FR is given by pt
p ( ) andq= ()) ( - y*(p ()))t D(pm ()). Furthermore, (pm (j) -) D (pm (c))
is a lower bound on the best full-delivery PBE profit in both F and FR-
Proof. Given the first part of the result, the second part follows immediately from Corollary
12.
Suppose pt = p for all t. Let Q be the static demand for price p. The problem of finding
the best full-delivery PBE with a constant price p in FR reduces to finding the best number
of consumers to sell to in every period while maintaining the seller's incentive to deliver the
good; i.e., to solving the following functional equation:
V(Q) = max (p - c) q + 6V(Q - q). (45)
q<Q such that 6V(Q-q)>qc
Standard dynamic programming results imply that there is at most one solution to this
equation with a non-trivial set satisfying the constraints. Conjecture that V(Q) P6 CQ.
The right-hand side of (45) then becomes
max (p-c)q+(op-c)(Q-q)
o<(p-c c
(p-c(ac )Q+(p--c) Q
-
(p- )Q,
where the constraint set is non-trivial if p > c/6. Therefore, (p - j) Q is the highest profit
attainable by a price path fixed at p > c/6 when there are Q remaining consumers with
"Corollary 13 applies only to the case 0 > i. Proposition 18 shows that, if v < i, there is no full-delivery
PBE in F or FU in which the seller ever delivers the good or receives positive payments.
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valuations greater than p, and 0 is the highest such profit if p < c/ (as the solution to (45)
must be nonincreasing in p). Setting Q = D(p) and maximizing over p completes the proof.
U
Finally, I note that (non-constant price) full-delivery PBE of lR exist that yield profits
strictly above static monopoly profits with cost equal to c/6, if V > c/6. For example,
consider modifying the best full-delivery, constant price path by increasing po from p"' (j)
to p" (j) + E, for E small. I claim that, for small e, qo consumers will still pay po. This
follows because a consumer with valuation v demands the good at time 0 and price po if
v - p"' (c) - e > S (v - p" ()), or E < (1 - 6) (v -p" ()). This holds for all consumers
with v > p"' (L) in the limit as E goes to 0, and q0 = ( D (pm (')), which is strictly
less than 1 - F (pm (s)). Therefore, there exists E > 0 such that more than qo consumers
demand the good at time 0 when po = p" (') + E. And the continuation path of play from
t 1 onward is the same under the modified strategy profile as under the best constant
price PBE, so the modified profile yields strictly higher profits overall. This yields part 4
of Theorem 10:
Proposition 16 (Theorem 10.4) If V > c/6, there exists a full-delivery PBE of I'R (when
cost equals c) yielding profits strictly greater than static monopoly profits when cost equals
c/6. By Corollary 12, the same is true of full-delivery PBE of F.
Before leaving this subsection, note that Corollary 13 suggests that the best full-delivery
PBE of the relational contracting model may involve pricing above the static monopoly level.
I demonstrate this here in a simple, two-type example. 90
Example 1 Suppose that half the consumers have valuation 2. 36 while the other half have
valuation 2.12. Let c = .38 and 6 = .4. Note that the static monopoly price is 2.12, as
this yields profit 1. 74 while setting price equal to 2.36 yields profit .99. In the dynamic
todel, the discussion preceding Corollary 13 implies that the best full-delivery PBE with
pricc fixcd at 2.36 yields profit (2.36 - ) .5 - .71 while the best PBE with price fixed
" This example does not exactly fit the model as I have assumed a continuous distribution of valuations.
However, the example can be slightly perturbed to yield a distribution that satisfies my assumptions, and,
noting that every best full-delivery PBE price path is decreasing (by Proposition 17), I conjecture that the
best full-delivery PBE in the perturbed example will have po > p".
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at 2.12 yields profit (2.12 - 31 = 1. 17. On the other hand, one can check that setting
po = 2. 26 and pt = 2.12 for all t > 1 and selling to all high-valuation consumers in pe-
riod zero and then selling to the low-valuation consumers at the fastest possible rate yields
profit (2.26 - .38) .5 + .4 (2.12 - ) .5 = 1. 174. Furthermore, this is a PBE price-quantity
path, as high-valuation consumers receive 2.36 - 2.26 = .1 from purchasing in period zero
and at most .4 (2.36 - 2.12) = .096 from purchasing at a later date; while the seller gains
.4 (2.12 - ) .5 = .234 from delivering the good at time zero and gains .38 * .5 = .19 from
failing to deliver." Since this full-delivery PBE yields higher profit than the best PBE that
fixes price at the monopoly price of 2.12, which is clearly the best PBE in which all prices
are weakly below the monopoly price, the best full-delivery PBE in this example must have
pt > p"m for some time t.
4.6.2 Declining Prices
Finally, I establish three additional important properties of best full-delivery PBE of F and
FR, which hold for any fixed discount factor (parts 5 through 7 of Theorem 10). I first use
the possibility of rationing to ensure that best full-delivery PBE involve strictly decreasing
price paths and positive sales each period. The idea is that delaying sales is wasteful and
rationing can be used to ensure that speeding up sales does not violate the seller's incentive
compatibility constraint, which might otherwise be a concern.
Proposition 17 (Theorem 10.5) If V > ', any best full-delivery PBE of F or FR has a
strictly decreasing price path and strictly positive sales each period.
Proof. I prove the result for FR, whence the result for F follows by Corollary 12. If f) > ,
full-delivery PBE exist in which the seller makes positive profits (by Proposition 16), so any
best full-delivery PBE of FR yields positive profits. 2  Suppose that (p, q), is such a best
full-delivery PBE price path (which exists by 12). By Proposition 13, D, ((p, q)t) < q
for all T, so Q, = D, ((p, q)t) for all T. Suppose that there exists some time T such that
DT ((p, q),) = 0. Let t* be the first such time. If t* = 0, then define a new path by
1 Corresponding off-path play may be taken to be as in the strategy profile in the proof of Proposition 15,
for example.
9 2See Proposition 18 for why this is not true if Tv <
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letting p' = pt+1, q' = qt+1, i.e., shifting the original price-rationing path forward one period,
which implies that Q' = Qt+1, so profits under the new path are times profits under the
original path, contradicting the optimally of the original path. If t* > 0, let vt*-1 be the
lowest valuation such that a consumer with valuation vt-_1 demands the good at t* - 1,
which is well-defined because a positive measure of consumers demand the good at t* - 1, by
definition of t*. I first claim that vt._1 > pt*-1. To see this, first note that a consumer with
valuation vt._1 can demand the good at t* - 1 only if Vt*1 > pt*-. If vt*_1 = pt*-1, then it
must be true that p, = pt*_1 for all - > t* - 1, since the price path is weakly decreasing by
assumption; and if the price ever falls strictly below pt*_1 then all consumers with valuations
sufficiently close to pt*-1 prefer to wait until this time to purchase, and all but at most a set
of measure 0 of these consumers have the option of doing so since D, ((p, q)t) < q, for all
T. The fact that D, ((p, q)t) < q, for all T then implies that Q, = 0 for all T > V - 1, as
all consumers prefer to purchase at t* - 1 than at any later time. Therefore, continuation
profits from time t* - 1 onward equal 0, which implies that the seller does not deliver at
t* - 1. This in turn implies that no consumers pay at t* - 1, so that continuation profits
from time t* - 2 onward equal 0 as well. By induction, continuation profits from time 0
onward are 0, contradicting the fact that any best full-delivery PBE yields positive profits if
v7 > i
Now consider modifying (p, q)t by changing pt* to * . Since vt*-1 > pt*-1,
it follows that have pt- < pt*-1, and it is easy to check that all consumers with valuation
weakly greater than vt_1 continue to demand the good at t* - 1. By the skimming property
(which is easily seen to hold due to declining prices and no rationing), the seller can sell a
t-i-( 1_-r+l )o*-ipositive quantity at date t* +7 only if pt-+T < ,+1 so the seller strictly prefers
selling to some mass of consumers at t* at the new price to selling to them at any point
in the future. Next, observe that under the new price there is strictly positive demand at
t*, since at the new price a consumer with valuation vt*_1 strictly prefers to purchase at
t* - 1 than to purchase at any other time except t*, and is indifferent between purchasing
at t* - 1 and purchasing at t*, so a consumer with valuation slightly below vt*1 strictly
prefers purchasing at t* to purchasing at any other time. Furthermore, the total sales at all
future dates to consumers who do not buy at t* is left unchanged, so total profits are strictly
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higher under the new path. Finally, the potential complication that the seller's incentive
compatibility constraint may be violated at t* can be addressed by rationing at t*, since the
necessity of positive continuation profits from t* on implies that the seller can credibly sell a
strictly positive quantity at t*. So the modified path (possibly with rationing at t*) strictly
improves on the original path, contradicting the assumption that D, ((p, q)t) = 0 for some
T.
I have shown that every best full-delivery PBE induces strictly positive sales at every
date. Since every best full-delivery PBE involves no rationing, this is possible only if every
best full-delivery PBE has a strictly declining price path. M
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 10 by proving parts 6 and 7, which
show that every best full-delivery PBE of F (or FR) has an equilibrium price path (p)t that
asymptotes to a price at least as high as max {v, c/} as t goes to infinity. The intuition
is that a best full-delivery PBE has a declining price path, by Proposition 17; there is no
reason to price below v; and prices must be at least c/ in any full-delivery PBE with a
declining price path in which the seller ever delivers, in analogy with Proposition 10. The
following Lemma formalizes the last part of this intuition:
Lemma 13 In any full-delivery PBE of F or FR with price-quantity path (p, q) in which
pt ;> pt- for all t and a strictly positive quantity of the good is delivered along the equilibrium
path, pt > 6 for all t.
Proof. Consider FR first. Suppose that Q consumers have not yet received the good at
time t*. First note that the seller's continuation profit from time t* onward is bounded
from above by her continuation profit from time t* onward in a best full-delivery PBE of
the modified continuation game where she is constrained to price weakly below pt. and all
remaining consumers' valuations are set to pt.. This follows because in the modified game
the seller can set the original continuation price path (p)t,, and use rationing in order to
sell according to the original price-quantity path.
The seller's continuation value at t* in a full-delivery PBE of the modified game is there-
fore bounded from above by the solution to equation (45) with p = pt.. As shown in the
proof of Corollary 13, equation (45) has a solution with V(Q) > 0 if and only if opt. > c.
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So if pt. < ', the seller's continuation value at t* equals 0 in any full-delivery PBE in the
modified game, and therefore equals 0 in any full-delivery PBE of the unmodified game as
well. This implies that the seller delivers 0 units of the good at time t*, which then implies
that no buyers pay anything to the seller at time t*, so that the seller's continuation value at
t* - 1 equals 0 as well. By induction, the seller's continuation value equals 0 at all periods,
and the seller never delivers a positive quantity of the good.
By Proposition 12 and Corollary 12, the above argument shows that in any full-delivery
PBE of F with a declining price, the seller's continuation value starting from any t* satisfying
pt- < g is 0. As above, this implies that the seller never delivers any positive quantity of
the good. m
Proposition 18 (Theorem 10.6 and 10.7) Any best full-delivery PBE of F or FR has
Pt> anid Pt ;> vfor all t if i > j. If < j, there is no PBE in F or FR in which the
seller ever delivers the good or receives positive payments.
Proof. If f > , the price path of any best full-delivery PBE of F or FR is declining, by
Proposition 17; and any full-delivery PBE with a declining price path has pt > j for all t, by
Lemma 13. Finally, modifying any declining price path in FR by replacing all pt < v with
v and using rationing to ensure delivery yields a strict increase in profits if pt < v for any t
(as sales occur in every period in a best full-delivery PBE, by Proposition 17), so the result
for - > j holds for FR. Corollary 12 then implies that it also holds for F.
Suppose that T < j and that mass Q consumers have not yet received the good at some
time t in F or FR. If the seller delivers q units of the good at time t, she cannot receive total
payments of more than Uq and must of course be willing to deliver the q units. Therefore, her
continuation payoff from time t onward is bounded from above by the solution to equation
(45) with p = V. As we have seen, the only solution to equation (45) when V < is
V (Q) = 0 for all Q. So no PBE in F or FR yields positive profits if V < , which, as in the
proof of Lemma 13, implies that no PBE involves delivery or positive payments. m
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4.7 An Extension: Exogenous Chance of Nondelivery
The analysis is based on the assumption that the seller has the option of failing to deliver
the good after receiving payment. We have argued that the presence of equilibria that
yield high profits for the seller under this assumption suggests that sellers may try to avoid
committing themselves to delivering the good. However, in some environments sellers may
be "automatically" committed to delivery; for example, taking payment for a good and then
failing to provide it may be viewed by courts as breaching an "implicit" contract, particularly
if the seller has always provided the good to paying customers in the past (as is the case
in full-delivery PBE). In this section, I show that the model can easily be extended to
an environment in which this concern that the seller may be involuntarily committed to
delivery does not apply. In particular, I assume that in every period there is an exogenous,
independent probability q > 0 that the seller privately learns that she is unable to deliver
the good after receiving payment." For example, the seller may require certain specialized
inputs in order to produce the final good, and these inputs may not always be available (and
consumers and courts may be unable to observe whether the inputs are available). In this
model, the seller periodically fails to deliver the good even if she wishes to deliver in every
period, and since courts cannot tell whether failure to deliver results from lack of inputs or
opportunistic behavior by the seller there is no possibility that the seller can be involuntarily
committed to trying to deliver the good in every period.
The equilibria I have constructed for both the non-durable and durable goods models can
easily be adapted to this environment by specifying that no purchases or delivery occur after
any nondelivery by the seller (so that trade eventually breaks down on the equilibrium path),
and that prior to the breakdown of trade consumers take into account that they receive the
good only with probability 1 - q even if they pay (since consumers are risk-neutral, this
implies that the mass of consumers who wish to purchase at price p is now D (i T rather
than D (p)). That is, the results are "continuous" in T1. Rather than formally stating this
rather natural finding, I instead focus on characterizing the best full-delivery, constant-price
PBE in FR, in analogy to Corollary 13, which provides an intuitive lower bound on the best
full-delivery PBE profit in both F and FR. It turns out that the analysis of Section 4.6.1
9I thank Edward Green for suggesting I pursue this analysis.
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carries through with the sole modification that D (p) is replaced by D : the intuition
for this result is that, in the best full-delivery PBE, the seller is indifferent between delivering
the good and breaking off trade, so she is not made worse off by the possibility that trade may
break off exogenously (except insofar as this causes consumers with valuations v E p,)
to reject price her price offer). Finally, note that the original definition of a full-delivery
PBE does not allow for the possibility that trade breaks down in equilibrium, which leads
us to use the following, somewhat ad hoc, definition in the statement of the result:
Definition 18 A modified full-delivery PBE is a PBE in which the seller sets x= 1 at all
on-path histories at which Q, > 0 and sets xt = 0 at all on-path histories at which Qt = 0.
The earlier results pertaining to full-delivery PBE (in particular, Corollary 12) also apply
to modified full-delivery PBE.
Proposition 19 If P > jthe best modified full-delivery, constant-price PBE in ,R is given
by pt arg maxp (p - c) D p* (q) and qt = y* (p* (a)) (1 - y* (p* (l)))t D
where )* (p) as in Section 4.6.1.
Proof. A consumer who demands the good at price p receives it with probability at most
1 - i, so at most D consumers ever purchase in a full-delivery PBE with constant
price p. The argument in the proof of Corollary 13 shows that, if the seller faces this
demand curve and can freely choose what quantity to deliver in every period, her best
(modified) full-delivery PBE profit with constant price p equals (p - j)D . Therefore,
(p* (n,) - E) D is an upper bound on the seller's best modified full-delivery, constant-
price PBE profit when in each period she may be unable to deliver the good with probability
1)7.
I claim that the following strategy profile attains this upper bound: the seller sets (pt, qt)
as in the statement of the proposition and sets xt 1 until the first time that delivery is
impossible arid subsequently sets xt = 0; and a consumer with valuation v demands the
good if arid only if v ;> I and the seller has always set pt = p* (,) and delivered the good
in the past. The only nontrivial part of verifying that this profile is a PBE is checking
that it is optimal for the seller to deliver the good when prescribed. Nondelivery leads to
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continuation payoff 0, and in every period prior to the first nondelivery the seller fails to
deliver with probability 7. Therefore, the condition that it is optimal for the seller to deliver
the good when prescribed at time t is
7)(1 - 2)' gt+q (pt+, - c (1 - 7)) > qtc.
T=1
Substituting in the specified (pt, qt) yields
T* (p* ()) (1 - (1* (71)))t (I - Y*(p* ( 1-))) D (* (p* (,) - c(1 - ))1 -(1 - y* (p* (77)))(1 - )1 -
> -y* (p* (,q)) (1 - -y* (p* (77)))t D c,
or
S1- Y* (p (,q))) V()-C>C
1 -(1 - Y* (p* (11)))(1 - )
This can be rewritten as
Y* (p* (q)) < C6p* (TI)
exactly as in (43), which holds by definition of y* (p* (71)). This verifies that the above
strategy profile is a modified full-delivery, constant-price PBE, and it is straightforward to
check that it yields expected profit (p* (7) - j) D
Thus, Proposition 19 shows that the lower bound on optimal monopoly profits derived
in Section 4.6.1 extends naturally to environments with an exogenous change of nondelivery,
where it may be more realistic to view the seller as having the option of nondelivery.
4.8 Conclusion
The main insight of this paper is that the optimal pricing strategy of a dynamic monopoly
may be very different from that in traditional models when the relationship between the
seller and consumers is regulated by relational incentives. Unlike in Hart and Tirole (1988),
a non-durable goods monopoly in my model can earn high profits even if consumers are non-
anonymous, provided the discount factor is sufficiently high. And unlike in Coase (1972), a
durable goods monopoly can earn approximately static monopoly profits in the limit as the
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discount factor approaches one, even if the lowest consumer valuation is above the marginal
cost of production. A durable goods monopoly can also earn high profits when the discount
factor is bounded away form one.
While the model has many equilibria, restricting attention to the best equilibria for the
seller brings out some novel economic intuitions and empirical predictions. First, for both
non-durable and durable goods monopolies, the temptation to fail to deliver provides an
incentive for pricing above the static monopoly level. 94 The intuition is the same in both
cases: The larger the quantity of the good a monopoly is supposed to deliver, the greater
is its incentive to renege. So the monopoly benefits from restricting quantity, and the most
profitable way for it to restrict quantity is to raise price. Second, in the durable goods case,
the monopoly has an incentive to gradually cut prices over time, using high prices rather
than rationing to restrict sales early on. These new effects have potentially interesting
applications for regulation: In traditional models, observing a monopoly cutting its price
is a sign that consumers are doing better than they would be if the monopoly had full
commitment power, since they are paying lower prices and (if the discount factor is high) are
not facing costly delays in purchasing. In my model, however, consumers may be better off
when the monopoly has full commitment power, for two reasons: they may face lower prices
(since without commitment the monopoly may price above the static monopoly price), and
they may receive the good significantly faster. This also points to an important empirical
prediction of my model: in contrast to the standard full-commitment and "no-commitment"
models of durable good monopoly, my model predicts that a monopoly will cut prices over
time, but will do so slowly enough that the costs from delay are significant.
I also introduce two methodological innovations. First, I use an augmented "model with
rationing" to help analyze the durable-goods seller problem. This greatly simplifies the
analysis by allowing us to construct simple equilibria with flat price paths in the model with
rationing and then use the relationship between the model with and without rationing to
draw conclusions about best full-delivery equilibria in the model without rationing. Second,
and more generally, I use relational incentives to replace the temptation to deviate at the
" This possibility that dynamic monopolies may price higher than static monopolies is a prediction of the
model which differs from standard models of dynamic monopoly pricing.
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contract offer stage (price offers in the model) with the temptation to deviate at the contract
execution stage (delivery of the good in the model), which may have applications to other
areas where studying dynamics in the presence of adverse selection has proved difficult. For
example, recall that in the model of non-durable goods and non-anonymous consumers, the
"dynamic enforcement" constraint that the seller delivers the good replaced the ratchet effect
in price setting. Perhaps further insights may be gained from applying this idea to dynamic
principal-agent problems with adverse selection, where characterizing dynamics in models
with "no commitment" is difficult due to the ratchet effect (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole,
1988).
4.9 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First observe that the problem of finding the best PBE for the
seller is equivalent to finding the best PBE for the seller when she can fully commitment
to her sequence of prices ({pt,})t. To see this, note that one can specify off-path beliefs
for buyers such that each buyer expects the seller to never deliver the good following any
deviation in price-setting by the seller. Given these beliefs, no buyer will ever accept a
strictly positive price in any period following a deviation in price-setting by the seller, so the
seller always receives continuation payoff zero, equal to her minmax payoff, after any such
deviation.
Using this observation and applying the revelation principle to each period, one can write
the problem in a standard mechanism design notation, writing T for transfers:
max 6tw] (TH(v) - cxt(v)) f (v)dv
{Tt(-),xt(-)}t t=0 JV
subject to
vxt(v) - Tt(v) - arg max vxt (v') - T(v') for all v and t (IC)
xV
vxt (v) - Tt (v) > 0 for all v and t (IR)
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and
E36T f (T+T(v) - cxt+T(v)) f (v)dv > cj xt(v)f (v)dv for all t. (DE)
T=1
Note that the third constraint is the seller's incentive compatibility constraint, which I also
refer to as the dynamic enforcement or DE constraint. Substituting for T(v) using the IR
and IC constraints in the usual way and temporarily ignoring the resulting monotonicity
constraint lets us rewrite the problem as
00
max E 6t ((v - c) f (v) - (1 - F(v))) xt(v)dv{Xt(-)} ,_O IV
subject to the DE constraint
6T J, v - c) f(v) - (1 - F(v))) xt+T(v)dv ;> c xt(v)f(v)dv for all t.
T=1 v
Let {x*(v)}, be a solution to this problem. Note that, for all t, x*(v) must solve
max ((v - c) f (v) - (1 - F(v))) xt(v)dv
subject to
6T ((v - c) f (v) - (1 - F(v))) x*+(v)dv > c xt(v)f (v)dv,
r=1 , +-I
since the solution to this program maximizes both the original objective and the left-hand
side of each original constraint over all xt(.) that satisfy the original time t constraint.
This implies that, for all t, t', if (v - c) f(v) - (1 - F(v)) > 0, then x*(v) > x*,(v) if
0 T  1) (x(v)d7 > 1 fJ X,* (v)dv; while if (v - c) f(v) - (1 - F(v)) < 0, then
x*(v) = x*,(v) = 0. Since E' " fI xt,(v)dv is bounded from above, there exists a finite
x*(.) such that x*(v) = sup x*(v) if (v - c) f(v) - (1 - F(v)) > 0 and x*(v) = 0 otherwise.
I claim that xt(v) = x*(v) for all t and v in any solution to this problem. Clearly,
the profit corresponding to this allocation is an upper bound on the profit in any solution.
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Furthermore,
T  ((v - c) f(v) - (1 - F(v))) x*(v)dv = I ((v - c) f (v) - (1 - F(c))) sip *(v)di
T=1 JV '=1 JV,
> sup ST  ((v - c) f (v) - (1 - F(v))) ,<*(v )dv'
> slipc jx*(v)f(v)dv
c x*(v)f(v)dv,
where the first line is by the definition of x* (v), the second is immediate, the third follows
because {x*(v)}, satisfies the DE constraint for all t, and the fourth follows because x* (v) >
x,*, (v) if and only if x* (v') x,*, (v') for any t, t', v, and v', so the sup may be moved inside
the integral. The above chain of inequalities implies that repeating x* (v) satisfies the seller's
incentive compatibility constraint. Finally, if there exists t such that x*(v) f x*(v), then
the allocation {x*(v)} yields strictly lower profit than repeating x*(v) in period t and yields
weakly lower profit in all other periods, so every solution to the original problem has the
same allocation rule in every period.
I have shown that the optimal allocation rule is stationary, so the problem becomes
max ((v - c) f (v) - (1 - F(v))) x(v)dv
subject to the DE constraint
6T j ((v - c) f(v) - (1 - F(v))) x(v)dv C x(v)f(v)dv for all t.
The DE constraint may be rewritten as
(vf (v) - (1 - F(v))) x(v)dv x( f(v)dv.
If the constraint is slack, we have standard monopoly pricing. If the constraint is binding,
noting that the assumptions on F(v) imply that x(v) continues to take a cutoff form whereby
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x(v) 0 if v < v* and x(v) = 1 if v > v* for some v* yields that, for any v > v*, price equals
v - x (s) ds = v*. And complementary slackness implies that the constraint is binding if
and only if p"' < '. Finally, note that in any case these solutions satisfy the monotonicity
constraint.
If V- < C, then v* > V9, so x (v) = 0 for all v, which implies that the seller never delivers
the good or receives positive payments in any optimal PBE. Since the seller's minmax payoff
is zero, every PBE is optimal if V < ,which proves the result in the i) < case. m
Proof of Proposition 11. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 12, so I omit
some details. Let F be the set of PBE price-quantity-delivery paths (p, Q, x)t satisfying
pt E [v, i5] for all t. If a PBE is optimal in the set of PBE with price-demand-delivery paths
in F, then it is optimal overall. Furthermore, it is clear that the seller's PBE payoff is
continuous in price-quantity-delivery paths (p, Q, x), in the product topology.
Next, note that the continuation value of a consumer with valuation v facing price-
quantity-delivery path (p, Q, x), at time t is continuous in (p, Q, x)t in the product topol-
ogy. To see this, observe that the maximum gain in continuation value over a E-ball about
(p, Q, x), E F is no more than 1-, , corresponding to receiving the good, valued at V, with
additional probability E in each period, and paying e less in each period. This converges to
0 as E does.
I now show that F is compact in the product topology. Observe that F C H0% ([v, i5], [0, 1], [0, 1])t,
which is compact by Tychonoff's Theorem. Therefore, it suffices to show that F is closed
in the product topology. To see that it is, consider a sequence of paths {(p, Q, x),} , c
converging pointwise to (p*, Q*, x*),. I must show that there exists a PBE with price-
demaid-delivery path (p*, Q* x*),. Consider the following strategy profile:
1. The seller sets price-delivery path (p*, x*)t as long as she has conformed to this strategy
in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = D, x - 0 for all future periods. In particular,
the seller sets xt = 0 in any period in which she has set pt # p*.
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at t pays at t if and only
95This continuation value is well-defined here by standard dynamic programming arguments, because,
unlike in the model with rationing, each consumer faces the same optimization problem regardless of the
behavior of the other consumers.
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if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and x*v - p* > x*Vv,
where V7 Jl is the continuation value of such a consumer facing (p*, Q*, x*)t.
The proof that the seller's play is optimal is as in the proof of Proposition 12. To see
that each consumer's play is optimal, first note that it is obvious that her off-path play is
optimal, as paying is costly and yields no benefit when the seller sets xt = 0. To see that
her on-path play is optimal given (p*, Q*, x*)t, note that paying at t gives expected payoff
x*v - p* + 3 (1 - x*) Vv , while not paying gives Vt" , so paying is optimal if and only if
X*v - p* > Sx* Vtj+.
That the prescribed consumer behavior induces quantity path (Q*)t follows from the
observation that each consumer's payoff is continuous in (p, Q, x),, and that each consumer
plays a best response to each (p, Q, x)t, in equilibrium. This completes the argument that
_F is closed, and therefore compact, in the product topology. Weierstrass's Theorem then
implies that there is a point in F that maximizes profits, completing the proof. M
Proof of Lemma 10. Fix a price-rationing path (p, q), and two full-delivery PBE o and
u'. Let V be the set of generic valuations v such that there exists a consumer with valuation
v who purchases at different times under a and o'. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that
V is nonempty. Then V has a supremum, which I denote by v*. Let V be the payoff of a
consumer with valuation v* under a, let V. be the payoff of a consumer with valuation v*
under a', and without loss of generality assume that V,. > Vv..
I first claim that V. = V.. To see this, suppose that there exists a consumer with
valuation v* who purchases at time r, under a and purchases at time r': # rV under o',
with 6 o* (v* - PT,) > " (v* -P , so that the consumer receives a higher payoff under
a. This is possible only if the consumer is unable to purchase at time r, under a', which
in turn is possible only if strictly more than q,, consumers accept price PT, at time rv
under o'. Since the consumer is able to purchase at time rV. under a, which is possible
only if no more than q,, consumers accept price PT, at time r, under a, this implies that
there is a positive measure p of consumers with valuations greater than v* who purchase at
rV* under a' but not under o. By Lemma 8, this implies that there exists a consumer with
valuation v' > v* and v' generic with respect to (p), who purchases at different times under
a and a', which contradicts the fact that v* = sup {v : V e V}. This implies that V, = V.
184
which also implies that v)* V, as if V- = V,. then either every consumer with valuation v*
purchases at the same time under a and a' or v* is nongeneric with respect to (p).
If V,* = V, = 0, then is no time t at which v* > pt and a consumer with valuation v* is
able to purchase under either o or o'. This implies that there is no time t at which v > pt
and a consumer with valuation v is able to purchase under either a or 0', for any v E V, as
v < v* for all v C V and a consumer with a lower valuation is able to purchase at a weakly
smaller set of times. Therefore, a consumer with valuation v never purchases under either
7 or c', for all v E V, which implies that V is empty, a contradiction.
If Vv- = V' > 0, then for any 17 e (0, V.) there exist at most finitely many times t such
that there exists v C [V, V) such that 6' (v - pt) > Vv* -7 and qt > Qt, where Qt is the measure
of consumers who purchase at time t under a and have valuations greater than v* (as pt > 0
for all t); call the set of such times T. Let Et = qt - Qt, and let E min {Et : t E T} /2 > 0.
Since every consumer with generic valuation greater than v* purchases at the same time
under or and o', by definition of V, and the set of consumers with nongeneric valuations is
of measure 0, by Lemma 8, the measure of consumers with valuations greater than v* - E
who purchase at any t under a' is less than Qt + E. By definition of E, this implies that
the measure of consumers with valuations greater than v* - E who purchase at any t E T
under o' is less than qt. So any consumer with valuation v > v* - E can purchase at any
time t with 6t (v - pt) > V- - 7j under o' at which she can purchase under a. By the
same argument, there exists 6' > 0 such that a consumer with valuation o > v* - E' can
purchase at any time t with 6' (v - pt) > V,* - T) under a at which she can purchase under o'.
Therefore, letting E" -m {6, 6'}, we see that a consumer with valuation v > v* - E" can
purchase at the same set of times t with 6t (v - pt) > V. - q under a and T'. Furthermore,
a consumer with valuation close enough to v* can purchase at any time at which a consumer
with valuation v* can purchase, by the specification of rationing, so there exists E* such that
a consumer with valuation v > v* - E* receives a payoff of at least V,- - i] under both a
and T'. Finally, by definition of v*, there exists v C V such that v > v* - min {", E*}. A
consumer with valuation t receives a payoff of at least V,* - 1 under both a and a', which
implies that he purchases at a time t with o' (v - pt) > V* - 7 under both a and a'. The
set of such times at which the consumer can purchase is the same under a and T'. Since v
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is generic with respect to (p), the consumer has a strict preference ordering over purchase
times, which implies that he purchases at the same time under a and a', which contradicts
the assumption that v e V. m
Proof of Lemma 12. Consider the problem of maximizing Qt over price-rationing paths
(p', q'), in an E-ball about (p, q),. As e -> 0, the measure of consumers who have dif-
ferent preference orderings over purchase times (i.e., over the {6' (v - p,)},) under (p', q'),
and (p, q), converges to 0. Furthermore, the maximum difference between Q, and a Q',
corresponding to (p, q') in an E-ball about (p, q)t (holding (p), fixed) is no more than
Z 0 max {, Qt}, the maximum measure of consumers whose purchasing times can be af-
fected decreasing qt by E for all t, holding other consumers' purchasing times fixed; this
follows because if rationing prevents measure p consumers froi purchasing at some time
t, each of these consumers cannot alter his play in a way that leads more than one total
consumer to purchase at time T (i.e., he can purchase at time T himself, or he can displace
one other consumer through rationing at some other time).> Thus, the maximum variation
in Qt over an E-ball about (p, q)t converges to lim,-o E O max {, Qt} as E -> 0, so the the
following technical lemma completes the proof:
Lemma 14 Given any quantity path (Q)t, limno Ee max {E, Q,} 0.
Proof. First, note that
00(
max {E, Q} = lime# {t : Qt > F} + liin E Qtlim E xrt (E- 0  E-0E- t=o 
t:Qt <E
= lim e# {t : Qt > E}.
E-0
Let N, -- # {t : Qt > E} to simplify notation. Assume, towards a contradiction, that the
lemma is false, i.e., that there exists 6 > 0 such that for all _ > 0 there exists F < satisfying
ENE > 6. Fix such a 6 > 0, and let 6o > 0 satisfy EoNo > 6. Now for all n > 1, lets, E",
and let E6 be a strictly positive number strictly less than sn satisfying ENsr > 5. Note that
En-1 2
96I omit the measure-theoretic details of this argument, which are similar to those in the proof of Propo-
sition 13.
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Observe that, for any n, N, < 1, for otherwise the total quantity of sales made in the
Ne periods in which Qt > E, would exceed 1. Since N, < I, and Enf+1NEn,, > 6, it follws
that NEn+1 - Nn > . Now Ne n - NE, is the number of periods in which Q, is
between En+1 and n, so total sales made in all periods is at least
E (Ne1 - Ne) En+1 > E -
n>O n>O
> 2n
n>O
= 00.
This contradicts the assumption that the population of consumers is of measure 1. * *
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose that rationing occurs at time t* along a full-delivery
PBE path (p, q),. I show that (p, q), cannot be a best full-delivery PBE path.
First, consider the path (p', q'), given by p' = pt for all t and q' = Qt for all t, where
(Q), is the unique (by Lemma 11) quantity path corresponding to (p, q),. All consumers are
best-responding if they purchase at the same time under (p', q') as they did under (p, q)t,
and by Lemma 10 this purchasing schedule is unique up to the measure-0 set of consumers
who are indifferent between purchasing at different times, so the seller's profit is the same in
any full-delivery PBE corresponding to (p', q') and in any full-delivery PBE corresponding
to (p, q),. Furthermore, D,- ((p', q')t) > q'.- Since F admits a strictly positive density, there
is a small enough strict increase in pt, Ap, such that demand at t* still exceeds q,- when
price at t* is increased by Ap. So consider the path (p*, q*), given by p*- = pt* + Ap, p* = pt
for all t : t*, and q* = Qt for all t. I claim that Q* = Q, for all t, which then implies that
profit is higher under (p*, q*), than under (p', q'), (and therefore (p, q)t), since Q,- > 0 (by
the definition of rationing occurring at t*).
Since q* = Qt for all t, it follows that Q* < Qt for all t, so since Q*- =Qt by definition
of At it suffices to show that - Q* ; Qt. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that
Zt,4 Qt - Et- Q* 1,p > 0. For any -T t*, if Q, - Q* p > 0, then D, ((p*, q*),)
q* -p. Since the price at 7 is the same under (p*, q*)t and (p, q),, this is possible only if there
are measure p, consumers who demanded the good at T under (p, q), and have higher PBE
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payoffs under (p*, q*),. Since prices are weakly higher in each period under (p*, q*),, this
implies that at least p, consumers who purchase at T under (p, q), must purchase at times
under (p*, q*)t at which they could not purchase under (p, q),. This argument applies to all T
such that pt, > 0, so at least yL = E p, consumer purchase at times under (p*, q*), at which
they could not purchase under (p, q),, and receive higher payoffs under (p*, q*)t. Let D be
the set of consumers who purchase at times under (p*, q*), at which they could not purchase
under (p, q), and receive higher payoffs under (p*, q*)t. Now measure pt of consumers can
purchase at times under (p*, q*), at which none of them can purchase under (p, q), only
if there exists a measure-preserving injection 0 : D -> [v, v] (mapping consumers who do
better under (p*, q*), to consumers they "displace") from these consumers to a another set
of consumers of mass y satisfying
1. @ (v) > v for all v E D
2. If a consumer with generic (with respect to (p*),) valuation v purchases at time t
under (p*, q*),, then every consumer with valuation Q (v) purchases at time t under
(p, q), and (since 4 is measure-preserving) for every t the measure of consumers in the
preimage who purchase at time t under (p*, q*), equals the measure of consumers in
the image who purchase at time t under (p, q),.
3. A consumer in the image of 4 who purchases at time t under (p, q), purchases at some
time t' $ t under (p*,q*)t
Note that each of the consumers in the image of i4 retains under (p*, q*) the option of
purchasing at the same time at which she purchased under (p, q),, because her valuation is
higher than that of the corresponding consumer in the preimage, so since she does not do
so it must either be that she purchases at a time t' at which she could not purchase under
(p*, q*)t and receives a higher payoff under (p*, q*), or that t = t*, in which case purchasing
at t has become less attractive. That is, if a consumer is in the image of @4, then either he
is also in D (the preimage of V)) or he purchases at t* under (p, q), but not under (p* q*),.
Iterating the procedure of constructing such a measure-preserving injection from consumers
who purchase at different times under (p*, q*), and (p, q) and receive higher payoffs under
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(p*, q*)t to the consumers they "displace" implies that there are y consumer who did not
purchase at t* under (p, q), who do purchase at t* under (p*, q*), that all of them receive
higher payoffs under (p*, q*), than under (p, q),, and that a measure-preserving bijection
satisfying 1 through 3 exists between the set of consumers who receive a higher payoff under
(p*, q*), than under (p, q), and the set of consumers who purchase at t* under (p, q), who do
not purchase at t* under (p*, q*)t.
By the preceding paragraph, the measure of consumers who purchase at t* under (p, q),
who do not purchase at t* under (p*, q*), is at least p. Since all consumers who purchase
at t*t under (p*, q*)t but not under (p, q), receive a higher payoff under (p*, q*), it follows
that every consumer who purchases at t* under (p, q)t has a higher valuation than any of
these consumers, and therefore has a higher valuation than any consumer who receives a
higher payoff under (p*, q*), than under (p, q)t. Therefore, every consumer who purchases
at t* under (p, q), but not under (p*, q*)t prefers to purchase at any T satisfying p, > 0 to
never purchasing. Furthermore, suppose that mass E of such consumers, with valuations
with infimum v, purchase at time 'i satisfying p, = 0 under (p*, q*),. Then there must
exist mass E of consumers each with valuation strictly less than v who purchase at 'i under
(p, q), but not under (p*, q*),. Consider such a consumer with valuation v' < v, fix any T
satisfying PT > 0, and suppose towards a contradiction that v' < PT. We have that v > pT,
a consumer with valuation v prefers purchasing at time i and price p, to purchasing at time
T and price pT (by revealed preference at (p*, q*)t, since there is no rationing at T under
(p*, q*),), and a consumer with valuation v' also prefers purchasing at time ± and price p,. to
purchasing at time T and price PT (since v' > pt by revealed preference at (p, q), and v' < PT
by assumption). Now there also exists a consumer who purchases at time r and price pT
under (p, q), and obtains a higher payoff under (p*, q*),, since yT > 0. Such a consumer
must have valuation v" E [PT, v), so v" > v', which implies that such a consumer has the
option of purchasing at 7 under (p, q),. Therefore, such a consumer must prefer purchasing
at time T and price PT to purchasing at time i and price p,. Thus, the assumption that
V' < PT < v" < v yields a violation of single-crossing. Therefore, each of the t consumers
who purchases at t* under (p, q), but not under (p*, q*), either purchases at a r such that
PT > 0 under (p*, q*) or else displaces another consumer who prefers to purchase at any
189
such T to never purchasing. So the measure of consumers who purchase at some (finite)
time under (p*, q*), must weakly exceed the measure of consumers who purchase at some
time under (p, q),. Since Q*. = Qt-, this implies that Et 1t Q* > Eit Qt, completing the
proof that profit is higher under (p*, q*) than under (p, q)t.
It remains only to check that there exists a full-delivery PBE with price-rationing path
(p*, q*)t. This follows from the fact that there exists a full-delivery PBE with price-rationing
path (p, q),, because, since Q* = Qt for all t and p* > pt for all t, the seller's gain from nonde-
livery is the same in every period under (p*, q*), as under (p, q)t, and her gain from delivery
is weakly higher in every period under (p*, q*)t, in a strategy profile in which consumers
expect the seller to never deliver in the future if she does not deliver in the current period.
U
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose that (p*, q*), is a best full-delivery PBE price-rationing
path in FR. Consider the following strategy profile in F, which I denote by J:
1. The seller sets price path (p*)t and xt 1 as long as she has conformed to this strategy
in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt V, x, = 0 for all future periods. In particular,
the seller sets xt = 0 in any period in which she has set pt -/ p*.
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at r accepts at T
if and only if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and r E
arg max, 6t (v - p*)97.
To establish that a is a PBE, first observe that a consumer with valuation v receives the
same payoff V under o as under any full-delivery PBE with price-rationing path (p*, q*),
in FR. This follows because, since no rationing occurs along (p*, q*), in FR (by Propo-
sition 13) and the path of play does not depend on an individual consumer's actions, a
consumer with generic valuation v facing (p*, q*), in FR purchases at time r if and only
if T E arg maxt 6t (v - p*) in any full-delivery PBE. Furthermore, if valuation v is generic
with respect to (p*)t, then the payoff of a consumer with valuation v uniquely determines her
9 7The case where there are multiple maximizers is irrelevant, as this is occurs for a set of measure zero
consumers.
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purchase time. Therefore, (Q)t is the same under any full-delivery PBE with price-rationing
path (p*, q*), in FR as under T.
Next, note that if the seller ever sets p, # p*, she receives zero continuation payoff.
Since this is her minmax value in FR, she cannot receive continuation payoff strictly less
than this in the continuation game from T + 1 onward in FR under a full-delivery PBE with
price-rationing path (p*, q*)t. Now we have seen that (Q), is the same in any full-delivery
PBE with price-rationing path (p*, q*)t in FR as in a, and by construction (p)t is the same
as well, so the seller's on-path continuation payoff from T + 1 onward must be the same,
too, so in particular this continuation payoff must be nonnegative. This implies that setting
p, # p* on-path is not a profitable deviation. Similarly, the fact that setting qt = q* is
optimal on-path along (p*, q*), implies that setting qt = q* is optimal on-path in a, because
the cost of delivery and on-path continuation values are identical, while the payoff of zero
that results from deviating from the equilibrium path in a is at least as bad as the payoff
from deviating in any PBE of FR. Also, the seller's off-path play is optimal because off-path
price-setting does not affect her payoffs and off-path delivery imposes a positive cost at no
benefit.
I next check that each consumer's play is optimal. It is again obvious that his off-path
play is optimal, as paying is costly and yields no benefit when the seller sets qt = 0. That
his on-path play is optimal follows from the fact that the seller's strategy is full-delivery. So
a is a full-delivery PBE of F.
The above argument shows that if a price-quantity path (p, Q)t is a best full-delivery
PBE price-quantity path in FR, then it is also a best full-delivery PBE price-quantity path
in F. For the converse, suppose that (p*, Q*), is a full-delivery PBE price-quantity path in
F. Consider the following strategy profile in FR:
1. The seller sets price path (p*), and qt = 1, xt = 1, as long as she has conformed to
this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt =t, qt = 1, and Xt = 0 for all future
periods. In particular, the seller sets x, = 0 in any period in which has set pt # p*.
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at T pays at T
if and only if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and T E
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arg maxt 6' (v - p*).
It is easy to check that this is a PBE in FR. Furthermore, since no other players condition
play on an individual consumer's actions, a consumer with generic valuation v purchases at
time r under this strategy profile if and only if a consumer with this valuation purchases at
T in any full-delivery PBE in F with price-quantity path (p*, Q*),. This implies that the
mass of consumers who purchase at each period under this profile is the same as the mass
of consumers who purchase at each period in any full-delivery PBE in F with price-quantity
path (p*, Q*), which then implies that the seller's profit under this strategy profile is the
same as under any full-delivery PBE in F with price-quantity path (p*, Q*) ,. This completes
the proof. m
4.10 Appendix B: Non-Full-Delivery Equilibria
This appendix considers non-full-delivery PBE of the relational contracting model of Section
4.5. I conjecture that optimal PBE of F are not fully-delivery PBE, though the difference
in payoff between an optimal PBE and a best full-delivery PBE must converge to 0 as 6
converges to 1, as argued in the text. This is because setting x < 1 allows the seller to sell
to some lower-valuation consumers before higher-valuation consumers. This may be useful
for the seller, as selling to low-valuation consumers before high-valuation consumers may be
a way of increasing continuation payoffs without increasing quantity sold today, allowing the
seller to sell more quickly.
While a complete analysis of optimal (non-full-delivery) PBE is outside the scope of the
paper, I show here that analogues of parts 3 and 4 of Theorem 10 for non-full-delivery PBE
can be established without reference to the model with rationing. I view these results as
complementary to those in the text, because full-delivery PBE are of particular interest
for reasons discussed in the text. The results in this Appendix do not establish that full-
delivery equilibria exist that yield profits close to static monopoly profits; I do not know how
to establish this result without using the connection to the model with rationing developed
in Section 4.5.
Intuitively, one can prove analogues of parts 3 and 4 of Theorem 10 directly for non-full-
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delivery PBE because one can use non-delivery to substitute for rationing. That is, instead
of using rationing to ensure that only fraction y of those consumers who demand the good
at price pt at time t are allowed to purchase at t, the seller can charge -ypt to each of these
consumers in exchange for delivering the good to each of them with probability -y. With
this idea in hand, the proof of parts 3 and 4 of Theorem 10 follows easily from the proof of
Proposition 15 in Section 4.6:
Proposition 20 There exists a strategy profile in 1, that is a non-full-delivery PBE for high
enough 6 under which the seller's payoff converges to her static monopoly payoff as o - 1.
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile:
1. The seller sets pt = ypm, xt -y for all t, for y an arbitrary positive constant less than
1, as long as she has conformed to this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = V,
xt = 0 for all future periods, and in particular sets xt = 0 in any period in which has
set pt # YPm .
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good pays if and only if
v > pm and the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy.
At any period t along the equilibrium path, a consumer with valuation v < pm has
continuation value 0, while a consumer with valuation v > pm who has not yet received the
good has continuation value 1 _ (v - pm) < 1-3(1-i) (v - pm), so every consumer's play
is optimal by the one-shot deviation principle. It is clear that the seller's off-path play and
on-path price setting is optimal. It remains only check that the seller has an incentive to
deliver the good along the equilibrium path. This condition is
-((1 - 2 )t+ pt+T - 7(1 - )t+ c) > y (1 - 7)t c for all t > 0.
T=1
For any t, this can be rewritten as inequality (43). Now if 6 > c/pm then there exists a posi-
tive y that satisfies (43). The above strategy profile then yields profit D(p m )(pm -
c) for the seller, which converges to D(pm)(pm - c) as 6 converges to 1. *
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For the analogue of part 4 of Theorem 10 for non-full-delivery PBE, I argue as in the
discussion following Proposition 15. Consider the strategy profile where the seller fixes the
price of a -y chance of receiving the good at some given yp. Recall that
6p - c
Y*(p) 
--
By the same argument that led to (43), -y*(p) is the greatest probability of receiving the
good that the seller can credibly offer at price ),* (p)p in a PBE with fixed price and delivery
probability. The best PBE profit for the seller with a constant price path at yp and a
constant sales rate -y is therefore
- * (P) D (p) (p - c),1 - 6(1 - -Y*(p))/
which can be rewritten as
(P - c)D(p).
Therefore, if the seller sets pt = yp" (' ) and xt =y* (p"m ()) - pm(3) for all t on3 6pm ( E)
the equilibrium path, and off-path play is given as in the strategy profile in the proof of
Proposition 20, the seller's profit is equal to the static monopoly profit when cost equals c/S.
Finally, the seller can achieve a strictly higher payoff than this by slightly raising price and
delivery probability early on while keeping quantity delivered constant in every period, in
analogy with the discussion preceding Proposition 16.
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